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ABSTRACT 
Governance of transboundary water systems is complicated by factors such as institutional 
fragmentation, social and environmental change, competing values for and uses of water and 
power dynamics. These challenges exist in both international and federal transboundary contexts, 
although much of the scholarly attention has been on international transboundary watersheds. 
Sustainable transboundary water governance is an important goal given the fact that freshwater 
ecosystems are among the most rapidly degrading in the world. Governance, the ways in which 
decisions are made and implemented, can have a critical role to enable sustainability in 
transboundary watersheds. Many analyses of transboundary water systems provide only partial 
accounts of transboundary water governance because they focus primarily on the roles of 
governments and interjurisdictional institutions. Furthermore, analyses of federal transboundary 
water systems have not satisfactorily considered the role of power dynamics as possible 
constraints on transboundary water governance. Appreciation of the full complexity of 
transboundary water governance, and factors that constrain and enable sustainable transboundary 
water governance, requires considering governance processes at multiple levels and the variety of 
actors that may be involved therein. A power-analysis can facilitate consideration of which 
interests are advantaged in various governance processes that have implications for sustainable 
transboundary water governance.   
The purpose of this study is to explore factors that constrain and enable sustainable 
transboundary water governance in a federal transboundary water system. Explicitly assessing 
multi-level governance processes, and the ways in which power dynamics impact them, facilitates 
a consideration of their roles and contribution to transboundary water governance. This study’s 
purpose is achieved via the following objectives: 1) identify the jurisdictional levels at which 
federal transboundary water governance takes place in the Mackenzie River Basin, (MRB), 
Canada; 2) consider the design and performance of an interjurisdictional river basin organization 
(RBO) in the MRB; 3) determine the ways in which power dynamics impact a) collaboration and 
b) water use decisions within jurisdictions in the MRB; and 4) assess the role and contribution of 
a) an RBO, b) collaboration and c) water use decisions within jurisdictions to transboundary 
water governance within the MRB. Single and multiple case studies and qualitative data 
collection and analysis methods were used to achieve these objectives. Two hundred and ninety-
six documents, 30 interviews and personal observations were collected and analyzed to achieve 
the study objectives.  
The MRB, a jurisdictionally and ecologically complex federal transboundary system in 
which three provinces, three territories, a federal government and Indigenous governments have 
responsibilities for water, provided an excellent empirical context in which to explore these 
issues. Upstream hydroelectric developments and oil sands mining have emerged as key 
transboundary concerns in this basin. The multiple perspectives, values, interests and power 
dynamics among key actors in the basin challenge governance that contributes to sustainability. 
Furthermore, as a basin that at 1.8 million km
2
 that drains approximately 20% of Canada’s land 
mass, a multi-level governance design is essential to achieving coordination and inclusion 
required to enable sustainable transboundary water governance. In fact, a number of multi-level 
governance initiatives, including an interjurisdictional water management institution, 
collaborations at various levels and major water use decisions, exist within and among 
jurisdictions in the basin. They are included as case studies in this dissertation.  
By considering multi-level governance processes and the ways in which power dynamics 
impact federal transboundary water systems, this study makes two major contributions to the 
transboundary water governance literature. First, it demonstrates the need to consider large 
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transboundary water systems as systems of multi-level governance. Considering the ways in 
which governance processes at multiple levels interact may be key to identifying factors that 
constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance. Second, by undertaking a 
power analysis of a federal transboundary water context this study directly challenges 
assumptions in the literature that the presence of a central government or well-developed 
regulations within federal jurisdictions can temper federal water conflicts. This study’s 
assessment of the design and performance of an interjurisdictional institution, the ways in which 
power dynamics impact collaboration and water use decisions and consideration of the roles and 
contributions of multi-level governance processes in a federal transboundary water governance 
context provide empirical contributions to the transboundary water governance literature. The 
assessment of how power impacts collaboration in transboundary contexts adds a theoretical and 




I was fortunate to have the company, advice and support of a great many people during the 
completion of this project. I am grateful to those who agreed to be interviewed for this study – 
their participation enriched this work and helped me to gain a much more nuanced understanding 
of the politics of transboundary water governance. My supervisor, Rob de Loë, provided support, 
advice, laughs and the occasional bit of chocolate that proved invaluable to the completion of this 
thesis. The perspectives and suggestions provided by committee members Derek Armitage, Ian 
Rowlands and Larry Swatuk made this a stronger piece of work. The external examiner, Peter 
Clancy, provided insight that helped to strengthen the analysis presented in this final version of 
my dissertation. Wonderful peers and colleagues helped to make this a fun as well as educational 
journey. Thanks to the 2011 PhD cohort and my colleagues in the Water Policy and Governance 
Group. To my good friend Adriane MacDonald – we did it! Working on this degree would have 
been a great deal more difficult and much less interesting without your friendship. Soccer 
provided a much needed break from academics during my years in Kitchener-Waterloo - thanks 
to my many teammates and especially to the Rangers and Dragons. My parents Ben and Brenda 
Morris provided their unconditional support and a willingness to pick me up at any and all hours 
at the Calgary airport. Thanks also to my siblings, grandparents and extended family for their 
support. I enjoyed the (somewhat captive) company of my son, August, during the final months 
of completing this work. He provided an extra bit of motivation to get writing. Finally, my 
partner, Mathieu, knew that I would complete this degree even when I had serious doubts. I 
cannot imagine how it would have been possible without his love, support and encouragement . . . 
and perhaps also his willingness to discuss water governance with me at any time (including 
Friday nights and weekends) for several years. Thank you all! 
 viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ........................................................................................................ ii 
STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS ......................................................................................... iii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ v 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ vii 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. xii 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... xiii 
List of Boxes ................................................................................................................................. xiv 
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... xv 
1 Chapter One  Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Research context and problem rationale .................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research objectives .................................................................................................. 5 
1.3 Literature review ...................................................................................................... 9 
1.3.1 Transboundary water governance .................................................................. 10 
1.3.2 Collaborative environmental governance ...................................................... 15 
1.3.3 Theories of power .......................................................................................... 18 
1.3.4 Sustainability .................................................................................................. 20 
1.3.5 Summary ........................................................................................................ 22 
1.4 Empirical context: the Mackenzie River Basin ...................................................... 23 
1.5 Methods.................................................................................................................. 31 
1.5.1 Frameworks .................................................................................................... 32 
1.5.2 Case study design ........................................................................................... 36 
1.5.3 Data collection ............................................................................................... 41 
1.5.4 Data analysis .................................................................................................. 44 
 ix 
1.6 Organization of thesis ............................................................................................ 46 
2 Chapter Two  Cooperative and adaptive transboundary water governance in Canada’s 
Mackenzie River Basin: status and prospects ................................................................................ 48 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 48 
2.2 Case and context .................................................................................................... 50 
2.3 Politics, strategies and institutional design ............................................................ 55 
2.4 Performance of the MRBB as a coordinating river basin organization ................. 60 
2.4.1 Coordination .................................................................................................. 61 
2.4.2 Accountability ................................................................................................ 64 
2.4.3 Legitimacy ..................................................................................................... 65 
2.4.4 Environmental effectiveness .......................................................................... 66 
2.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 66 
3 Chapter Three  A power analysis of the role of collaboration in transboundary water 
governance in Canada’s Mackenzie River Basin ........................................................................... 70 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 70 
3.2 Transboundary water governance, collaboration and power ................................. 71 
3.3 Empirical context: the Mackenzie River Basin ...................................................... 76 
3.4 Methods.................................................................................................................. 78 
3.4.1 Case studies .................................................................................................... 78 
3.4.2 Data collection and analysis ........................................................................... 80 
3.5 Findings.................................................................................................................. 81 
3.5.1 The ability to prevail in decisions .................................................................. 81 
3.5.2 Agenda-setting power .................................................................................... 83 
3.5.3 Discursive power............................................................................................ 88 
3.6 Multi-level collaborations in a transboundary context ........................................... 89 
3.7 Discussion and conclusion ..................................................................................... 91 
 x 
4 Chapter Four  A power-analysis of federal transboundary water governance: water use 
decisions in upstream jurisdictions as constraints on sustainability .............................................. 94 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 94 
4.2 Transboundary water governance, levels and power ............................................. 95 
4.3 Empirical context: the Peace and Athabasca Rivers ............................................ 100 
4.4 Methods................................................................................................................ 104 
4.4.1 Case studies .................................................................................................. 105 
4.4.2 Data collection and analysis ......................................................................... 109 
4.5 Results .................................................................................................................. 110 
4.5.1 The power to prevail in decisions ................................................................ 110 
4.5.2 The power to set the agenda ......................................................................... 111 
4.5.3 The power of ideas ....................................................................................... 116 
4.6 Analysis and discussion ....................................................................................... 118 
4.6.1 Power dynamics and sustainable transboundary water governance ............. 119 
4.6.2 Assessing power-related challenges within federations by analyzing internal 
water use decisions .............................................................................................................. 122 
4.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 123 
5 Chapter Five  Conclusion .................................................................................................... 124 
5.1 Purpose and objectives ......................................................................................... 124 
5.2 Major findings ...................................................................................................... 125 
5.3 Contributions ........................................................................................................ 131 
5.3.1 Academic contributions ............................................................................... 131 
5.3.2 Recommendations for practice ..................................................................... 137 
5.4 Study limitations and ideas for future research .................................................... 142 
5.5 Research reflections ............................................................................................. 145 
6 Chapter Six .......................................................................................................................... 147 
 xi 
6.1 Semi-structured interview guide questions .......................................................... 147 
6.2 List of documents reviewed ................................................................................. 150 
References Cited .......................................................................................................................... 171 
 xii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1: Research objectives, corresponding chapters & outcomes ............................................. 7 
Table 1.2: Governance principles for sustainability: criteria and evaluative questions ................. 21 
Table 1.3: Population and GDP in provinces and territories in the MRB and Canada as a whole 25 
Table 1.4: IAD framework rules and indicators ............................................................................ 33 
Table 1.5: RBO performance criteria ............................................................................................. 34 
Table 1.6: Power analysis framework ............................................................................................ 35 
Table 1.7: Case study selection criteria ......................................................................................... 37 
Table 1.8: Interviews by background and case .............................................................................. 43 
Table 2.1: Rules underlying the institutional design of the Master Agreement and the Mackenzie 
River Basin Board .......................................................................................................................... 56 
Table 3.1: Power indicators ........................................................................................................... 75 
Table 4.1: Power indicators ........................................................................................................... 98 
Table 4.2: Governance principles for sustainability: criteria and evaluative questions ................. 99 
Table 4.3: Summary of power analysis findings .......................................................................... 120 
 xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1: The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada .......................................................................... 24 
Figure 2.1: The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada .......................................................................... 51 
Figure 3.1: The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada .......................................................................... 77 
Figure 4.1: The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada ........................................................................ 101 
 xiv 
LIST OF BOXES 




 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACFN – Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation 
BCUC – British Columbia Utilities Commission 
BMC – Bilateral Management Committee 
CEMA – Cumulative Environmental Management Association 
EA – Environmental assessment 
ENGO – Environmental non-governmental organization 
Framework – Surface Water Quantity Framework for the Lower Athabasca Region 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
IAD – Institutional Analysis and Development 
JRP – Joint Review Panel 
Master Agreement – 1997 Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement 
MCFN – Mikisew Cree First Nation 
MRBB – Mackenzie River Basin Board 
MRBC – Mackenzie River Basin Committee 
MRB – Mackenzie River Basin 
NWT – Northwest Territories 
P2FC – Phase 2 Framework Committee 
PAD – Peace-Athabasca Delta 
PADEMP – Peace-Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program 
RBO – River Basin Organization 
SRDP – Slave River and Delta Partnership 
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
 1 
1 Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Research context and problem rationale 
Freshwater ecosystems are among the most rapidly degrading in the world (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Vörösmarty, et al. 2010), making sustainable water governance, 
which supports human well-being and ecosystem integrity, a pressing practical problem. Water 
crises related to pollution and overuse often stem from problems of governance, such as 
fragmentation or sector-specific valuation of water (Pahl-Wostl, et al. 2012). Governance, which 
involves decision-making and taking action in a range of activities such as monitoring, planning, 
coordinating and policy development and implementation, has an integral role to encourage 
sustainability (Newell 2012). Although there is no universal blueprint to achieve sustainable 
water governance, criteria such as transparency, inclusiveness, integration, adaptiveness and 
fairness can be used to measure progress toward sustainability (Lockwood, et al. 2010).   
In transboundary water systems, where watersheds are intersected by international and/or 
federal political boundaries, achieving sustainability can be made difficult by institutional 
fragmentation, competing values for and uses of water, sovereignty, social and environmental 
change and power dynamics (Armitage, et al. 2015). Furthermore, transboundary water 
governance can be complicated by multi-level governance processes that involve a range of 
governmental and non-governmental actors at various levels (e.g., local, regional, basin-wide) in 
different kinds of governance activities (e.g., local monitoring, regional land use planning, policy 
development, intergovernmental agreements) (Cosens 2010; Dore and Lebel 2010; Suhardiman 
and Giordano 2014). These kinds of challenges exist for both international and federal 
transboundary systems (Burchi 2008; Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009; Garrick, et al. 2014).  
Much of the transboundary water governance literature focuses on international 
transboundary water systems, but there are over 300 watersheds around the world intersected by 
federal borders that provide rich empirical contexts for research (Garrick, et al. 2013). Federal 
countries, defined by the division of powers between elected and relatively autonomous central 
and sub-federal governments (Anderson 2008), can also be challenged to achieve sustainable 
transboundary water governance. Research and analysis that can provide insights on the factors 
that constrain and enable governance that contributes to sustainability in federal transboundary 
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water systems can help to address the problem of increasing water degradation. This research, by 
investigating a federal transboundary water context, is a step in that direction. 
Understanding factors that constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water 
governance requires consideration of the multiple levels at which governance processes involving 
monitoring, planning, coordinating and decision-making occur. Multi-level governance includes 
federal political systems, in which authority is distributed among general purpose, territorially-
based levels of government, as well as governance arrangements that involve governmental and 
non-governmental actors at various levels (Hooghe and Marks 2003). The latter kind of multi-
level governance reflects the proliferation of multi-actor environmental governance arrangements 
across scales and levels (Andonova and Mitchell 2010; Newell, et al. 2012). Transboundary 
water governance takes place across scales and levels, and may involve a variety of governmental 
and non-governmental actors (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Cosens 2010; Dore and Lebel 2010; 
Zawahri and Hensengerth 2012). Scale is the “spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical 
dimensions used to measure and study any phenomenon” whereas level refers to “the units of 
analysis that are located at different positions on a scale” (Cash, et al. 2006). The geographic 
scale is often paramount in water governance. The river basin, which can be segmented into sub-
basin levels, often is considered the desirable scale at which to coordinate transboundary water 
governance (Cooley and Gleick 2011; Grey and Sadoff 2003; Kliot, et al. 2001). However, the 
jurisdictional scale – which refers to how authority to make environmental governance decisions 
is distributed – is also pertinent.  Interjurisdictional agreements and institutions, resource 
management decisions made by different levels of government, as well as multi-actor 
environmental governance arrangements (Weibust 2014a), are governance activities at different 
jurisdictional levels that can impact federal transboundary water governance.  
An emerging literature acknowledges that governance takes place in transboundary water 
systems at multiple levels (Suhardiman and Giordano 2012), and this characteristic can enable 
adaptiveness in transboundary water systems (Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008), which 
is a key component of sustainable transboundary water governance. However, much of the extant 
transboundary water governance literature focuses on one level in particular: the 
interjurisdictional. The transboundary water governance literature also tends to focus on the role 
of governments specifically (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Norman and Bakker 2008). There is a 
large body of scholarship that assesses interjurisdictional agreements and institutions. Within this 
research, river basin organizations (RBOs), interjurisdictional institutions that coordinate 
governance at the scale of the river basin, are considered key contributors to adaptive 
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transboundary water governance (Cooley and Gleick 2011; De Stefano, et al. 2012; Green, et al. 
2013). However, RBOs throughout the world vary significantly in terms of form and functions 
(Huitema and Meijerink 2014), which makes it necessary to assess, in detail, their actual designs 
and performance. Assessing their performance may also require considering the ways in which 
interjurisdictional arrangements such as RBOs coexist with other multi-level governance 
arrangements. For example, governance arrangements in transboundary systems may include 
collaborative forms of governance, which emphasize resource sharing, learning and problem 
solving among interdependent government and non-governmental actors (Gray 1989; Holley, et 
al. 2012) at various levels. In transboundary systems, collaborative forms of governance may also 
contribute to adaptiveness and problem solving among actors with different interests and 
perspectives (Birdsong 2008; Raadgever, et al. 2008).  
Research that focuses solely on one level of governance, such as interjurisdictional 
institutions, provides only a partial account of transboundary water governance. Understanding 
the roles and functions of multi-level governance arrangements may be critical to illuminating the 
factors that constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance. Undertaking such 
an analysis requires in-depth investigations of the roles (e.g., coordinating, policy-making, 
information generation, resource use decisions) of interjurisdictional arrangements between and 
among governments, and the governance processes (e.g., community based monitoring, 
intergovernmental partnerships, intergovernmental agreements, resource use decisions) that occur 
at local and regional levels, such as collaboration or decision-making that takes place within 
jurisdictions in a transboundary system.  
The extent to which governance contributes to sustainability is often related to existing 
power dynamics (Newell 2012). Power, defined as the ability to create or prevent change (Sayer 
2012), or more generally as the ability to achieve preferable outcomes (Lukes 2005) can be 
distributed inequitably in transboundary basins (Zeitoun and Warner 2006).  Power dynamics 
have been identified as crucial considerations for understanding transboundary water interactions 
at the international level (Zeitoun, et al. 2011), but there has been relatively little attention given 
to the role of power in federal transboundary water systems. Furthermore, much of the power-
concerned research neglects to consider the roles of non-governmental actors or governance 
processes beyond interjurisdictional level interactions (Lopes 2012).  
 In federal countries where the responsibility for water is highly decentralized, sub-federal 
governments may be as protective of their autonomy to make resource management decisions as 
countries in the international context (Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009). Factors such as 
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jurisdictional autonomy, unequal populations, asymmetries in financial and technical resources 
and upstream-downstream dynamics, can complicate achieving sustainability in federal 
transboundary water systems, as they do in the international context. Consider conflicts between 
sub-federal governments in India regarding hydropower development (Iyer 2013), or water 
allocation conflicts between states in the United States and Australia (Bhat 2009; Draper 2007; 
Weibust 2014b). These examples suggest that power dynamics also are at play in federal 
transboundary water systems. Important contextual differences exist between international and 
federal transboundary water systems. However, acknowledging that there are differences does not 
imply that federal systems are not prone to challenges that emerge because power dynamics, such 
as differences in the capacities to prevail in decisions, determine decision-making agendas or 
construct/impose dominant ideas among actors involved in federal transboundary water 
governance.  
The fact that much of the power-concerned transboundary water governance literature tends 
to focus on interjurisdictional level interactions is also problematic from a perspective that views 
multi-level governance processes as important in transboundary water systems (Warner and 
Zawahri 2012). Governments are not monolithic entities, and there is no guarantee that a central 
government will intervene to resolve sub-federal disputes in federal transboundary water systems 
even when it possesses the authority to do so (Saunders 2014). Federal transboundary water 
contexts are inherently multi-level systems (Weibust 2014a). Sub-federal governments may enter 
into interjurisdictional agreements but retain significant political authority for waters that flow 
within their borders. Sub-federal governments may transfer responsibilities to or be involved in 
local and regional governance initiatives with non-governmental actors, such as collaboration, 
that can potentially impact transboundary water governance outcomes. However, power 
dynamics, such as the ability to set the agenda or have ultimate authority over policy decisions, 
may constrain the contributions collaboration can make in transboundary contexts, as has been 
shown in other contexts (Brisbois and de Loë 2016; Cook 2015). A power-based analysis can 
help to reveal who prevails, who sets the agenda and which actors benefit from underlying ideas 
in multi-level governance processes in transboundary systems. Such an analysis can facilitate a 
consideration of the role of multi-level governance processes in transboundary water governance 
by highlighting the outcomes they achieve, and interests advantaged in governance processes and 
outcomes. Insight derived from such analysis can assist in assessing the extent to which 
governance contributes to sustainability.  
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1.2 Research objectives 
Understanding how power dynamics impact federal transboundary water governance can provide 
critical empirical and theoretical insight that may help to illuminate a path toward sustainability in 
federal transboundary water systems. Assessing the roles and contributions of governance 
activities can provide a more comprehensive consideration of federal transboundary water 
governance. Such research can also make substantive contributions to the literature, which has 
tended to focus on interjurisdictional interactions and international transboundary water 
governance contexts. In light of the above, the purpose of my research is to assess factors that 
constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance. A power analysis is useful for 
identifying factors that constrain sustainability and the roles that various governance processes 
play in transboundary water systems. My research purpose is achieved by fulfilling the following 
objectives.  
1. Identify the jurisdictional levels at which federal transboundary water governance takes 
place in the Mackenzie River Basin (MRB), Canada. 
2. Consider the design and performance of an interjurisdictional RBO, the Mackenzie River 
Basin Board (MRBB), in the MRB. 
3. Determine the ways in which first-, second- and third-dimensional power dynamics, 
according to Lukes (2005), impact a) collaboration and b) water use decisions within 
jurisdictions in the MRB.  
4. Consider the role and contribution of a) the MRBB, b) collaboration and c) water use 
decisions within jurisdictions to sustainable transboundary water governance in the MRB.  
These objectives, and the overall research purpose, are accomplished using transboundary 
water governance in the Mackenzie River Basin (MRB), Canada, as an empirical setting. The 
MRB is a large, transboundary basin in northwestern Canada. It is both jurisdictionally and 
ecologically complex. Three provinces, three territories, a federal government and Indigenous 
peoples have jurisdiction for water in the basin, which contains some of the last remaining 
relatively pristine wilderness on the North American continent (Rosenberg International Forum 
on Water Policy 2013). However, the basin also hosts some of the largest resource development 
projects currently underway in Canada. More detailed information about this context is developed 
in section 1.4. 
Through completing these objectives, this research makes substantive theoretical and 
empirical contributions to the transboundary water governance literature and collaborative 
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environmental governance literatures. Importantly, the research objectives build upon and speak 
to one another. Linkages among research objectives, their individual and cross-cutting 
contributions, and chapters of this dissertation that address each objective, are summarized in 
Table 1.1 and detailed below.  
Addressing Objective 1 resulted in a focus on an interjurisdictional RBO, collaboration and 
water use decisions as empirical foci to achieve Objectives 2, 3 and 4. Achieving Objective 2 
with respect to an interjurisdictional RBO reinforced the need to consider governance processes 
at multiple levels and the ways in which power dynamics may impact those processes, as 
identified in Objective 3. The assessment of the design and performance of an interjurisdictional 
institution and the ways in which power dynamics impact collaboration and water use decisions 
facilitated a consideration of the roles and contribution of these governance processes to 
transboundary water governance in an empirical context.  
Achieving Objective 2 addresses a gap in the transboundary water governance literature 
regarding the actual design and performance of RBOs based on a detailed assessment of an 
empirical case. Much of the transboundary water governance literature identifies RBOs as key 
enablers of adaptive transboundary water governance (Cooley and Gleick 2011; De Stefano, et al. 
2012). However, the actual design and performance of RBOs can vary significantly (Huitema and 
Meijerink 2014), making in-depth case studies helpful to determining the extent to which they 
contribute to adaptive and sustainable transboundary water governance.  
Objective 3 helps to illuminate the ways in which power dynamics related to prevailing in 
decisions, determining agendas and benefiting from underlying ideas impact federal 
transboundary water governance in general, and simultaneously reveals specific governance 
processes that take place within federations. Power dynamics are key considerations for 
international transboundary water governance, but existing scholarship tends to focus on the 
interjurisdictional level and interactions between countries (Lopes 2012). Furthermore, less is 
known about how inequalities in the ability to achieve preferable outcomes among governance 
actors impact federal transboundary water governance. However, based on existing controversies 
about federal transboundary water governance related to pollution, over-abstraction and 
fragmentation, it is clear that power politics may be a constraint on governance that contributes to 
sustainability. Objective 3 a) facilitates a theoretical and empirical contribution to the 
collaborative environmental governance literature, which has tended to avoid detailed power-
based analyses (Brisbois and de Loë 2015). It also requires considering the role of collaboration 
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Table 1.1: Research objectives, corresponding chapters & outcomes 
Research objectives Chapter(s) Objective-specific outcomes Cross-cutting outcomes 
1: Identify the jurisdictional 
levels at which federal 
transboundary water 





Identification of a) an 
interjurisdictional river basin 
organization b) collaboration 
and c) water use decisions as 
case studies for analysis. 
Identification and consid-
eration of multi-level 
governance processes 




An assessment of the 
ways in which multi-level 
governance processes 
constrain and enable sus-
tainable transboundary 
water governance in a 
federal transboundary 
water system. 
2: Consider the design and 
performance of an 
interjurisdictional river basin 
organization in a federal 
transboundary context. 
Two Detailed assessment of the 
design and performance of an 
existing river basin 
organization. 
Confirmation of the need to 
consider how power 
dynamics impact multi-level 
governance processes as 
detailed in Objectives 3 and 
4.  
3: Determine the ways in 
which power dynamics 
impact a) collaboration and 
b) water use decisions within 
jurisdictions. 
Three 3a) Assessment of the ways 
in which power dynamics 
impact collaboration, which 
reinforced the need to 
consider how power 
dynamics impact major water 
use decisions within 
jurisdictions. 
3a) Consideration of how 
power impacts collaboration 
in transboundary contexts. 
Application of a power 
analysis framework to a 
federal transboundary water 
governance context. 
Four 3b) Power analysis of major 
water use decisions internal to 
jurisdictions in transboundary 
water systems. 
Application of a power 
analysis framework to a 
federal transboundary water 
governance context. 
4: Consider the role and 
contribution of a) a river 
basin organization, b) 
collaboration and c) water 
use decisions within 
jurisdictions to transboundary 





Assessment of the ways in 
which multi-level governance 
processes constrain and 
enable sustainable 
transboundary water 




in federal transboundary basins, which can provide necessary empirical insight to the 
transboundary water governance literature concerned with adaptiveness and collaboration in 
transboundary contexts.  Objective 3 b) allows for a consideration of the ways in which power 
dynamics within jurisdictions can impact transboundary water governance outcomes in 
federations. This contributes to a growing literature that considers multi-level governance 
processes pertinent to transboundary water governance (Suhardiman and Giordano 2014; Warner 
and Zawahri 2012). The power-analysis framework used to guide analysis to achieve Objective 3 
provides a theoretical contribution to the collaboration and federal transboundary water 
governance literatures. It provides a simple, but rigorous approach to assessing more and less 
obvious manifestations of power in these contexts.  
Achieving Objectives 2 and 3 involved considering the design and performance of an 
interjurisdictional institution and the ways in which power dynamics impact several multi-level 
governance processes in a federal transboundary water system. Undertaking these analyses 
involved assessing the roles and contributions of the various multi-level governance processes to 
transboundary water governance. These assessments, undertaken in Chapters Two, Three and 
Four, address Objective 4 and the broader purpose of this study – to understand factors that 
constrain or enable sustainable transboundary water governance in federations.    
Many scholars working on transboundary water issues have noted that additional nuance 
is required in analyses of transboundary water governance and this can be achieved by 
considering governance processes across scales and levels (Dore and Lebel 2010; Suhardiman 
and Giordano 2012; Warner and Zawahri 2012). By considering multiple levels of governance, 
and factors that constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance, this research is 
able to offer a practical contribution to governance that contributes to sustainability in 
transboundary systems in general and transboundary water governance in Canada’s MRB 
specifically. This research points to the important role of water use decisions made within 
upstream jurisdictions as constraints on sustainable transboundary water governance. 
Furthermore, despite the presence of a diversity of governmental and non-governmental actors in 
multi-level governance arrangements in transboundary water systems, governments remain 
dominant, powerful actors. Collaborations were created in response to, but do not directly 
influence, major water use decisions about development upstream. Finally, considering the design 
and performance of an interjurisdictional institution contextualizes its role. In the MRB, the 
existing interjurisdictional institution, the Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB), has played a 
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relatively marginal, reactive role due to inadequate funding and the hesitance of governments to 
empower it to play a strong role in the basin.   
This dissertation is presented in manuscript-style. Each of Chapters Two, Three and Four 
are interrelated but stand alone as manuscripts intended for publication in academic journals (see 
section 1.6). Chapters Two, Three and Four are guided by research questions, literature, 
theoretical grounding, methods, analysis and conclusions that are specific to each chapter. The 
purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a rationale for considering these chapters as an 
overall conceptual whole, grounded in the study objectives, literature review and global 
methodology that informed this study. Additional contextual information helps to support the 
contention that these chapters can be viewed collectively. The remainder of this chapter reviews 
the literature related to transboundary water governance, collaboration, theories of power and 
sustainability used to inform this study. The empirical context in which this research is situated 
will be described and rationale for and execution of methods used in the course of this research 
will be presented. The final section maps out the remainder of this dissertation. 
1.3 Literature review 
This section presents several key arguments related to the transboundary water governance, 
collaborative environmental governance, theories of power and sustainability literatures that 
informed this study. The following section argues that appreciating the full complexity of federal 
transboundary water governance requires considering multi-level governance processes. 
Governance at local, regional and basin-wide levels can potentially impact transboundary water 
governance outcomes. Multi-level governance processes are especially important to consider as 
factors that may constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance. For instance, 
an emerging theme in some of the transboundary water governance literature is the identification 
of collaboration, which emphasizes inclusion, learning, data sharing and problem-solving, as a 
possible promising approach to governance in transboundary water systems. Although power is a 
central consideration in much of the transboundary water governance literature in the 
international context, less is known about how power impacts federal transboundary contexts. 
Furthermore, the collaboration literature has tended not to include thorough and theory-based 
considerations of how power dynamics impact collaboration. These shortcomings raise questions 
about the potential role of collaboration in federal transboundary water systems. A theory-
informed power analysis can help to reveal the more and less obvious interests advantaged in 
multi-level governance processes in federal transboundary water systems. Finally, principles of 
governance that contributes to sustainability can be used to inform normative assessments 
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regarding the ways in which power dynamics and multi-level governance processes constrain or 
enable sustainable transboundary water governance. 
1.3.1 Transboundary water governance 
Transboundary water governance refers to how decisions are made and actions undertaken 
regarding waters that cross or form international or federal political boundaries. This definition of 
governance includes the roles of government and non-governmental actors and encompasses a 
broad range of activities (Holley, et al. 2012; Pierre and Peters 2000). Governance is sometimes 
used to refer to situations wherein the role of government has been severely diminished, is non-
existent or gives way to post-sovereign forms of political authority (Karkainnen 2004). The 
perspective adopted in this study acknowledges that although the role of governments may be 
changing in many western, liberal democracies, it would be a mistake to assume that governments 
are not still key actors (Newell, et al. 2012; Pierre and Peters 2000). It is important to understand 
and analyse the ways in which non-governmental actors or less traditional forms of governance 
that include non-governmental actors (Hooghe and Marks 2003) coexist or interact with 
traditional governance arrangements wherein governments are perceived to dominate (Skelcher 
2005).    
Despite the fact that a number of actors can be engaged in a variety of governance activities 
that can impact transboundary waters, much of the literature on transboundary water governance 
focuses on one or two particular aspects of transboundary water governance – the role of 
governments and interjurisdictional agreements. This focus is motivated, in part, by assumptions 
that governments are the dominant actors in transboundary water systems (Blatter and Ingram 
2000). It is also informed by a concern that sovereignty – the authority and legitimacy to make 
and implement rules within a given territory without external interference – can complicate 
transboundary water governance. The possibility that sovereignty could lead to the adoption of 
extreme views that a government can do whatever it wishes with resources within its territory 
regardless of consequences to down or upstream neighbours – referred to as the Harmon Doctrine 
or absolute sovereignty (McIntyre 2010) – has led to concern that conflicts over transboundary 
waters could incite ‘water wars’ (Eliasson 2015). In fact, overt conflicts over water occur very 
rarely (Wolf 1998). The dominant trend in transboundary water governance is the application of 
limited sovereignty wherein governments recognize mutual obligations to cooperate and consider 
the needs of their neighbours (McIntyre 2010). Obligations may take the form of commitments to 
exchange information and to notify neighbouring jurisdictions of developments in 
interjurisdictional water management agreements, which may also include commitments to pass 
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on a particular quantity and quality of water (McCaffrey 2007). Therefore, interjurisdictional 
agreements between governments are considered key components of transboundary water 
governance. 
There are important contextual differences between international and federal transboundary 
water systems. However, because they share similar challenges, interjurisdictional water 
management agreements are also considered key governance tools in federations (Burchi 2008; 
Draper 2007; Garrick, et al. 2013; Muys, et al. 2007). Federalism has several characteristics, 
including the division of authority between central and sub-federal governments that are 
democratically elected and possess some autonomy from one another (Anderson 2008). When 
sub-federal governments possess the majority of authority for water, upstream-downstream 
asymmetries, institutional fragmentation and power dynamics may impact transboundary water 
interactions, as they do in the international context (Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009). Therefore, 
much of the transboundary water governance literature that considers governance within 
federations also focuses on the role of agreements among sub-federal governments. 
In recognition of the importance of interjurisdictional water management agreements, a 
substantial literature has been written that identifies desirable features of transboundary water 
management agreements (Cooley and Gleick 2011; Green, et al. 2013; Kliot, et al. 2001; Muys, 
et al. 2007) and factors that encourage the negotiation of agreements (Lindemann 2008; Tir and 
Stinnett 2011). In addition to prescriptions for desirable features of transboundary water 
management agreements, scholarship assesses the actual content of international (Conca, et al. 
2006; De Stefano, et al. 2012; Giordano, et al. 2014; Zawahri, et al. 2014) and federal water 
management agreements (Burchi 2008; Garrick, et al. 2013). In recent years, adaptive 
governance has emerged as a key desirable feature of sustainable transboundary water 
management agreements. Adaptive governance is desirable in recognition that water is a non-
stationary resource (Milly, et al. 2008). Further, social and environmental change may render 
rigid transboundary water management agreements obsolete (Falkenmark and Jägerskog 2010) 
and potentially conflict-prone (Cooley and Gleick 2011). Adaptive approaches to governance 
conceptualize ecosystems as complex adaptive systems characterized by uncertainty, non-
linearity and surprise (Folke, et al. 2005). In response, it is necessary to build capacity to adapt to 
change to avoid conflict and to maintain ecosystem integrity. Institutions that are flexible, nested 
and promote learning may facilitate adaptive governance (Dietz, et al. 2003). 
In the context of transboundary water systems and institutions formed at the 
interjurisdictional level, RBOs are identified in much of the literature as key institutions that may 
 12 
encourage adaptive transboundary water governance (Cooley and Gleick 2011; De Stefano, et al. 
2012; Green, et al. 2013). RBOs, which operate at the scale of the basin, may play key roles in 
coordinating responses to extreme events such as floods and droughts (Cooley and Gleick 2011). 
They may play problem-solving roles that can help to avoid conflicts (Drieschova, et al. 2008). 
RBOs can facilitate information exchange and data sharing between jurisdictions that help to 
ensure well-informed policy responses (Green, et al. 2013) and agreement implementation and 
enforcement (De Stefano, et al. 2012; Muys, et al. 2007). To the extent that RBOs are linked with 
local and regional management institutions, they may facilitate multi-level responses to emerging 
environmental and social challenges that can promote adaptiveness (Akamani and Wilson 2011; 
Raadgever, et al. 2008). While they may have key roles promoting adaptiveness, it is important to 
acknowledge that in practice, RBOs can vary significantly in terms of their actual responsibilities, 
levels of funding, membership and authority (Huitema and Meijerink 2014); these factors can 
significantly impact the roles they assume in transboundary water governance. Therefore, 
assessing the extent to which RBOs actually do contribute to adaptive transboundary water 
governance requires assessing their actual design and performance in context. The Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework (Ostrom 1986; Ostrom, et al. 2014) provides a framework 
to consider, in detail, the formal and informal rules that impact how RBOs operate that can 
facilitate a consideration of the actual design of RBOs. The framework is considered in section 
1.5.1. 
Agreements and formal institutions, such as RBOs, are undoubtedly important aspects of 
transboundary water governance. Agreements can create mutual obligations, expectations, norms 
and institutions that can promote cooperation over transboundary waters. However, an explicit 
focus on agreements as the primary governance mechanism in transboundary water systems can 
be misleading. The presence of an agreement does not guarantee beneficial cooperation or 
effective governance, and neither does the absence of agreement guarantee anarchy, conflict or 
water degradation (Warner and Zawahri 2012). Power analyses of transboundary water 
interactions suggest that conflict and cooperation can coexist, and that agreements can be a 
manifestation of either or both. Zeitoun and Warner’s (2006) framework of hydro-hegemony for 
analyzing power in interactions over transboundary waters, which draws from Gramscian notions 
of hegemony and Lukes’ power theory, emphasizes that developing an agreement is just one of 
the tactics or strategies a powerful jurisdiction may use to secure preferential outcomes. Several 
different sources of power can impact transboundary water interactions, including geographic 
position; material resources, such as financial, technical and military resources; the ability to set 
the agenda through bargaining or stalling negotiations or agreements; and, the ability to construct 
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and impose dominant ideas about how transboundary waters should be managed (Cascão and 
Zeitoun 2010). Power can be expressed in strategies to control water resources via allocation or 
the development of major water use projects despite protests from neighbouring jurisdictions, by 
securing preferential outcomes via agreements or by using power beneficially to develop 
mutually-satisfactory arrangements (Zeitoun, et al. 2011; Zeitoun and Warner 2006). The 
scholarship on power focuses on the international context and conflict-prone regions in the 
Middle East and North Africa in particular. It is also concerned mainly with the role of 
governments (Lopes 2012), as is the transboundary water governance literature in general 
(Akamani and Wilson 2011; Blatter and Ingram 2000). Neglected in the power-concerned 
literature are the roles of non-governmental actors and governance processes that occur at 
multiple levels, including federal water systems. 
Federal water systems are neglected in this literature, because Zeitoun et al. (2011, 164) 
suggest contextual differences between international and federal conflicts mean that  
an inter-state conflict in the rough-and-tumble world of the Middle East 
cannot be understood and addressed in the same way that a water conflict in 
the European Union is, nor can it be readily compared to a sub-national 
water conflict.  
They suggest that the presence of a central government that can intervene in sub-federal water 
disputes, the existence of well-developed regulations within federations and a federal 
government’s monopoly on the legitimate means of military violence, make federal contexts 
significantly different from their international counterparts. However, the significance of these 
differences may not apply equally to all of the world’s 28 federations (Anderson 2008). There is a 
high degree of variability in terms of the decentralization of responsibilities and central 
governments’ willingness to intervene in sub-federal political disputes among federations in the 
world (Anderson 2008). Furthermore, the presence of legislation and regulation does not preclude 
power politics in federal systems. Power dynamics can inform the creation and implementation of 
environmental legislation and regulations in ways that can constrain sustainability and lead to 
undesirable outcomes (Raik, et al. 2008). The final key difference – authority over military 
matters – is significant, and although actual military conflicts are rare the threat of violence is an 
important tactic available to powerful jurisdictions (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). This may 
fundamentally alter how power dynamics impact federal transboundary water systems. However, 
such an admission does not mean that federal systems are immune to power-related challenges– 
only that they may manifest differently. A different framework for power analysis may be 
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necessary for federal transboundary water governance. I will consider such a framework in 
section 1.5.1. 
1.3.1.1 Multi-level transboundary water governance   
Empirical foci on governments and interjurisdictional-level interactions sit uncomfortably with 
acknowledgements and investigations that demonstrate a variety of levels are implicated in 
transboundary water governance (da Silveria and Richards 2013; Dore 2014; Suhardiman and 
Giordano 2012). Multi-level governance can refer to federal political systems as well as 
governance arrangements that involve a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors in 
task-specific activities at various scales and levels (Hooghe and Marks 2003). The latter form of 
multi-level governance is often nested within the institutional frameworks of existing political 
systems, including federations. Understanding how these different levels of governance interact 
and intersect may be critical to appreciating factors that constrain and enable sustainable 
transboundary water governance.   
Studies have demonstrated that non-governmental actors are involved in transboundary 
water governance in a variety of ways (Gerlak 2015; Zawahri and Hensengerth 2012). For 
example, some analyses have suggested that multi-level dynamics in transboundary water 
systems are critical to enabling sustainable transboundary water governance by promoting 
adaptiveness (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Raadgever, et al. 2008). Linking local monitoring 
programs that involve non-governmental actors with higher level policy decisions may enable 
well-informed policy responses that can contribute to adaptive governance in transboundary 
basins (Green, et al. 2013). Deliberative processes that include multiple perspectives that exist at 
a variety of scales within basins may contribute to more sustainable water governance by 
encouraging learning, inclusion and accountability (Dore 2014). In this context, encouraging 
cross-sectoral interactions and linkages among multiple levels of water governance is considered 
an important component of effective and adaptive transboundary water governance (Raadgever, 
et al. 2008) that contributes to sustainability. da Silveria and Richards (2013) add that 
understanding the extent to which multi-level arrangements actually contribute to sustainability in 
transboundary water systems requires in-depth consideration of historical context, actual linkages 
between different levels of governance and existing power asymmetries. 
 A power analysis can provide needed insight into factors related to decision-making, 
agenda determination and underlying ideas and values that impact governance processes at 
various levels. In an empirical study of transboundary water governance in India and China 
Hensengerth and Zawahri (2012) suggest that non-governmental organizations encourage more 
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sustainable transboundary water management by providing data to and trying to influence internal 
decision-makers in both countries. Domestic policy changes in Spain and Portugal, combined 
with direction from the European Union, have arguably led to more sustainable transboundary 
water governance in that region (Lopes 2012). Suhardiman and Giordano (2014) illustrate how 
institutional fragmentation within Laos benefits interests associated with increasing hydropower 
development. This collection of work demonstrates the important role of governance processes 
within jurisdictions and the variety of actors therein for transboundary water governance. Even 
when governments sign interjurisdictional water management agreements, their internal 
governance warrants consideration because they typically retain significant decision-making 
authority for waters that flow within their territory.  
Appreciating the full complexity of transboundary water governance requires broadening 
the scope of analysis to consider how multi-level governance impacts transboundary water 
governance outcomes. This necessarily requires extending empirical foci from beyond the role of 
governments at the interjurisdictional level. That said, empirical analysis of the institutional 
design and performance of RBOs can contribute to improved understanding regarding the extent 
to which they contribute to adaptive transboundary water governance. A framework that 
identifies important aspects of institutional design could improve understanding about RBOs. 
However, it is also critical to consider the role of power dynamics which can act as a constraint or 
enabler of sustainable environmental governance (Newell 2012) at multiple governance levels. 
Assessing the roles of different forms of multi-actor governance and water use decisions made 
within jurisdictions that may have transboundary implications is one of many possible paths 
forward. 
1.3.2 Collaborative environmental governance  
Collaborative environmental governance is based on the notion that inclusive dialogue in which 
opinions and ideas are articulated, debated and potentially transformed is the best way to effect 
environmentally sustainable change (Glasbergen 1998; Kronsell and Bäckstrand 2010). In 
collaborative processes, organizations and individuals pool resources, share knowledge and learn 
from each other to address a common problem (Fish, et al. 2010; Gray 1989; Holley, et al. 2012). 
Collaborative governance is celebrated for encouraging learning about diverse perspectives and 
creating innovative solutions participants find acceptable, even in contexts of power asymmetry 
or high stakes decision-making (Ansell and Gash 2007; Emerson, et al. 2012; Innes and Booher 
2010). Collaboration may take place at local, regional and basin-wide jurisdictional levels 
(Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Lane and Robinson 2009; Margerum 2008). Characteristics of 
 16 
collaboration and collaboration’s use at multiple levels make it a promising approach to 
governance in transboundary contexts (Dore 2014; Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008). 
The label, collaboration, has been assigned to a diverse class of governance activities. In 
general, it reflects a perceived shift from government-based, command and control forms of 
governance to more inclusive and deliberative forms (Holley, et al. 2012). Forms of collaboration 
differ based on the level and scale (local, regional, basin-wide) at which they operate, whether 
government actors are involved and the extent to which ideals of deliberative democracy inform 
the collaborative processes. They can also range from voluntary, grassroots initiatives to 
legislatively mandated processes initiated by government (Moore and Koontz 2003). For 
example, collaborative planning exercises are based on Habermasian ideals of deliberative 
democracy related to inclusion, interdependence and authentic dialogue (Innes and Booher 2010). 
They tend to take place at the local level and involve local level government officials (Healey 
2003). In contrast, collaborative public management involves horizontal and vertical information 
sharing and cooperation between government ministries at various levels; non-governmental 
actors may or may not be involved and the process may not require deliberation (McGuire 2006). 
Cross-sectoral collaboration emphasizes voluntary problem-solving among the business 
community, non-governmental organizations and government (Selsky and Parker 2005). 
However, government may not be involved in this form of collaboration. Collaborative 
environmental governance, the form used to identify cases of collaboration in this study, 
emphasizes information sharing, dialogue and cooperative problem-solving between 
governmental and non-governmental actors at a variety of levels (Holley, et al. 2012; Margerum 
2011). They may or may not be state-mandated (Moore and Koontz 2003).  
Features of collaborative environmental governance such as inclusion, knowledge sharing 
and cooperative problem-solving make it potentially important in transboundary contexts where 
upstream-downstream challenges and a diversity of perspectives and values for water exist 
(Birdsong 2008). In transboundary contexts, collaboration that occurs at multiple levels and is 
linked may contribute to more adaptive and inclusive transboundary water governance (Akamani 
and Wilson 2011; Green, et al. 2013). It may promote the inclusion of actors and perspectives 
necessary to enable sustainable transboundary water governance (Dore 2014) and well-informed 
problem solving at the appropriate level (Cosens 2010). However, one important shortcoming in 
the collaborative water governance literature is that it has tended to neglect power (Brisbois and 
de Loë 2015), which may temper the role of collaboration in transboundary contexts. It also 
undermines the usefulness of the collaboration literature for transboundary contexts in which 
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power dynamics exist. Underdeveloped considerations of power in the collaboration literature 
may follow a general trend wherein forms of governance perceived to be novel, or departures 
from traditional, state-based approaches, such as collaboration, are analyzed without attention to 
important ‘traditional’ concepts such as power (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004). It may also be the 
result of the uncritical adoption of normative theoretical ideals in empirical settings where power 
dynamics are at play but are undertheorized (Murray 2005). Regardless of the reasons, the 
collaboration literature does not yet have all the tools needed to assess and consider the role that 
power dynamics might have in informing what collaboration actually achieves. 
Hence, while power asymmetries have been identified as an important precursor to 
collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2007), there has been relatively little systematic exploration of the 
ways in which power dynamics impact collaborative processes and outcomes. Important 
exceptions exist. For example, Purdy (2012) suggests that resources, authority and the ability to 
construct issues are important power-related factors that can impact collaboration. However, this 
work does not engage with the extensive and well-developed literature regarding theories of 
power which may be important for identifying subtle power-related effects. It also does not 
conceptualize a role for political-economic contexts. Other empirical studies have demonstrated 
that industry actors have disproportionate influence over collaborative processes in the 
environmental realm, through setting agendas and information control (Cook 2015). The political 
and economic contexts in which collaborations are embedded can constrain collaborative 
outcomes (Brisbois and de Loë 2016). Yet other empirical research, although it does not 
explicitly use a power analysis, suggests that power dynamics may be at work in collaborative 
processes. For example, research on collaborations in Australia (Holley, et al. 2012), South 
Africa (Mirumachi and Van Wyk 2010) and Canada (Norman and Bakker 2008) suggest that 
government actors are not always willing to cede authority to collaborative groups. For example, 
collaborations may serve advisory functions, leaving decisions regarding implementation to 
government actors. Critical analyses of large-scale collaborations in the US suggest that some 
interests will continue to be marginalized through collaborative processes (Kallis, et al. 2009). 
These findings challenge assumptions that collaboration results in inclusive, productive dialogue 
that can enable environmentally sustainable change. More systematic assessments of how power 
impacts collaboration can enrich the collaboration literature by identifying the ways in which 
power may challenge some of collaboration’s promising appeal. Such an analysis is critical for 
understanding the role that collaboration can play in transboundary basins.  
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1.3.3 Theories of power 
Power is an essential concept in the social sciences, and is an especially important consideration 
in the context of policy and governance (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004; Newell 2012). Theories 
of power are subject to much disagreement; they offer a variety of different approaches to 
investigating power dynamics and their effects in empirical contexts. Perspectives on power 
differ on whether they conceptualize power as exercised by agents (Dahl 1957), endowed in 
structures that determine, or strongly influence, human action (Gould, et al. 2004) or as an 
omnipresent force that informs all human consciousness and activities (Foucault 1982). Power 
relations may also be viewed as dominating or empowering (Haugaard 2012) or as a force that 
circulates and is not possessed (Foucault 1982).  
A number of different power theory frameworks exist to guide empirical analysis, such as 
Gaventa’s (2006) power cube, Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) power taxonomy or perspectives that 
draw from post-structuralism (Digeser 1992). This study uses Steven Lukes’ power theory to 
develop a framework for analyzing how power dynamics impact various transboundary water 
governance processes and the ways in which power may constrain or enable sustainable 
transboundary water governance. Steven Lukes (2005) developed an agent-centered theory of 
power that views power as domination – the ability to achieve preferable outcomes despite 
opposition. However, it is important to acknowledge that Lukes promotes a broad interpretation 
of agents as including individuals, collectivities and institutions (Hayward and Lukes 2008; 
Lukes 2005). These agents may not be aware of the effects of their actions and they may produce 
power-related effects through inaction. Lukes suggests that the agent-centred view is critical to 
holding agents morally, ethically and politically responsible for the power-related actions they 
bring about or fail to effect. Such a view is highly compatible with the central aim of this 
dissertation: to understand the factors that constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water 
governance. Part of the reason that power is so contested is because it is fundamentally tied to 
norms and values that are also highly contested (Dowding 2012; Lukes 2005). In this work, I 
suggest that sustainability is a desirable normative goal, which informs my power analysis. This 
view also distinguishes Lukes’ approach, and my perspective, from post-structural perspectives 
that suggest power is not possessed by any one entity and that even strategies claiming to be 
emancipatory are imbued with power (Digeser 1992; Foucault 1982). Such a view makes 
allocating responsibility and developing an effective strategy to address power dynamics difficult. 
Lukes also offers an alternative to structural determinism. The possibility that agents could have 
acted differently is critical to his definition of power. Thus, using this theory of power illuminates 
the things that may be changed or challenged to enable greater progress toward sustainability. It 
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also offers, as compared with Duvall and Barnett (2005) and Gaventa (2006), a comparatively 
simple framework that can be used to analyse very complex governance settings. Steven Lukes’ 
power theory can be usefully applied to natural resource governance contexts (Caine and 
Krogman 2010), such as the ones that concern this study. It can also help to uncover some of the 
less obvious dimensions of power that can impact transboundary water governance (Zeitoun and 
Warner 2006). 
Lukes produced his book Power: A Radical View as a response to perceived shortcomings 
associated with two dominant theories of power that circulated in the 1970s (Lukes 2005). The 
first predominant theory of power, what Lukes refers to as power’s first dimension, is Dahl’s 
pluralist perspective on power. Dahl suggested that power is the ability to achieve preferable 
policy outcomes, despite opposition (Dahl 1957). The first dimension can be studied empirically 
by attending to which actors participate in policy decisions, the preferences they articulate and 
which actors prevail in decision making processes (Lukes 2005). Bachrach and Baratz (1962) 
critiqued the pluralist view of power for being too focused on actual behavior and decision-
making. They articulated what Lukes refers to as power’s second dimension: the ability to set the 
agenda by excluding relevant concerns from policy discussions, through influencing policy actors 
so that they do not raise relevant concerns or developing institutional environments that neglect 
particular interests (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). This form of power can also be directly observed 
by considering articulated grievances with the scope of the decision-making agenda or decisions 
not to act when it is possible to do so (Lukes 2005). The second dimension of power can result in 
what Lukes refers to as non-decisions which may not be revealed by analyzing power in its first 
dimension. 
Lukes acknowledges that both the first and second dimensions of power offer insight into 
how agents can dominate the actions of others. However, he offers a critique based on the fact 
that the first two dimensions are too concerned with actual behavior and overt conflicts. He 
suggests that power works in a third, less obvious dimension, that allows for consideration of the 
ways in which “potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social 
forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions” (Lukes 2005, 28, emphasis in 
original). This third dimension of power prevents overt conflicts from taking place by socializing 
individuals and groups to “accept the existing order of things . . . because they can see or imaging 
no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable” (Lukes 2005, 28). Power’s 
third dimension is concerned with the ways in which ideas and values can be used to support an 
existing inequitable or unsustainable status quo without overt conflict. Certainly, Lukes drew 
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inspiration from Gramscian theories of cultural hegemony, which provide an explanation for why 
communist revolution did not materialize as theorized: ideas associated with private property and 
upward mobility were firmly entrenched in civil society institutions and adopted by working 
classes (Cox 1983). Gramsci added the role of ideas to Marxist concerns associated with the 
economic matters and the ownership of production: he added the crucial consideration that “man 
[sic] is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas” (Bates 1975, 351). As mentioned above, an 
important distinction needs to be made between Lukes’ power theory and structural theories 
generally associated with Marxism. Lukes rejects structural determinism as a form of power 
(Hayward and Lukes 2008). A power relation rests, in part, on the possibility that an agent could 
have acted differently. This is necessary for assigning responsibility for things that might be 
changed to produce more sustainable forms of governance.   
Lukes’ power theory is helpful for guiding empirical analyses of more and less obvious 
relations of domination. It can be usefully applied to governance processes in transboundary 
contexts. Understanding factors that constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water 
governance also requires assigning political responsibility so that constraints can be addressed or 
challenged. For reasons listed above, I use Lukes’ power theory in this dissertation.  
1.3.4 Sustainability 
There is no one-size-fits all definition or universal blueprint to achieve sustainability. Here, I 
offer a few reflections on concepts and criteria used in this study to make assessments about the 
extent to which governance contributes to sustainability.  My consideration of sustainability is 
based on the assumption that governance can contribute to or thwart sustainability (Newell 2012) 
and that measuring dimensions of governance that may contribute to sustainability is an important 
contribution to furthering sustainability. Ultimately, this work is based on the belief that 
sustainability is a valuable concept and a normative goal. It is also worth noting that the purpose 
of this study is not to make assessments about whether a given governance arrangement is 
sustainable per se. Rather, I am interested in how multi-level governance arrangements and power 
dynamics may constrain or enable governance that contributes to sustainability. I undertake such 
investigations by using principles and criteria associated with governance that contributes to 
sustainability to inform my assessments, or where indicated in each manuscript, criteria related to 
the expected performance of various governance processes and institutions.  
The concept of sustainability is premised on the notion that human and ecological well-
being are interdependent, and that ecological degradation and economic inequality are significant, 
intractable and interrelated problems that must be addressed in such a way as to improve both 
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(Gibson, et al. 2005). Sustainability has a biophysical dimension regarding material limits but 
also an important social dimension related to governance – the ways in which decisions are made 
and actions are undertaken. Lockwood, et al. (2010) identify eight principles, including 
legitimacy, transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, fairness, integration, capability and 
adaptability, with which to evaluate environmental governance. Table 1.2 identifies evaluative 
questions related to these principles. Other metrics (Adger, et al. 2003) and paradigms, such as 
integrated water resources management, exist, but I prefer Lockwood, et al.’s (2010) approach. 
The criteria elaborated by Lockwood, et al. (2010) include normative principles to assess 
Table 1.2: Governance principles for sustainability: criteria and evaluative questions  
Criteria Evaluative questions 
Legitimacy Do actors have the authority to govern based in legislation or stakeholder acceptance? 
Transparency Are decision-making processes visible? 
Is the reasoning behind decisions apparent? 
Is information related to decisions and performance publicly available? 
Accountability Are there mechanisms to hold accountable those responsible for decisions? 
Are there mechanisms to determine whether key responsibilities have been met? 
Inclusiveness Are there opportunities to participate in and impact governance processes? 
Fairness Are decisions free of systematic bias? 
Are the distributions of costs and benefits associated with decisions adequately 
considered? 
Integration Is there coordination across and between different levels of government? 
Do different government agency policies align? 
Capability Can individuals or organizations deliver on their commitments? 
Adaptability Are new sources of knowledge and learning incorporated? 
Are threats, risks and opportunities anticipated? 
Is governance reflective? 
Adapted from: Lockwood, et al. 2010. 
governance, a key concern of this dissertation, and concepts used in alternative paradigms such as 
integrated water resources management, which regards operational decisions about watershed 
planning. For instance, the integration criterion is a key concern associated with integrated water 
resources management (Mitchell 2005). Adaptability is a vital component of sustainable water 
governance (Pahl-Wostl 2007) and a necessary part of integrated water resources management 
(Hooper 2010). Unlike integrated water resources management, the criteria elaborated by 
Lockwood, et al. (2010) are not geographically bound to the watershed and concern governance 
specifically. This distinction is critical because challenges achieving governance that contributes 
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to sustainability, such as those related to power, may not originate in the watershed (Cohen and 
Davidson 2011; Davidson and de Loë 2014). 
Lockwood, et al.’s (2010) criteria have been used in assessments of multi-level 
conservation initiatives (Wyborn 2015), adaptive river basin governance (Pahl-Wostl, et al. 2012) 
and transboundary water governance (Akamani and Wilson 2011). Importantly, as Wiek and 
Larson (2012) point out, the sustainability criteria refer to procedural aspects of governance that 
contributes to sustainability. If desired, the criteria can be combined with additional biophysical 
metrics used to make sustainability assessments (Wiek and Larson 2012). 
In this dissertation, Lockwood, et al.’s (2010) principles were used to inform my 
assessments, unless noted otherwise in each manuscript. For instance, for Chapter Two criteria 
related to the effective and adaptive governance were used to make assessments about the role 
and contribution of the interjurisdictional institution in the MRB (see Table 1.5). In Chapter 
Three, expectations about the roles and contributions of collaborations in transboundary contexts 
were assessed against findings related to power dynamics. However, criteria used also 
correspond, in general, to criteria associated with governance that contributes to sustainability 
identified here, which served as a normative framework that underlay this study and directly 
informed assessments made in Chapter Four. 
1.3.5 Summary 
Transboundary water governance involves a diversity of actors at multiple governance levels. 
This is as true in the international context as it is in federal transboundary water systems. While 
interjurisdictional water management agreements and institutions have important roles, it is 
necessary to consider how governance activities at other levels contribute to transboundary water 
governance. A detailed analysis of transboundary water management institutions that operate at 
the scale of the basin can provide important insights related to the role and contribution of 
interjurisdictional institutions. Understanding the factors that constrain and enable sustainable 
transboundary water governance also requires considering the ways in which power dynamics 
impact governance processes at multiple levels. Although power has been identified as a critical 
factor that impacts international transboundary water interactions, less is known about how power 
impacts federal transboundary water systems and governance processes that may exist in 
transboundary basins, such as collaboration. Literature on collaboration, which has been 
identified as a potentially promising approach to governance in transboundary water systems, has 
not adequately considered the role of power dynamics. Such an assessment is critical to 
understanding the roles and contributions of collaborations in transboundary water systems. 
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Finally, a power analysis can reveal factors that constrain and enable progress toward 
sustainability; such an analysis can be informed by criteria associated with sustainability 
governance.  
1.4 Empirical context: the Mackenzie River Basin 
The Mackenzie River Basin (MRB), Canada, provides an excellent empirical context in which to 
situate this research. The MRB drains 20% of Canada’s landmass; it encompasses an area of 
approximately 1.8 million km
2  
(MRBB 2003b). Water in the MRB flows through three provinces 
– British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan – three territories – the Yukon Territory, the 
Northwest Territories and a very small portion of Nunavut – as well as the traditional territories 
of Dene, Cree, Métis and Inuvialuit peoples (see Figure 1.1). The headwaters of the MRB are in 
the Rocky Mountains of British Columbia and Alberta, where the Peace and Athabasca rivers 
emerge, respectively. They flow northeast, converge at the Peace-Athabasca Delta (PAD), and 
turn northward to form the Slave River which drains into Great Slave Lake at the Slave River 
Delta. The Mackenzie River drains Great Slave Lake’s northwestern corner, and is joined by 
major tributaries including the Liard River, which flows from British Columbia, and the Peel 
River, which flows from the Yukon. The entire Mackenzie River is approximately 4241 km long 
and has an average annual discharge of approximately 9910 m
3
/s into the Beaufort Sea in the 
Arctic Ocean (MRBB 2003b).  British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the Yukon are primarily 
upstream jurisdictions, whereas Alberta is both an upstream and downstream jurisdiction – it 
receives water from British Columbia but passes water on to the NWT. The NWT is the ultimate 
downstream jurisdiction in the basin; it receives water from British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and the Yukon. The Nunavut’s proportion of the basin is so small that it is 
generally not considered a basin jurisdiction in interjurisdictional arrangements.   
There are significant differences in the populations of the provinces and territories in the 
MRB.  In 2001, the last time that the population of the MRB was calculated, approximately 
397,000 people lived in the MRB. At that time, almost three-quarters of the MRB’s population 
resided in Alberta, 17% in British Columbia, 9% in NWT and less than 1% in Saskatchewan and 
the Yukon (MRBB 2003b). Approximately 15% of the basin’s population is Indigenous. The 
proportion of Indigenous peoples relative to non-Indigenous persons in the basin is much higher 
in the northern territories. For example, the NWT’s population is approximately 50% Indigenous 
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Figure 1.1: The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada 
 
 
(Statistics Canada 2006). Since 2001, population has grown significantly in the headwaters of the 
MRB where major industrial developments are taking place. For instance, in 2015, the 
government of British Columbia identified Fort St. John as the province’s second-fastest growing 
municipality in the province, with a 4.7% growth in population between 2013 and 2014 (BC Stats 
2015). Between 2007 and 2012, Fort McMurray, which is located near major oil sands extraction 
in Alberta, and the largest city in the MRB, saw population grow by approximately 30% 
(Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo 2012; Statistics Canada 2012). Important differences 
also exist among the provinces and territories regarding the size of their economies and the 
technical and financial resources available to governments. As shown in Table 1.3, the provinces 
of British Columbia and Alberta have much larger economies, measured by GDP, than do other 
provinces and territories in the MRB. 
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Real 2014 GDP (expenditure based; millions of chained 
2007 dollars) 
British Columbia 4 703 939 222 868 
Alberta 4 216 875 320 113 
Saskatchewan 1 138 879 63 127 
Yukon Territory 37 288 2 363 
Northwest 
Territories 
44 253 3 849 
Nunavut 37 025 2 018 
Canada 35 985 751 1 747 709 
Sources: (Statistics Canada 2015a; Statistics Canada 2015b) 
In Canada, water management is largely the responsibility of the provinces as per section 92 
of the Canadian constitution, under powers related to ownership of land and natural resources and 
jurisdiction over property (Clancy 2014), or territories through devolution agreements with the 
federal government (Rodon 2015).  Each province and territory in the MRB therefore has distinct 
legislation and regulations pertaining to water, environmental assessments (EAs) and land 
management. The federal government also possesses potentially broad powers for 
interjurisdictional water matters; it has responsibilities for migratory birds, the criminal law, 
anadromous fish species, species at risk, transboundary waters, First Nations (one of three distinct 
Aboriginal peoples identified in the Canadian constitution) lands and powers under the peace 
order and good government clause of the Canadian constitution. However, in practice, the federal 
government has largely deferred to the provinces in matters related to transboundary waters 
(Saunders 2014). Unless there is clear electoral advantage associated with intervening in 
perceived provincial environmental matters, the federal government tends not to intrude even 
when it may possess the jurisdiction to do so (Harrison 1996). Therefore, responsibilities for 
water are highly decentralized in Canada, which creates transboundary water governance 
challenges related to institutional fragmentation, upstream-downstream asymmetries and power 
dynamics.  
Indigenous peoples are also very important actors in water governance in the basin. They 




 These rights may include adequate quality and quantity of water 
(Passelac-Ross and Smith 2010; Phare 2009). In addition to constitutionally-protected rights, 
there are land claim agreements in the Yukon and Northwest Territories that assign Aboriginal 
governments responsibilities for resource management. They may also include commitments 
about water that flows into Aboriginal territories. For example, the Gwich’in Land Claim 
Agreement states that waters that flow into the Gwich’in territory will be “substantially unaltered 
in quality and quantity” (Gwich'in Nation and Government of Canada 1992, 88), a phrase that has 
informed several other land claim agreements and the Northwest Territories’ water strategy 
(Government of the Northwest Territories 2010). The presence of land claims alters 
environmental governance in the territories. For example, in the Northwest Territories, Aboriginal 
governments tend to be viewed as partners in governance and are involved in various co-
management arrangements and included in the water policy development and implementation 
(Government of the Northwest Territories 2010; Government of the Northwest Territories 2011). 
In the Yukon, as required by the Final Umbrella Agreement (1990), Indigenous governments are 
involved in land use planning processes. If the territorial government fails to adequately consult 
with Yukon First Nations, it is vulnerable to litigation, as demonstrated in the recent controversy 
over the Peel Watershed Land Use Plan (The First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v. Yukon 2015 
YKCA 18). This is in contrast to the provinces which have struggled to meaningfully and 
respectfully incorporate Indigenous governments in environmental governance in ways that 
recognize their distinct rights and title (Passelac-Ross and Buss 2011; von der Porten and de Loë 
2014). These perspectives inform the fundamentally different approaches to consultation and 
engagement with Indigenous peoples that the provinces and territories have adopted. 
The federal, provincial and territorial governments – with the exception of Nunavut, which 
did not exist at the time – in the MRB signed the Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters 
Master Agreement (the Master Agreement) in 1997, after decades of negotiation, in response to 
the perceived need to coordinate and communicate with one another. The need for coordination 
was first formally recognized after British Columbia completed construction of the W.A.C. 
Bennett Dam in 1968 (see Figure 1.1). Environmental changes – specifically low water levels – 
observed in the PAD over 1000 km downstream were believed to be caused by the dam and 
highlighted the need for interjurisdictional cooperation, information exchange and notifications of 
developments (Creery 1979; Mackenzie River Basin Committee 1981). In response, governments 
                                                     
1
 In this dissertation, the globally-preferred term “Indigenous” is used with the exception of contexts in 
which the term “Aboriginal” is based in law, locally appropriate or used in referenced documents or 
contexts.  
 27 
formed the Mackenzie River Basin Intergovernmental Liaison Committee in 1972, through which 
they committed to communicating and providing prior notification of developments (Mackenzie 
River Basin Committee 1981). At that time, they also recognized the need for additional 
information on the ecology and hydrology of the MRB. In the late 1970s, they created the 
Mackenzie River Basin Committee (MRBC), which was responsible for facilitating a $1.6 million 
(1979 dollars) study of the hydrology and ecology of the entire basin and providing 
recommendations to the governments based on the study findings.  
The MRBC (1981, x) reported that  
development of any resource, be it in one jurisdiction or several, could 
affect the uses of water by altering flows, levels or water quality 
downstream. Hence, the need for cooperative management represents the 
greatest and most urgent challenge for the future. 
In its report, the MRBC recommended that governments enter into a formal agreement that 
contained commitments for flows, flow regulation and water quality at jurisdictional boundaries 
and establish a permanent board to implement the provisions of the agreement. Sixteen years 
later, the Master Agreement was signed. The Master Agreement articulates general principles to 
inform transboundary water management in the MRB, including maintaining ecosystem integrity, 
sustainable water management, cooperation and the right of each jurisdiction to use water so long 
as it does no harm to neighbouring jurisdictions (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). It created 
an RBO, the MRBB and included provisions for the negotiation of bilateral water management 
agreements between neighbouring jurisdictions. Recognizing the unique position of Indigenous 
peoples in the basin, the Master Agreement assigned seats on the MRBB to five Aboriginal 
representatives.  
In the years since the Master Agreement was signed, a number of significant industrial 
developments have taken place in the MRB. In fact, some of the largest energy development 
projects in Canada are located in the headwaters of the MRB, including hydroelectric projects in 
British Columbia and oil sands extraction in Alberta. Two hydroelectric projects on the Peace 
River in British Columbia provide approximately 30% of the province’s generating capacity (BC 
Hydro 2003b). A third, the Site C dam, was approved for construction in the fall of 2014 and will 
add an additional 1100MW of capacity to the system (BC Hydro 2014b). Between 1997 and 
2014, production in Alberta’s oil sands region, most prominently in the Athabasca sub-basin, 
grew by approximately 75% (Alberta Energy and Utilites Board 2001; Alberta Energy Regulator 
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2015). Current production from oil sands is expected to more than double by 2030 (Alberta 
Energy Regulator 2015).  
More developments are planned. For example, British Columbia is anticipating significant 
increases in oil and gas production in the northeast portion of the province. The province 
estimates that approximately 78 trillion ft
3
 of natural gas could be developed in the northeast. The 
government intends to see annual levels of natural gas production increase from 1.1 trillion ft
3
 in 
2009 to 2 trillion ft
3
 by 2020 (British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines 2012). Natural gas 
will be recovered via hydraulic fracturing, which is controversial, in part, because of its high 
water demands, uncertainties related to groundwater contamination caused by chemicals used in 
the fracturing process and its role in causing small earthquakes (Council of Canadian Academies 
2014). Hydroelectric development on Alberta’s northern rivers has also been considered for many 
years and has emerged as a topic of exploration in the legislature (Standing Committee on 
Resource Stewardship 2013). In late 2014, a 300 MW run-of-river dam on the Peace River in 
Alberta began the early stages of an EA (AHP Development Corporation 2015). Finally, the 
prospects of developing an over 1000 km long natural gas pipeline through the Mackenzie River 
Valley in the Northwest Territories has long been considered a potential option (Berger 1977; 
Imperial Oil, et al. 2004). In fact, the pipeline was recommended for approval in 2010 (National 
Energy Board 2010) but construction has been delayed indefinitely. There is relatively less 
development in the Yukon and Saskatchewan portions of the basin, which are also sparsely 
populated.  
Current energy developments are controversial for the social and environmental impacts 
they create, and for their potential impacts to downstream ecosystems. Flow regulation on the 
Peace River has been a longstanding concern for downstream governments and Indigenous 
peoples (NRBSB 1996; Peace Athabasca Delta Committee 1970). In fact, it inspired the earliest 
forms of intergovernmental cooperation. Flows are manipulated on the Peace River to store water 
during late spring and early summer and released during periods of high electricity demand in the 
winter, which has resulted in significant alterations to natural flow patterns – flows are higher 
than would occur naturally in the winter time and reduced in the spring and summer (Church 
2014). A multi-decadal drying event experienced in the PAD is believed by many to be caused by 
upstream flow regulation. There are different scientific perspectives on whether drying in the 
PAD is the result of flow regulation or reflects natural variability and climate change. Based on 
paleolimnological studies, Wolfe, et al. (2006; 2012) suggest drying in the PAD is consistent with 
the historical record of natural variability and that no impact from the dam can be detected. 
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Others, however, suggest that a combination of flow regulation and climate change has negatively 
impacted the capacity to form ice-jam flooding events on the Peace River critical to recharging 
the PAD (Beltaos 2014). This latter perspective is consistent with traditional knowledge about 
changes in the PAD (NRBSB 1996; Straka, et al. 2014). However, BC Hydro, which manipulates 
the flows and is currently building a third dam on the Peace River, has adopted the former view 
that drying in the PAD is consistent with natural variability (BC Hydro 2013a; BC Hydro 2014a). 
Longitudinal studies have demonstrated that flow regulation has impacted sedimentation in 
the Peace River downstream in Alberta. Specifically, it has reduced the capacity to transport 
sediment throughout the river, resulting in the creation of sandbars at tributary mouths (Church 
2014). Monitoring in the Slave River indicates higher than expected levels of some dissolved 
solids, which is believed to be linked to upstream flow regulation (Sanderson, et al. 2012). 
Therefore, in addition to changes in water levels in the river, changes in sedimentation and 
sediment transport have also been observed.  
Environmental impacts from oil sands mining include habitat destruction, fragmentation, 
water use and pollution. Over 600 km of land is currently under development for oil sands 
extraction, and there are approximately 170 km
2
 of tailings ponds in the region (MRBB 2012) 
which contain toxic materials including metals, napthenic acids and polyclyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (Timoney and Lee 2009). Oil sands development is controversial because of its 
environmental impacts and impacts to Aboriginal and treaty rights (Mantyka-Pringle, et al. 2015). 
The precise nature and extent of environmental contamination that has resulted from oil sands 
operations is currently a matter of scientific debate (Hodson 2013). Kurek, et al. (2013) detect 
increases in levels of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons subsequent to the onset of oil sands 
mining at lake sites approximately 90 km northwest of the major oil sands development area. 
Timoney and Lee (2009) indicate there is seepage from tailings ponds into the adjacent Athabasca 
River. Kelly, et al. (2010) add that contaminants associated with the oil sands industry, such as 
cadmium, mercury, nickel and lead, can be detected in snowpack in sites near the oil sands region 
and in the Athabasca River. Wiklund, et al.’s (2012) paleolimnological research indicates that 
contaminants from oil sands extraction do not reach the PAD 200 km downstream from oil sands 
activities. Regardless, there are concerns that contaminants from oil sands mining may reach the 
Slave River and Delta in the NWT (AANDC and GNWT 2012), or that there would be 
devastating impacts if one of the tailings ponds in the oil sands region were to fail (Grant, et al. 
2010). Importantly, several studies have indicated that environmental baseline data and 
monitoring have been inadequate to measuring the impact of industrial operations on the 
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landscape (Auditor General of Canada 2011; Oil Sands Advisory Panel 2010). In response, a 
number of monitoring programs have been developed, including a multi-million dollar 
partnership between the federal and provincial governments (Government of Canada and 
Government of Alberta 2012) and more local, community based efforts.  
In addition to oil sands development and hydroelectric facilities, climate change is a 
significant pressure on governance in the basin and a source of social and environmental changes. 
Measuring observed changes is difficult, in part, because a lack of baseline monitoring data in 
many parts of the basin (MRBB 2012). That said, changes have been observed in terms of river 
freeze-up and ice break-up in portions of the MRB (MRBB 2012). Furthermore, flows may 
decline in the Peace (Wolfe, et al. 2012) and Athabasca headwaters (Sauchyn, et al. 2015). 
Uncertainties about the impacts of climate change, but anticipated changes in flows, make an 
adaptive approach to governance in this basin critical.  
Implementing governance arrangements that can contribute to sustainability may be 
challenged by existing power asymmetries in the basin. For example, upstream jurisdictions 
British Columbia and Alberta, where the most significant developments are taking place, have 
much larger populations and GDPs than the downstream NWT (see Table 1.3). They have 
significantly more material resources at their disposal and much more at stake in terms of current 
development projects. Furthermore, there are significant, and entrenched interests in this basin 
related to industrial development and economic growth that may complicate achieving 
sustainability (Clancy 2014).  However, there is also a diversity of perspectives and values 
regarding water governance in the basin. As mentioned previously, the NWT’s water strategy, 
inspired by land claim agreements within the territories, has an overarching goal of clean, 
productive waters for all time in the NWT (Government of the Northwest Territories 2010). 
Certainly, environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have articulated concerns 
regarding environmental sustainability and integrity (Grant, et al. 2010; WWF-Canada 2009) in 
the basin. Indigenous peoples have raised concerns related to ecological integrity, Aboriginal 
rights and title and treaty rights (Candler, et al. 2010; First Nations Summit 2014; Mikisew Cree 
First Nation and Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society 2014).  
Given the size and diversity of the MRB, there is a role for multi-level governance 
processes in this basin. It would be incredibly difficult to integrate the diverse economic and 
environmental perspectives, and traditional knowledge, at the scale of the basin, always. In fact, a 
number of collaborative environmental governance processes have emerged at local and regional 
levels in response to perceived impacts associated with upstream developments and concerns 
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about climate change. Understanding their roles and contributions can be facilitated by an 
assessment of the extent to which existing power dynamics in the basin impact what they do. 
Importantly, decisions about upstream developments are primarily the purview of the provincial 
governments. Although governments signed the Master Agreement in 1997 they still retain 
significant authority to make decisions about water use without external interference. The 
Agreement articulates principles of maintaining ecosystem integrity and sustainability, but it also 
protects the autonomy of each jurisdiction to use water so long as it does not harm neighbouring 
jurisdictions. Therefore, although the Master Agreement and collaboration may have important 
roles in the basin, so does water use decision-making within jurisdictions. Considering how 
power dynamics impact water use decisions within upstream jurisdictions can lend insight into 
factors that constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance in the MRB. 
Finally, assessing the design and performance of the existing interjurisdictional institution, the 
MRBB, can facilitate a consideration of its role in the basin and how it may constrain and enable 
sustainable transboundary water governance.  
1.5 Methods 
Chapters Two, Three and Four contain sections detailing methods used for data collection and 
analysis that are tailored to the research questions and purposes of each manuscript. This section 
provides additional information on the methodological approach used to achieve the overall 
objectives of this research. This research was informed by a critical realist ontology. This 
perspective assumes that a reality exists that is external to the perceiver but that observing that 
reality is difficult, if not impossible, because of biases in perception, interpretation and 
understanding (Sayer 1992). A critical realist ontology is compatible with an interpretivist 
epistemology which recognizes that there are multiple meanings and interpretations of 
phenomena (Maxwell 2012). However, critical realists suggest that some interpretations are more 
valid than others in the sense that they correspond more readily to what actually exists in the 
world. In the words of critical realist, Sayer (1992, 67), “the admission that all knowledge is 
fallible does not mean that all knowledge is equally fallible”. Critical realists seek to produce 
research that helps to explain causes of events. In this dissertation, institutions, multi-level 
governance processes and power dynamics are considered potential factors that may constrain 
and/or enable governance that contributes to sustainability. Using frameworks and theories to 
guide analysis can help to uncover what exists, or knowledge about causes, in the world. The 
complexities of the particular contexts under investigation permit observations about patterns or 
dynamics related to causation but not direct cause-effect relationships. Judgements therefore rely 
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on some degree of abstraction guided by frameworks and theories used in the course of the 
research (Sayer 1992). The corresponding epistemology seeks data from multiple sources 
(Maxwell 2012) using qualitative methods that facilitate an in-depth understanding of context, 
perceptions and understandings and what exists in the world. Therefore, qualitative methods of 
data collection and analysis were used in this study, and data were sought from a variety of 
sources, including interviews, documents and personal observations. Frameworks were used to 
guide data collection and analysis. A case study research design, which was used for this study, is 
consistent with critical realist ontology and qualitative methods.  
1.5.1 Frameworks 
Two frameworks, used as diagnostic tools to identify important factors and key relationships in 
the empirical context (Ostrom 2011; Ostrom, et al. 2014), were used in this study to explore cases 
of interest. The first framework discussed below informed data collection and analysis for 
Chapter Two, while the second was used for Chapters Three and Four. In this section, I will 
describe the frameworks, why and how they were used and explain why two different 
frameworks were used in the course of this research. The frameworks were supplemented by 
criteria associated with governance that contributes to sustainability discussed in section 1.3.5 and 
detailed in Table 1.2. Specific criteria related to the performance of RBOs were used to make 
assessments in Chapter Two (see Table 1.5). Additional criteria are elaborated in each chapter. 
1.5.1.1 A modified Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
A modified version of Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
(Ostrom 1986) was used to guide data collection and analysis for Chapter Two. The IAD 
framework is one of the most widely used research frameworks in the social sciences (Weible 
2014) and has been used and modified to analyze hundreds of resource management contexts 
(Ostrom, et al. 2014). Huitema and Meijerink (2014) modified the framework to distinguish 
between different kinds of RBOs and to provide an alternative to the existing empirically-based 
typologies which resulted in conceptual confusion. The modified IAD framework permits 
detailed assessment of the institutional design of specific RBOs in context, and helps to achieve 
Objective 2 of this study. The original framework, developed by Elinor Ostrom, posits that in 
environmental governance settings, actors interact to produce environmental management 
outcomes. The interactions and outcomes produced are influenced by several important external 
factors, including the biophysical environment, the characteristics of the community and seven 
formal and informal rules. The seven formal and informal rules determine: positions that can be 
assumed by actors (position rules); how actors become involved in the action situation (entry and 
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exit or boundary rules); the scope of choices and actions available to actors (authority or scope 
rules); information that is available to actors and how it is shared (information rules); how 
decisions are made (aggregation rules); the kinds of outcomes that they can affect (authority 
rules); and the benefits and drawbacks of participating and producing outcomes (payoff rules) 
(Ostrom 1986; Ostrom, et al. 2014). Huitema and Meijerink (2014) combined several rules to 
provide a simple framework to differentiate RBOs based on authority, aggregation, boundary, 
information and pay-off rules (see Table 1.4). 
Table 1.4: IAD framework rules and indicators  
Rules Indicators 
Authority rules Scope of decisions, responsibilities allocated to RBOs 
Aggregation rules Formula used to make decisions 
Boundary rules Geographic boundaries that pertain to the RBO’s jurisdiction 
How participants enter and exit the RBO 
Information rules The kinds of information considered relevant to the RBO’s activities 
How information is shared 
Pay-off rules Benefits and costs to participants in the RBO 
Source: Huitema and Meijerink (2014), adapted from Ostrom (1986) 
Analytical criteria related to the performance of RBOs and adaptive transboundary water 
governance were also used to inform data analysis for Chapter Two and to contribute to the 
achievement of Objective 2. Performance criteria related to effective governance were elaborated 
by Huitema and Meijerink (2014) and supplemented with relevant criteria associated with 
adaptive transboundary water governance, as drawn from the transboundary water governance 
literature (see table 1.5).  
The IAD framework provides a detailed structure that can be used to evaluate a large 
number of resource management contexts. It can provide a rich account of various factors that 
impact the interactions and outcomes that can be produced in environmental management 
contexts (Ostrom, et al. 2014), including transboundary water governance. It is therefore very 
useful for considering, in detail, the role of institutions in transboundary water governance. It can 
also be used to make comparisons between different kinds of RBOs (Huitema and Meijerink 
2014). However, one significant shortcoming of the IAD framework, including the modified 
framework used in Chapter Two, is that it does not account for how power dynamics can impact 
resource management contexts (Clement 2010; Whaley and Weatherhead 2014). Certainly, 
 34 
several of the rules refer to power-related dynamics, such as positions, information and scope. 
However, theories of power offer rich insights regarding the more and less obvious ways that 
power dynamics may impact resource management situations that the IAD framework may 
neglect. Theories of power can help researchers to identify and interpret power dynamics. 
Therefore, for scholars interested in how power impacts environmental governance, an approach 
informed by theories of power is necessary. For that reason, a different framework was used to 
guide data collection and analysis for Chapters Three and Four.   
Table 1.5: RBO performance criteria 
Normative criteria Evaluative questions  
Bioregional governance Does the RBO operate at the scale of the bioregion? 
Coordination Does the RBO help to avoid contradictory policies and conflicts about 
geographical or jurisdictional boundaries? 
Accountability To what extent is the RBO linked to democratic institutions? 
To whom is the RBO formally held to account for its activities? 
What mechanisms exist to monitor and evaluate RBO performance? 
Legitimacy Is the RBO publically acceptable? 
Do those who are subject to the actions of the RBO approve of the 
institution (Gearey and Jeffrey 2006; Suchman 1995)? 
Does multi-actor dialogue inform RBO activities? 
What kinds of activities does the RBO undertake? 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
Does the RBO achieve goals related to ecological performance? 
Multi-level design Is the RBO linked with other governance activities in the basin? 
Does information flow freely between other forms of water governance in 
the basin and the RBO (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Green, et al. 2013)? 
Incorporation of multiple 
knowledges 
Does the RBO adequately integrate and use scientific, local and traditional 
knowledge (Raadgever, et al. 2008)? 
Responsiveness Is the RBO capable of responding to emerging issues in the basin (Green, et 
al. 2013; Lockwood, et al. 2010)? 
Source: Huitema and Meijerink (2014), and others where noted 
1.5.1.2 Power theory-based framework 
As mentioned in section 1.3.3, Lukes’ power theory was used to develop a framework for 
analysis for Chapters Three and Four of this dissertation. The framework was organized 
according to power’s three dimensions – which provided general categories for analysis and 
interpretation. More detailed criteria were identified based on the collaborative environmental 
governance and transboundary water governance literatures to guide empirical assessments of 
how power may manifest in each context (see Table 1.6). Finally, assessments about the impact 
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of power dynamics were made relative to expected contributions of collaborations in 
transboundary contexts (Chapter Three) and characteristics of governance that contributes to 
sustainability (Table 1.2; Chapter Four). 
Table 1.6: Power analysis framework 
Form of power  Indicators Examples from the 
collaboration 
literature 





 dimension: the ability 
to prevail in decisions 








 Financial and 
technical capacity 
(Holley, et al. 2012) 
 Capacity to make 
and implement 
decisions (Holley, et 
al. 2012; Purdy 
2012) 
 Inclusion of various 
perspectives (Kallis, 
et al. 2009) 
 Major water infrastructure 
projects (Zeitoun and 
Warner 2006) 
 Geographic position 
(Cascão and Zeitoun 2010; 
Dinar 2009) 
 Financial and technical 




 dimension: the 
ability to set the agenda 
(Bachrach and Baratz 











 Decisions not 
to act (non-
decisions) 
 Control of 
information used in 
collaboration (Purdy 
2012) 
 Control of the 
decision-making 
agenda, scope of 
factors that can be 
affected by 
collaboration (Cook 






 Appeals to international 
norms/international law 
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006; 
Zeitoun, et al. 2011) 
 Scope of factors to be 
considered/included in 
agreements or discussions 
about transboundary water 
governance (Feitelson 
2002; Zeitoun and Warner 
2006) 
 Actors/interests that benefit 
from institutional 
fragmentation (Suhardiman 
















 Ability to construct, 
represent or benefit 
from an idea (Purdy 
2012) 
 Political and 
economic context in 
which collaboration 
is embedded. 
 Ability to construct 
dominant ideas about which 
uses of water and 
management arrangements 
are beneficial (Feitelson 
2002; Zeitoun, et al. 2011) 
 
 
Importantly, as Lukes (2005) acknowledges, the dimensions of power overlap to some 
degree – and they can inform one another. Determining whether an instance is an example of 
 36 
first- or second-dimensional power requires careful analysis– and it is possible that it may be 
both. For example, one aspect of first-dimensional power is the ability to participate in decisions 
or discussions and to prevail. Power’s second dimension refers to the ability to set the agenda, 
which may also require participation. Therefore, careful consideration was taken to determine 
whether examples of participation without influence were instances of power’s first or second 
dimension – did the exclusion of an issue or actor result in an agenda that failed to consider that 
actor’s needs? If so, it was interpreted as power’s second dimension but it was also informed by 
elements of the first dimension – the inability to prevail. A failure to achieve a preferential 
outcome is also an expression of power’s first dimension. Likewise, an inability to influence, 
construct or impose an idea or value that informs decision making is evidence of power’s third 
dimension. In this way, the dimensions build on one another but they can be considered 
analytically distinct according to the ways in which they impact decisions. The framework and 
indicators used to consider each dimension of power for each paper is summarized in Table 1.6. 
1.5.2 Case study design 
A case study design was adopted to facilitate an in-depth understanding of context and how 
institutions, multi-level governance processes and power dynamics acted as constraints or 
enablers of sustainable transboundary water governance. Case studies were appropriate because 
of the evaluative nature of this research (Yin 2009) and because I sought an in-depth 
understanding of power-related factors related to causation and context (Gerring 2007). 
Specifically, at an empirical level, I was interested in the design and performance of an 
interjurisdictional institution, as well as the ways in which power dynamics impacted several 
different governance processes in a federal transboundary water governance context. On an 
analytical level, I was concerned with what the empirical evidence implied for the roles of 
institutions and multi-level governance processes in transboundary water governance and their 
contributions to sustainable transboundary water governance. I studied contemporary events and 
had no control over the instances under consideration, making them explanatory case studies (Yin 
2009). For each chapter, multiple sources of data, such as interviews, documents and personal 
observations, were used to triangulate findings to ensure validity.  
Single and multiple case studies were used in the course of this research. The single case 
study design, although plagued by well-known problems related to generalizability (Yin 2009), 
was appropriate to address the purpose and research questions that informed Chapter Two. In this 
context, a single case study design was appropriate because of a significant gap in understanding 
about the institutional design and role of RBOs. Multiple case studies were used in Chapters 
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Three and Four. They allowed for detailed consideration of each case and comparisons across 
cases that facilitated more generalized findings relative to the research questions that informed 
each manuscript (Stake 2005). Cases were selected based on the purpose and research questions 
for each manuscript. In total, five separate cases were analyzed during the course of this research. 
One case – the MRBB – is assessed in Chapters Two and Three, using the modified IAD and 
power analysis frameworks, respectively. Cases, criteria used to select case, chapters to which 
case study analysis corresponds and research objectives they address are described below and 
summarized in Table 1.7. 
Table 1.7: Case study selection criteria  
Objective Research 
Design 
Case Study Selection 
Criteria 
Cases Selected Results 
Reported 
2: Consider the design and 
performance of an 
interjurisdictional river 






 An interjurisdictional 
river basin organization 
that operates at the scale 
of a transboundary basin 
in a federal country. 
  MRBB Chapter 
Two 
3 a): Determine the ways 





 Involvement of 
governmental and non-
governmental actors 
 Resource and information 













3b): Determine the ways in 
which power dynamics 





 Recent major water use 
decision that took place 
within an upstream 
jurisdiction in a 
transboundary basin 
 Water use decision 
corresponds to key 
governance pressure with 
transboundary 
implications 
 Site C EA & 
Decision 








A single case study design was used in Chapter Two, which focuses on the role of an 
interjurisdictional transboundary RBO to address Objective 2 of this dissertation. This focus 
determined the selection of the MRBB, the only RBO that currently operates in the MRB, as the 
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key case for analysis. For Chapter Three, which focuses on how power dynamics impact the role 
of collaboration in transboundary water governance (Objective 3a), a multi-case study design was 
used. Cases were selected according to several criteria. First, cases needed to include 
characteristics of collaborative environmental governance discussed in section 1.3.2, including 
the involvement of governmental and non-governmental actors, resource and information sharing 
and working to address a common problem. Second, cases needed to take place in the geographic 
boundaries of the MRB and to be concerned with matters of transboundary water governance, 
such as industrial developments in upstream jurisdiction or the integrity of downstream 
ecosystems. Finally, data availability influenced the selection of cases. The cases that were 
selected for this analysis include the Slave River and Delta Partnership (SRDP), the Peace 
Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program (PADEMP) and the MRBB. For Chapter Four, 
which asks how power dynamics impact water use decisions within jurisdictions that may have 
transboundary implications (Objective 3b), a different set of criteria was used to select cases for 
inclusion in the multiple-case study. Each case involved a recent water use decision that took 
place within an upstream jurisdiction that is also identified as key governance pressures in the 
MRB by the MRBB. Finally, the availability of data informed the selection of cases. The EA and 
decision-making process for the Site C Dam in British Columbia and the development of the 
Surface Water Quantity Framework for the Lower Athabasca River (the Framework), where most 
oil sands mining is currently taking place, were selected for inclusion in Chapter Three. Each case 
included in this study is briefly described below. 
1.5.2.1 The Mackenzie River Basin Board 
The MRBB was created by the 1997 Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master 
Agreement (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). It is the only governance mechanism that exists 
at the scale of the MRB. The federal government, the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, as well as the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, are party to the agreement. 
The Master Agreement details the roles, finances and membership of the MRBB. One appointed 
government official represents each of the provinces and territories that are party to the 
agreement. The federal government has three representatives, one each from the health, 
indigenous affairs and environment ministries. In addition, one Aboriginal member per province 
and territory is appointed to sit on the Board to represent Indigenous peoples. They are considered 
non-governmental members of the Board. The Board is responsible for providing a forum to 
exchange information and coordinate among governments. The Master Agreement also assigns 
the Board responsibilities to consider the needs of Aboriginal peoples, identify necessary studies, 
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recommend objectives for water quality or quantity, establish technical committees, monitor the 
progress of the completion of bilateral water management agreements and implement the 
principles of the agreement in general (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). The Agreement’s 
preamble suggests that a broad interpretation of the Board’s role in the basin is possible (Donihee, 
et al. 2000). In Chapters Two and Three, I evaluate specific features of the Board’s institutional 
design as well as factors that have constrained a broad interpretation of the Board’s role in the 
basin. 
1.5.2.2 The Slave River and Delta Partnership 
The Slave River and Delta Partnership was created in 2010 in response to growing concerns that 
upstream developments in British Columbia and Alberta were negatively impacting the 
ecological integrity of the Slave River and Delta. It was also created as a part of the 
implementation of the government of the Northwest Territories’ Water Stewardship Strategy 
(Government of the Northwest Territories 2010; Government of the Northwest Territories 2011). 
The primary goal of the water stewardship strategy is to ensure that waters in the NWT remain 
clean and productive for all time. Currently, a number of tools are being used to achieve this goal, 
including the development of community-based monitoring programs such as the SRDP. 
Members of the SRDP include academic institutions, municipalities, members of the public, 
federal and territorial government officials and First Nations and Métis governments (AANDC 
and GNWT 2012). A Steering Committee identifies key monitoring priorities and paid members 
undertake monitoring to address community questions about the health of the SRDP.  
1.5.2.3 The Peace Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program 
PADEMP was created in 2008. Like the SRDP, it was created in response to growing concerns 
about the impacts of upstream development, specifically on the PAD. Parks Canada has assumed 
a leadership role in PADEMP because 80% of the delta is located in Wood Buffalo National Park 
(Macmillan 2013). First Nations and Métis governments, provincial, territorial and federal 
governments and ENGOs are participants in PADEMP. They are involved in determining 
PADEMP’s key objective, which is to ensure the cultural and ecological integrity of the PAD 
(Peace-Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program 2015). To achieve this objective, 
PADEMP has been developing a vulnerability assessment of the PAD, undertakes studies to 
address key monitoring priorities and facilitates information exchange between various 
monitoring programs that are underway in the region (Macmillan 2013).  
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1.5.2.4 The Environmental Assessment and Decision Regarding the Site C Dam 
The EA for the Site C dam began in 2010 and was completed in 2014, but the dam has been 
assessed and rejected two previous times – once in the early 1980s and again in the 1990s. The 
Site C dam will be the third hydroelectric dam on the Peace River in British Columbia, and will 
add an additional 1100 MW of capacity to the current system on the Peace, which currently 
provides approximately 30% of British Columbia’s generating capacity (BC Hydro 2014b). The 
Site C dam figures prominently in the provincial government’s plans for economic development 
(British Columbia Office of the Premier and British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines 
2014) but it has generated a considerable amount of local and downstream opposition. There are 
historical, and current, impacts associated with the operation of the two existing dams on the 
Peace River, which many are concerned will be further embedded by the operation of the Site C 
dam (Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and Mikisew Cree First Nation 2014; NRBSB 1996; 
Straka, et al. 2014; Treaty 8 Tribal Association 2014). While the province of British Columbia 
has primary authority to allocate water and to approve the construction of hydroelectric facilities, 
the federal government also has responsibilities for navigation and fisheries that a major dam 
could impact. Therefore, a cooperative, joint environmental review process was established to 
assess the project’s potential social, cultural, heritage and environmental effects. A report 
prepared by the Joint Review Panel (JRP), which provided recommendations regarding whether, 
and under what conditions, the dam should be built, was released in May 2014 (JRP 2014). In 
November 2014, the provincial and federal governments announced their approvals and 
conditions for the Site C project’s construction and operation and in December 2014 (Aglukkaq 
2014; British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office 2014b), the province of BC announced 
its decision to invest in the $8.8 billion project (Clark  2014).  
1.5.2.5 The Surface Water Quantity Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca 
River 
The development of the Surface Water Quantity Management Framework for the Lower 
Athabasca River in Alberta also took several years to complete. The Framework comprises part 
of the Government of Alberta’s Lower Athabasca Regional Plan, which seeks to manage 
cumulative effects in designated land use areas by developing management frameworks for water 
quality, water quantity, air and biodiversity according to common principles and priorities in the 
Regional Plan. The Regional Plan identifies continued oil sands extraction as a priority use for the 
Lower Athabasca region (Government of Alberta 2012). The Framework is intended to manage 
the effects of that growth. Importantly, and as mentioned earlier, the growth in oil sands 
extraction that has taken place in Alberta has created concerns downstream in the NWT. 
 41 
Therefore, the Framework is a policy decision with potential transboundary implications. The 
Framework was developed based on the non-consensus recommendations of the Phase 2 
Framework Committee, a multi-stakeholder committee that deliberated options for cumulative 
water withdrawals for oil sands mining in the Lower Athabasca Region. All six mining 
companies currently withdrawing water from the Athabasca River, representatives of the federal 
and provincial governments, one First Nation group and one Métis group, as well as three 
ENGOs participated in the Phase 2 process (Ohlson, et al. 2010). However, several First Nations 
and Métis governments declined to participate in Phase 2 because they did not believe multi-
stakeholder bodies were serving their interests. The Phase 2 Framework’s recommendations were 
adopted, with some minor modifications, in the Surface Water Quantity Management Framework 
for the Lower Athabasca River, in March 2015 (Government of Alberta 2015c). 
1.5.3 Data collection 
Data collection methods are summarized here and reviewed in Chapters Two, Three and Four. 
Data sources used to undertake this research include semi-structured interviews, documents and 
personal observations. Data collection took place between August 2012 and November 2015. I 
made a total of eight visits to communities in the process of data collection. In October 2013, I 
visited Yellowknife and Fort Smith, NWT to interview key informants about transboundary water 
governance in general, as well as in support of data collection for cases of collaboration. In 
December 2013, I visited Fort St. John, British Columbia in support of my assessment of the EA 
and decision-making process for the Site C Dam in British Columbia. I visited Peace River, 
Alberta in January 2014 to attend EA hearings on the Site C dam, interact with interveners, and 
conduct interviews. I also made trips to Calgary and Edmonton, Alberta in January 2014 to 
conduct interviews in support of the case of the development of the Surface Water Quantity 
Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca River. Finally, in January 2015, I attended the 
Slave River and Delta Partnership Research and Open Houses in Fort Smith and Fort Resolution, 
NWT, where I spoke with participants of the SRDP and presented a poster of preliminary 
findings on my research. Field visits provided important contextual information as well as 
opportunities to interact informally with key actors in transboundary water governance in the 
MRB. They provided a valuable source of insight. 
In total, 55 individuals were contacted for participation in this study. Thirty agreed to be 
interviewed. Interviewees were sought using purposeful and snowball sampling techniques. 
Individuals were contacted because their roles and involvement in the cases considered or 
transboundary water governance in general. They provided valuable, in-depth insights regarding 
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various aspects of transboundary water governance in the MRB. Interviewees provided 
information regarding experiences in and perceptions of various aspects of transboundary water 
governance such as power dynamics, contextual information and verified or clarified findings 
from document analysis.  
Interviewees came from a variety of backgrounds including current and former federal, 
provincial and territorial government officials, representatives of Indigenous governments and 
employees of industry and ENGOs. Several key informants were senior government officials. 
Most were directly involved in ongoing governance initiatives. Many interviews had experience 
in several of the cases included in this study and so were asked questions about several different 
cases. Table 1.8 details interviewee backgrounds and interviews that support the analysis of each 
case. Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to approximately two hours. All interviews were semi-
structured to allow for flexibility in questioning based on interview responses (Hay 2003). The 
interview guide used in the course of this research is available in Appendix 1. The interview 
guide was developed based on frameworks for each chapter and was implemented according to 
the experience and expertise of each interviewee. Following an interview guide facilitated 
comparisons between interviews and cases. However, the interview guide was revised iteratively 
in response to insights gained during data collection and the background of and nature of the 
interviewee’s involvement in the cases considered.   
Individuals who declined to be interviewed or did not respond to interview requests include 
provincial, territorial and federal government officials as well as representatives of Indigenous 
governments, ENGOs and industry. A number of factors likely limited the extent to which 
participants were willing to be interviewed. First, several of the groups contacted for involvement 
in this study are heavily involved in a number of other ongoing research projects. Research 
fatigue and capacity constraints may have played a role. Second, several major initiatives 
occurred simultaneously with data collection, including the negotiation of bilateral water 
management agreements between provinces and territories, the EA of the Site C dam and the 
development of the Surface Water Quantity Management Framework. The need for 
confidentiality may have limited the willingness of some individuals to be interviewed despite 
confirmation that interviews, if desired, would remain confidential. Extensive document analysis, 
participant observation (discussed below) and interviews conducted with key individuals directly 
involved in various aspects of transboundary water governance were used to address gaps 
resulting from denied interview requests.  
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Sixteen interviews were conducted in-person and 14 were conducted over the telephone. All 
but two interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed immediately following the interview. 
When interviewees requested that interviews not be recorded, detailed notes were taken. At times, 
some interviewees requested that certain statements be considered “off the record”, in which case 
those particular sections of the interview were not transcribed. Interview transcripts were returned 
to interviewees to verify the transcript before data analysis began.  









Interviews by Case * 







11 9 7 4 4 2 0 
Provincial 
government 
16 9 7 3 0 2 3 
Federal 
government 
10 5 5 3 2 1 1 
Indigenous 
government 
10 3 0 3 3 3 1 
Industry 4 2 0 0 0 0 2 
ENGO 4 2 0 1 0 2 2 
Total 55 30 19 14 9 10 9 
* Some interviewees provided data pertinent to more than one case. Therefore, the total number 
across cases does not sum to the total of unique interviews. 
The University of Waterloo Office of Research Ethics approved all interviews (ORE # 
19074), which were conducted in accordance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical 
Conduct for Research Involving Humans and the University of Waterloo Statement on Human 
Research. To conduct interviews in the Northwest Territories, a Scientific Research Permit from 
the Aurora Research Institute was required (License #15343). Therefore, all interviews conducted 
in the NWT received approval of and clearance from the Aurora Research Institute as well as the 
University of Waterloo Office of Research Ethics. All interviewees were provided with an 
information letter that detailed the study goals and a consent form to indicate they participated 
freely in the study, to provide consent for audio-recording and to indicate how they wished the 
interview to be reported in published material in the study. All interviewees participated freely. 
Many interviewees requested that interviews remain anonymous. Therefore, interviews will be 
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reported in this dissertation using codes to preserve the anonymity of each interviewee. Codes are 
specific to individual chapters and are reported as numbered confidential interviews (e.g., CI 1), 
as in Chapters Three and Four or numbered key informants (e.g., KI 1), as in Chapter Two. 
A total of 296 documents were reviewed to support this research (see Appendix 2 for a list). 
One hundred and eighteen of these documents support analysis in Chapter Two, 160 supported 
Chapter Three and 251 supported Chapter Four. Many documents were relevant to more than one 
chapter (see Appendix 2). Documents included historical government documents, current 
government documents, news articles, the policy prescriptions of ENGOs, letters, policy 
documents of Indigenous governments, EA hearing transcripts and submissions made to the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. Documents were identified via internet searches, 
bibliographies and the recommendations of research participants. The documents included 
provided essential contextual information, insight regarding institutional design, or information 
on how power dynamics operated in various cases. For example, document analysis was critical 
to assessing power’s third dimension in Chapters Three and Four. Document review verified, 
clarified and/or supplemented statements made by interview participations. Documents analysis 
provided an essential non-intrusive data collection method that was especially helpful in the 
context of this research. Publically available documents helped to address interview gaps. For 
example, there is an extensive publically available record of industry and ENGO interests and 
participation in the Site C EA and policy development regarding oil sands mining that supported 
analysis in Chapter Four.  
Personal observations made during field visits and interviews provided additional sources of 
insight. Observations were uncontrolled in the sense that I did not restrict myself to observing a 
set of prescribed phenomena (Hay 2003). Rather, I took notes of observations during EA hearings 
and meetings that were used to verify relevant findings revealed through interviews and/or 
document analysis. For instance, they were used to confirm or add nuance to findings revealed 
through document and interview analysis. 
1.5.4 Data analysis 
Documents and interviews were organized and analyzed using the data analysis software NVivo 
QSR 10. Documents and interviews were coded in NVivo using a coding scheme grounded in the 
framework used for each paper. Personal observations were used to verify or confirm relevant 
findings from document and interview analysis. Qualitative content analysis was used to 
deductively analyze interviews and key documents to derive understandings about the overt and 
latent meanings of the texts. Qualitative content analysis is a systematic method that can be used 
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to identify and describe meaning of qualitative data (Schreier 2012). Qualitative content analysis 
encourages focusing on specific aspects of texts that relate to the research questions (Schreier 
2012). A large number of documents are collected and read for context and then important 
passages are coded for analysis and interpretations (Cho and Lee 2014). As opposed to 
quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis permits a consideration of the latent 
meanings in text (Kohlbacher 2006), which is especially important for studies of power. 
In the context of this study, frameworks were used to guide data collection and then 
developed as coding schematics to analyze data. In qualitative content analysis, data are 
organized by key themes, statements, concepts and ideas in a coding framework. The coding 
framework assists the analysis and interpretation of data. Specific categories (e.g., participation, 
preferences, agenda control) can be abstracted to correspond to theories (e.g., power’s first or 
second dimension).  Data collection for Chapter Two was guided by indicators related to the IAD 
framework (see Table 1.4). Data were analyzed according to performance criteria and features of 
adaptive transboundary water governance identified in Table 1.5 and discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Two. For Chapters Three and Four, indicators from collaborative environmental 
governance and transboundary water governance literatures were used to develop coding 
categories related to core themes of power’s first, second and third dimensions (indicated in Table 
1.6). Multiple indicators were used in the case of each dimension of power. For instance, text 
related to preferences, conflicts and decisions were coded separately but under the broad category 
of power’s first dimension. Similarly, agenda-setting, information control and non-decisions were 
coded separately but under the more abstract category of power’s second dimension. Patterns and 
themes that emerged in the process of analyzing data that did not correspond to the coding 
framework were coded inductively as permitted in qualitative content analysis (Schreier 2012). 
Results from inductive coding are not reported in each chapter but will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter. An important limitation to qualitative content analysis, as a primarily 
deductive approach to data analysis, is that it is not suitable for open-ended explorations of 
particular contexts (Cho and Lee 2014; Kohlbacher 2006). This was particularly the case in the 
course of this research, which favoured deductive data coding based on pre-established categories 
derived from Lukes’ power theory and the collaborative and transboundary water governance 
literatures. As such, findings from deductive analysis are emphasized over emergent findings. 
Trustworthiness is achieved in this study via multiple strategies (Lincoln and Guba 1985; 
Shenton 2004). Triangulation between documents, interviews and personal observations, as well 
as participant verification of transcriptions, help to make findings credible (Schreier 2012). 
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Descriptions of context permit assessments of transferability (Shenton 2004). Standardized 
coding, derived from existing, well-established frameworks, contributes to dependability 
(Shenton 2004). Finally, each chapter’s description of methods and the consideration of study 
limitations in Chapter Five, help to ensure confirmability (Lincoln and Guba 1985).   
1.6 Organization of thesis 
The remainder of this thesis will be presented as follows. As mentioned above, each of Chapters 
Two, Three and Four, while they can be considered a conceptual whole, also stand alone as 
separate manuscripts for publication in academic journals. They have been prepared as co-
authored publications (Morris, M and R.C. de Loë). 
Chapter Two of this dissertation provides a detailed assessment of a RBO – the MRBB – 
using a modified IAD framework and several normative criteria related to sustainability and 
adaptive transboundary water governance. By adopting a single-case study design, it also offers a 
detailed, in-depth assessment of the role that the RBO has in contribution to adaptive 
transboundary water governance that directly addresses Objective 2 and contributes to addressing 
Objectives 1 and 4. This assessment offers rich empirical insights regarding the design and 
performance of an existing RBO that contributes to the transboundary water governance 
literature. Chapter Two is published in the journal Ecology & Society (Morris and de Loë 2016). 
In Chapter Three, a detailed assessment of the ways in which power dynamics have 
impacted three collaborations in the MRB is presented. The collaborations take place at local, 
regional and basin-wide levels, facilitating a consideration of the role that multi-level 
collaboration plays in transboundary water governance in the MRB. Chapter Three directly 
address Objective 3 a) and contributes to achieving Objectives 1 and 4. Chapter Three provides 
an empirical and theoretical contribution to the transboundary water governance and 
collaboration literature. First, empirical insight regarding the role that collaboration plays in 
transboundary basins is provided by exploring three cases in detail. Second, by applying a power-
based framework to collaborative processes, Chapter Three demonstrates that power-based 
analyses can usefully illuminate constraints on collaboration that may not be obvious. Chapter 
Three will be submitted to the journal Environmental Policy & Politics. 
 Chapter Four provides an analysis of major water use decisions within upstream 
jurisdictions in the MRB that have implications for downstream communities and governments. 
The focus of this manuscript corresponds to the contention in this dissertation that because 
jurisdictions typically retain significant autonomy to make resource management decisions within 
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their territories even when they sign interjurisdictional agreements, it is necessary to consider 
their internal water use decisions as a possible factor that can constrain and enable sustainable 
transboundary water governance. Chapter Four directly addresses Objective 3 b) and contributes 
to achieving Objectives 1 and 4. A power-based framework is used to assess the ways in which 
power dynamics impacted water use decisions within jurisdictions. This paper offers both an 
empirical and theoretical contribution to the transboundary water governance literature. First, it 
provides empirical evidence that power dynamics impact federal transboundary water 
governance. Second, it offers a fairly simple but effective framework for analyzing water use 
decisions within federal transboundary water systems. Chapter Four will be submitted to the 
journal Water Alternatives.  
Finally, Chapter Five offers concluding remarks on the scope, purposes and contributions of 
this dissertation. It reiterates key academic contributions made by this dissertation and charts a 
research path forward. Chapter Five also includes my personal reflections on conducting 
transdisciplinary research.  
References are listed at the end of this document, rather than at the end of each chapter, as 
required by University of Waterloo thesis guidelines. The interview guides and list of document 
reviewed for each chapter are included in Chapter Six.  
 
 48 
2 Chapter Two 
 
Cooperative and adaptive transboundary water governance in 
Canada’s Mackenzie River Basin: status and prospects 
2.1 Introduction 
The Mackenzie River Basin (MRB) is one of the largest, relatively pristine riverine ecosystems in 
North America (Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy 2013). It is also a site of 
increasing resource development within Canada, and a transboundary system in which three 
provinces, three territories, a federal government and Aboriginal governments (under Canada's 
constitution, Indigenous peoples are referred to as "Aboriginal") have responsibilities for water. 
We argue, as others have (Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009; Garrick, et al. 2013), that transboundary 
water governance within federal countries can face challenges similar to those between sovereign 
states in the international context. Evidence for this assertion is easy to collect; consider conflicts 
over water use in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin in the United States (Meruelo 
2007), the Narmada river system in India (Kumar 2013) or the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia 
(Bhat 2009). In the MRB, concerns regarding the downstream impacts of hydro-electric 
development have persisted for decades. More recently, the environmental impacts of increasing 
oil and gas extraction have emerged as major concerns.  
To illustrate the scope and nature of these challenges, upstream hydro-electric 
developments have altered natural flow patterns to correspond to periods of high electricity 
demand. Oil sands extraction has resulted in habitat fragmentation and impacts to water quality; 
Indigenous peoples report deteriorating water quality and poor fish health downstream of oil 
sands mines (MRBB 2012). Changing temperatures in the MRB have impacted the timing of 
spring thaw, fall freeze-up and peak river flows; the basin’s hydrology may also be impacted by 
increased permafrost thawing (MRBB 2012). These changes may impact the quality and quantity 
of water available for human settlements and resource development. Transboundary water 
governance that respects the interests of the diversity of Indigenous peoples in the MRB is also a 
key challenge. A coordinated and adaptive approach to transboundary governance may help to 
address uncertainties associated with climate change and increasing industrial development in the 
MRB as well as fostering greater inclusion in environmental monitoring and decision-making. 
How Canadians address the challenge of cooperative and adaptive governance in this basin can 
provide insights for both scholars and practitioners of transboundary water management. 
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Adaptive governance emphasizes learning and experimentation, which can foster conditions 
that help to deal with complexities and uncertainties in social-ecological systems (Chaffin, et al. 
2014), including those that exist in transboundary water systems such as the MRB. Adaptive 
transboundary water governance is characterized by features such as incorporating a variety of 
knowledges - local, traditional and scientific - in monitoring and decision-making and institutions 
that are flexible to allow responses to new information (Raadgever, et al. 2008). Vertical and 
horizontal information sharing and the presence of nested institutions can help to facilitate 
adaptive transboundary water governance by enabling well-informed and coordinated 
management responses to take place at the appropriate scale (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Folke, 
et al. 2005; Green, et al. 2013). Joint institutions, such as river basin organizations, which operate 
on the scale of the bioregion, are considered key facilitators of adaptive governance in 
transboundary systems (De Stefano, et al. 2012; Green, et al. 2013). However, as Huitema and 
Meijerink (2014) point out, there is a great degree of variability in terms of river basin 
organization form and function. Thus, assessing the extent to which river basin organizations can 
contribute to adaptive governance requires considering their institutional design and performance. 
In this paper, we ask how well a river basin organization that operates in the MRB, the 
Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB), performs in terms of coordination, accountability, 
legitimacy and environmental effectiveness. Using these criteria of institutional performance, we 
also consider the extent to which governance based on river basin boundaries - a bioregional 
approach (Slocombe 1998) - contributes to adaptive governance in the MRB. Effectively enabling 
an adaptive, bioregional approach to governance requires appropriate institutions and a supportive 
political context (Folke, et al. 2005). Without accountability, legitimacy and evidence of 
effectiveness, sustaining interest in adaptive governance can be difficult (Cosens and Williams 
2012). Thus, institutional design and performance can be critical to enabling adaptive 
governance. 
The MRBB, a coordinating river basin organization, was established in 1997 under the 
Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement to encourage cooperative 
management based on principles of ecosystem integrity, sustainability and respect for 
jurisdictional autonomy. In the next section, we provide an overview of the constitutional, 
physical and socio-economic setting for transboundary water governance in the MRB. In the 
section that follows, we address the first two guiding questions underlying the special issue 
through exploring the design of the MRBB, and the politics and strategies that resulted in this 
design. Our evaluation of the effectiveness of the MRBB in Section 3 addresses the third question 
underlying the special issue. Questions of coordination, accountability, legitimacy and 
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environmental effectiveness are linked to the design of the organization. Based on our evaluation 
of the performance of the MRBB, we conclude by considering the extent to which it contributes 
to a bioregional, adaptive approach to governance in the basin. 
Our findings are based on several sources of information. A total of 118 documents, 
including government documents, technical reports, submissions to environmental assessment 
(EA) hearings, news articles and documents produced by Indigenous governments and 
environmental organizations inform our analysis. Nineteen semi-structured interviews with key 
informants directly involved in governance for water in the basin provided a rich source of data 
regarding experiences with and perceptions of the MRBB and transboundary governance in the 
basin. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and verified by participants. Personal observations 
made by the first author during EA hearings and meetings and the personal experiences of the 
second author, based on his role as a former member of the Northwest Territories' (NWT) 
Strategic Advisory Group of Experts regarding transboundary negotiations, also support our 
analysis. Interview data and policy documents were analyzed according to principles of 
institutional design and evaluation criteria related to coordination, accountability, legitimacy and 
environmental effectiveness discussed in Huitema and Meijerink (2014). Data were also 
considered for characteristics of adaptive transboundary water governance, including nested, 
multi-level design, the inclusion of multiple sources of information in monitoring and decision 
making and flexibility/responsiveness. 
2.2 Case and context 
Even in a country recognized globally for its considerable water resources, the MRB (Figure 2.1) 
stands out. It contains Canada's longest river system, at 4,241 km (MRBB 2003a). With an area 
of approximately 1.8 million km
2
, the basin drains approximately one-fifth of Canada's land area 
(MRBB 2003a). The basin's headwaters are the Peace and Athabasca rivers, which begin in 
British Columbia and Alberta, respectively. Numerous lakes - including the largest lake entirely 
in Canada (Great Bear) and the deepest lake in North America (Great Slave), along with 
internationally-significant deltas and vast wetlands, are part of the basin's hydrology. The waters 




Figure 2.1: The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada 
 
 
The basin's terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems are nationally and internationally significant. 
In addition to containing some of the last expanses of nearly pristine wilderness on the North 
American continent, the MRB also has globally significant wetland, tundra and forest 
ecosystems; these provide habitat for numerous species that reside part or all of the year in the 
basin. Deltas provide critical staging and breeding zones for millions of migratory birds; 
examples include tundra swans and geese that use the Peace-Athabasca Delta on Lake Athabasca 
(Figure 2.1). The Mackenzie Delta on the Beaufort Sea, Canada's largest active delta at 
approximately 9,000 km
2
 (Prowse, et al. 2009), is a critical habitat for species that include fish, 
beluga whales, moose and beaver (MRBB 2003a). The fish and wildlife resources of the basin are 
critical not only for their role in ecosystems, but also as a source of food for a significant portion 
of the basin's people, especially its Indigenous peoples (Government of the Northwest Territories 
2010). 
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The MRB is sparsely populated relative to southern Canada. Its population in 2001 (the 
most recent date for which basin population data have been calculated) was an estimated 397,000 
people - the majority of whom resided in the Alberta portion (MRBB 2003a). As in northern 
Canada as a whole (Prowse, et al. 2009), population growth and demographic change have been 
closely linked to resource development. Development of Alberta's oil sands, near the town of Fort 
McMurray (Figure 2.1), accounts for much of the basin's recent population growth. For example, 
between the 2006 and 2011 national census years, the population of Fort McMurray grew by 
approximately 30% (Statistics Canada 2012). Much of this population growth is due to the labour 
demands of oil sands mining and construction (Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo 2012). 
Indigenous peoples, who comprised 15 percent of the 2001 population, have lived in the MRB for 
millennia. The proportion of the population that is Indigenous is highest in the less densely 
populated northern portions of the basin (MRBB 2003a), where communities tend to be small 
(fewer than 500 people) and located along coastlines, lakeshores and rivers (Prowse, et al. 2009). 
Jurisdiction over the basin is shared and fragmented, with key actors including provinces, 
territories, the federal government and Indigenous peoples. 
 Portions of the basin are located in three of Canada's provinces (Alberta, British 
Columbia and Saskatchewan) and three territories (Yukon, NWT, and Nunavut - 
although Nunavut is not typically considered a basin jurisdiction because its share of the 
basin's land area is so small) (Figure 2.1). Under the Canadian Constitution, provinces 
have primary responsibility for the management of water resources, and thus each 
province has its own institutional framework for governing water. 
 The federal government is also a key basin jurisdiction because of its constitutionally-
defined responsibilities relating to concerns such as fisheries, national parks, 
transboundary waters and Aboriginal peoples. 
 The Yukon Territory and the NWT have received province-like powers from the federal 
government through devolution processes in 2003 and 2014, respectively. 
 Indigenous peoples occupy a special place in Canada's society because of their historical, 
legal, treaty and constitutionally-defined rights. Hence, the fact that the basin includes the 
traditional territories, treaty areas and land claim settlement regions of First Nations, 
Métis and Inuvialuit (or western Canadian Inuit) peoples is critical to any discussion of 
transboundary water governance in the basin. 
The MRBB was created in part to provide a coordinating function among these actors. 
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The basin is under pressure from a number of threats. A lack of adequate baseline 
environmental data in much of the basin has made tracking long-term environmental changes 
difficult (MRBB 2012). Climate change is an important current and future stressor on the basin's 
social and ecological systems (Schindler and Donahue 2006). Wolfe, et al., (2012) anticipate 
declining spring freshet and summer discharge in the headwaters of the MRB. Some models 
indicate that annual discharge may increase in the Peace River region, with higher discharge in 
the fall and winter months but reduced discharge in the late summer and early fall (Schnorbus, et 
al. 2011). Modelling future Athabasca River flows indicates a trend of decreasing flows which is 
expected to continue because of declining glacier ice and snowpack at higher elevations 
(Sauchyn, et al. 2015). There is some uncertainty about the impacts of the climate change in the 
basin. In general, water quality and quantity available for human settlements and resource 
developments are expected to fluctuate, making an adaptive approach necessary in this basin 
(MRBB 2012). 
Energy development projects located in the Athabasca and Peace sub-basins are additional 
sources of social and environmental change in the MRB. Fossil fuel extraction is predominant 
economic activity in the Athabasca sub-basin in Alberta. In 2014-2015, royalties collected from 
bitumen mining totaled approximately $5 billion, over half of those collected by the province 
(Government of Alberta 2015a). Production from surface and in-situ oil sands mines increased by 
over 200 percent between 2000 and 2014, from 0.66 million bbl/day to 2.3 million bbl/day 
(Alberta Energy and Utilites Board 2001; Alberta Energy Regulator 2015); production is 
expected to reach approximately 4.8 million bbl/day by 2030 (Alberta Energy Regulator 2015). 
Oil sands development figures prominently in Alberta's economy, but it has also created 
large-scale environmental disturbances. More than 600 km² of land is under development for oil 
sands mining and there are approximately 170 km² of tailings ponds in the region (MRBB 2012 
(MRBB 2012), which contain napthenic acids, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, arsenic and 
other trace metals (Timoney and Lee 2009). The most significant source of water for oil sands 
mining is the Athabasca River; mining requires on average 3.1 barrels of water per barrel of oil 
produced (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2015). Processed water is stored in 
tailing ponds which have been detected seeping into the Athabasca River and its tributaries 
(Timoney and Lee 2009). The scale and pace of oil sands development in Alberta is controversial 
because of local environmental impacts, including habitat fragmentation and destruction, 
pollution and water use (Hodson 2013) as well as impacts to the Aboriginal and treaty rights and 
contribution to Canada's greenhouse gas emissions (Mantyka-Pringle, et al. 2015). Concern 
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regarding the environmental impacts of oil sands extraction extends to the downstream NWT 
(AANDC and GNWT 2012). In the late 2000s and early 2010s, several reports critiqued 
monitoring programs in the oil sands region for failing to provide necessary data to conduct 
cumulative effects assessments (Auditor General of Canada 2011) or adequate sampling and 
baseline information to adequately assess industry's impact on the landscape (Kelly, et al. 2010; 
Oil Sands Advisory Panel 2010). In response, the federal government and province of Alberta 
cooperated to develop a multi-year Joint Oil Sands Monitoring Program in 2012 (Government of 
Canada and Government of Alberta 2012). The MRBB has not been directly engaged in this 
monitoring effort. 
Electricity generated from hydro-electric power stations in the basin also is extremely 
important to the economy of British Columbia. Two stations located on the Peace River account 
for approximately 30 percent of generating capacity in the province (MRBB 2003a). A third dam 
was approved by the provincial and federal governments in the fall of 2014. The environmental 
impacts of hydroelectric facilities on the Peace River have been long-standing concerns for 
downstream communities and governments (NRBSB 1996), who raised concerns during the EA 
for the third dam in 2013 and 2014 (Government of the Northwest Territories 2013; Moore 2014; 
Parks Canada 2013). The Bennett Dam on the Peace River (Figure 2.1) has resulted in changes to 
seasonal patterns of stream flow - higher flows in winter and lower flows in the spring - that have 
long been thought to have negatively affected the ecology of the Peace-Athabasca Delta (Prowse 
and Conly 2000). The extent to which changes experienced and observed in the Peace-Athabasca 
Delta are caused by climate change or the dam's flow regulation is currently a matter of debate. 
Some studies suggest that climate drivers are responsible (Wolfe, et al. 2012) while others 
acknowledge that although climate change has had an impact, flow regulation is the more 
influential driver of downstream ecosystem disturbance (Beltaos 2014). 
In summary, the MRB is a nationally significant bioregion. Critical ecological resources 
exist in a place that is immensely significant to Indigenous peoples, who have occupied the 
landscape for millennia. Major economic developments exist, and many more are planned. 
Inadequate monitoring and baseline information means considerable uncertainty exists about the 
extent of environmental changes resulting from industrial development and climate change. 
Uncertainties associated with the extent of environmental changes resulting from climate change 
and industrial development, and the multiple interests at stake in the MRB, make an adaptive 
approach to governance in this basin desirable. 
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2.3 Politics, strategies and institutional design 
The jurisdictions that share the MRB have independent responsibilities for water resources. As a 
result, even though the basin is located entirely within Canada, the kinds of problems that are 
typical in shared international basins (Loures, et al. 2008) also exist in this case. Recognizing this 
challenge, the basin jurisdictions began working towards a more cooperative approach to water 
management in the early 1970s (Creery 1979). These efforts coincided with a period of national 
leadership from the federal government, and a relatively high degree of cooperation among the 
provinces and the federal government on water issues in Canada (Booth and Quinn 1995). This 
cooperative spirit has dissipated as the territories received province-like powers for resource 
management and cuts to federal environment ministries reduced the federal government’s 
capacity for water-related matters (Clancy 2014). As noted above, although the federal 
government does possess constitutional jurisdiction for transboundary waters, in recent years it 
has largely deferred to sub-federal governments regarding transboundary waters (Saunders 2014).  
Work on the agreement that created the MRBB began in 1988 and proceeded through several 
iterations of negotiations and public comment. An agreement was drafted in the early 1990s and 
finalized in 1997 when the responsible Ministers from each jurisdiction signed the Mackenzie 
River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement (henceforth referred to as the Master 
Agreement) (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). The Master Agreement reflects the preferred 
style of intergovernmental cooperation in Canada during the 1990s, as well as key principles that 
were shaping discussions around ecosystems and transboundary water resources in the 
international realm during this time, e.g., information exchange, cooperation among watercourse 
states, and an ecosystem approach (McCaffrey 2007; Slocombe 1998). Table 2.1 summarizes 
how these preferences and principles were expressed in terms of the five institutional design rules 
discussed in (Huitema and Meijerink 2014). Key underlying principles in Part C of the 
Agreement (Government of Canada, et al. 1997) include the following: 
1.  Managing the Water Resources in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the Ecological 
Integrity of the Aquatic Ecosystem; 
2.  Managing the use of Water Resources in a sustainable manner for present and future 
generations; 
3.  The right of each to use or manage the use of the Water Resources within its jurisdiction 
provided such use does not unreasonable harm the Ecological Integrity of the Aquatic 
Ecosystem in any other jurisdiction 
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4.  Providing for early and effective consultation, notification and sharing of information on 
development and activities that might affect the Ecological Integrity of the Aquatic Ecosystem 
in another jurisdiction; 
5.  Resolving issues in a cooperative and harmonious manner. 
Table 2.1: Rules underlying the institutional design of the Master Agreement and the Mac-
kenzie River Basin Board 
Rule-types Rules in case study 
Authority 
rules 
The MRBB has no independent authority of its own beyond the mandate it received from 
the parties to the Master Agreement. Instead, its mandate focuses on coordination, 
facilitation, dispute resolution and information gathering and sharing. 
Aggregation 
rules 
Decisions are made by super majority of two-thirds of the members of the Board, 
although there are constraints on Aboriginal members (e.g., they are appointed at the 
pleasure of the respective Ministers and they cannot pass resolutions or action items 
without the support of some government members). 
Boundary 
rules 
The boundaries of the Board’s mandate are defined by the hydrologic basin, and the 
signatories to the Master Agreement have relatively well accepted territorial and 
constitutional jurisdictions. Entry and exit rules are specified in the Agreement. 
Membership is limited to representatives of governments, and to Aboriginal peoples 
(who are not considered as representatives of the general public). 
Information 
rules 
The Board has a mandate to conduct research and to generate information that contributes 
to a whole basin perspective on problems of issues; thus, it has some scope to generate its 
own information. Discussions around the board table are private, and minutes of these 
discussions are not publicly available. 
Pay-off rules The annual budget for the board that was established in 1997, $280,000, is provided by 
the basin jurisdictions according to a clear formula specified in the Master Agreement. 
The budget has not been changed since 1997, meaning that the present value of the 
budget is significantly less than in 1997 due to inflation. 
 
The agreement does not define ecological integrity, sustainable management, or what 
constitutes cooperative management. Fulfilling these objectives depends on the substance of 
seven bilateral water managements to be negotiated between neighbouring jurisdictions under the 
broad framework of the Agreement. The MRBB can support the negotiation of these agreements, 
but it does not have an explicit negotiating role. As of October 2015, three bilateral agreements 
have been completed. One, between the Yukon and the NWT, was completed in 2000, and is 
considered by many to be outdated and in need of revision. In 2015, bilateral water management 
agreements were completed between the governments of Alberta and the NWT and British 
Columbia and the NWT. Four other bilateral agreements are currently being negotiated. 
Section 2(D) of the Master Agreement created the river basin organization that is the focus 
of this article: the MRBB. The boundaries of the Master Agreement, and the jurisdiction of the 
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Board, were hydrologically-defined - and this boundary rule has not been contentious. When the 
agreement was negotiated the hydrological boundaries established in previous studies were 
accepted as constituting the MRBB's jurisdiction. Establishing the boundaries was apolitical as it 
was viewed as "a GIS [geographic information system] job and if somebody came and said the 
line needs to move a mile east or a mile west because they've now done more detailed GIS work . 
. . fine. That is not an issue" (Key Informant [KI] 4). 
As defined by the Master Agreement, the Board has up to three officials appointed by the 
federal government and one each appointed by the provinces and territories. If member 
jurisdictions wish to exit the agreement, the Master Agreement specifies that one year's notice to 
all of the other jurisdictions must be provided. A distinctive feature of the board's membership is 
the provision for five Aboriginal members. These members are elected by Aboriginal 
organizations in each of the provinces and territories, and are then appointed by the respective 
jurisdictions. Several board members have suggested that the inclusion of Aboriginal members 
brings a necessary perspective to the board (KI 1, KI 4). However, the Board's aggregation rules 
require a super majority of two-thirds of members present to consent to a decision or undertaking. 
Therefore, in most cases Aboriginal members cannot pass resolutions or action items without the 
support of some government members. 
The MRBB's overall mandate is to support the principles of the Master Agreement and to 
provide a forum to coordinate and facilitate information exchange between each jurisdiction. 
Specific duties relating to the underlying information rules are spelled out in the Master 
Agreement; these include monitoring the implementation of bilateral water management 
agreements that are to be completed between jurisdictions that share part of the MRB; creating 
State of the Aquatic Ecosystem Reports for the responsible Ministers every five years; reviewing 
the terms of the Agreement and making recommendations for revision to the Ministers at least 
every three years; encouraging consistent monitoring programs; and, recommending uniform 
water quality and quantity objectives. The board is also charged with considering the needs of 
Aboriginal peoples, keeping them informed of the MRB in culturally-relevant ways and 
incorporating traditional ecological knowledge and values. Payoff rules are clear-cut. The Master 
Agreement specified that the total annual costs to be shared by the parties shall not exceed 
$280,000 (Part D, Section 3) - an amount that has not been increased since 1997. 
The MRBB's mandate is broader than was considered ideal by the officials from Alberta 
and Saskatchewan who participated in the negotiation of the Master Agreement. These 
jurisdictions had prior experience with another Canadian internal transboundary agreement, the 
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1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment among Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and 
Canada, which created the Prairie Provinces Water Board (PWBB). The 1969 agreement 
apportions the waters of the Saskatchewan River system in southern Canada, which flows through 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba (Percy 2012). It tasks the PPWB with ensuring that each 
jurisdiction receives its full allocation, facilitating information exchange and preventing and 
resolving disputes (Saunders and Wenig 2007). Board members from Alberta and Saskatchewan 
preferred the narrower scope of the PPWB (KI 7). However, with its focus on principles of 
ecological integrity and sustainable water management, the Mackenzie River Basin 
Transboundary Waters Master Agreement has a much broader scope than the 1969 Master 
Agreement on Apportionment for the Prairie provinces (Saunders 2012). The Government of the 
NWT believes this broader approach is more appropriate because of the more complex situation 
in the MRB (KI 2). 
In terms of authority rules, the MRBB is an institution designed to facilitate and coordinate 
rather than to regulate. It does not have authority independent from the governments that created 
it. It does not issue licenses or make resource management decisions. It can influence decisions 
by providing information and acting as a "friend of the tribunal" in provincial, territorial, and 
federal public hearings (Donihee, et al. 2000). However, the MRBB has no authority to intervene 
in the parties' jurisdiction; indeed, Part G of the Master Agreement explicitly protects the 
"proprietary rights or interests of the Parties." This institutional design was purposeful. None of 
the jurisdictions wanted to cede their autonomy to make resource management decisions or to 
influence their development trajectory to a multijurisdictional management board (KI 4). 
Despite some disagreement about the board's design and role, there was enough of a 
consensus that the Master Agreement was signed by the parties. Undoubtedly part of the reason 
for this agreement was the fact that the Master Agreement is non-binding, its language is vague 
and its principles rely upon the fulfillment of the bilateral water management agreements that 
were to be negotiated in future. This definitional vagueness and openness can be interpreted as 
desirable; it reflects principles of adaptive management related to flexibility and leaves options 
open for future water managers. However, without specific definitions and water quality or 
quantity targets or recommendations, the agreement's implementation is also vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the desire of governments to cooperate and adhere to the principles of the 
agreement. For example, in the years since the agreement was signed, major industrial 
developments, including the expansion of oil sands extraction and hydroelectric facilities, have 
raised significant concerns for downstream governments. In recent years, the federal government 
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prioritized increasing resource development in Canada; there are strong interests associated with 
expanding resource development in the MRB (Clancy 2014). Upstream hydroelectric 
developments, and oil sands development in Alberta, inspired the creation of the NWT's water 
strategy (Box 1), the success of which depends strongly on the existence of bilateral agreements 
that respect the NWT's concerns.   
Box 2.1: The Northwest Territories Water Strategy 
Aboriginal peoples residing in the NWT have a history of partnership with government in making 
decisions about land and water resources. This is demonstrated in the NWT's recent water strategy, 
Northern Voices, Northern Waters, which states "today, as in the past, the deeply held values of 
Aboriginal people have brought water issues to the forefront of the NWT" (GNWT 2010, 3). The water 
strategy, which was developed in partnership between the Government of the NWT and Aboriginal 
governments, recognizes the cultural, spiritual and historical importance of water to Aboriginal people 
and outlines a commitment to appropriately involve Aboriginals in implementing the water management 
strategy. In the words of one key informant, "A lot of our perspective is driven by the people who were 
born and raised and lived in the NWT since time immemorial which is the Aboriginal population" (KI 3). 
 
In response to perceptions of deficiencies in the Master Agreement's implementation, the 
most downstream jurisdiction in the basin, the NWT, has recently been advocating for changes to 
the Board's membership and funding because it views the Board as ineffective, lacking 
independence from government, and missing needed authority (KI 2, KI 3). The NWT's Minister 
of Environment and Natural Resources, Michael Miltenberger, made several unsuccessful 
attempts to meet with the other Ministers to discuss reforming the Board within the confines of 
the Master Agreement (KI 5). However, because water is rarely a key issue for Ministers, and 
when it is, it competes with a host of other issues (Clancy 2014), the interjurisdictional consensus 
required to modify instructions given to the MRBB has not been forthcoming. The fact that 
provinces and territories have different perspectives on what the MRBB’s role should be is also a 
factor.  
As noted above, since the Master Agreement was signed in 1997, three bilateral agreements 
have been completed. In the case of the 2000 agreement between Yukon and NWT, the issues 
were relatively straightforward and the stakes much lower than is the case between BC and 
Alberta, or Alberta and NWT (Saunders 2012). The agreements signed in 2015 were the result of 
the NWT's strong desire to secure bilateral agreements. In an effort to reinvigorate and align the 
process of creating bilateral agreements, the Bilateral Water Management Agreements Guidance 
Document was created (MRBB 2009), largely under the leadership of the NWT (KI 3). The 
Bilateral Guidance Document (2009) provides common guidelines so that each of the bilateral 
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agreements to be negotiated will be complementary; several interviewees reported that it was 
helpful in the negotiation of the agreements (KI 9, KI 10). 
The bilateral agreements completed in 2015 reflect some aspects of Bilateral Guidance 
Document. They include commitments to develop transboundary objectives for surface and 
ground water quality and quantity and aquatic ecosystem health. Objectives will be developed 
based on monitoring and learning plans developed by BMCs. The agreements also reaffirm the 
guiding principles of the Master Agreement. However, unlike the Bilateral Guidance Document 
which outlines a future role the Board may have that is specific to monitoring the implementation 
of the bilateral agreements (one of its responsibilities under the Master Agreement), the 
agreements do not assign the MRBB this responsibility. Rather, the agreements create BMCs, 
composed of government appointees, and assign them responsibilities associated with 
implementing the agreement and reporting on the progress of doing so. Perhaps more importantly 
for the purpose of this article is the limited role envisioned for the MRBB, which is mentioned 
only twice in the agreements: in relation to roles identifying basin-wide research priorities and in 
the context of helping to resolve disputes that have been referred to the MRBB (Government of 
Alberta and Government of the Northwest Territories 2015; Government of British Columbia and 
Government of the Northwest Territories 2015). The appendices acknowledge that the MRBB 
will have an oversight role in implementing the agreement, but is sparse on details regarding what 
that will entail. 
The extent to which the MRBB will undertake basin-level research, resolve disputes and 
provide oversight is uncertain, in part because of the constraints under which it operates. As 
Donihee et al., (2000) point out, even without the bilateral water management agreements, the 
MRBB could play a more active and engaged role in transboundary water governance in the 
basin. Why this has not occurred is explored in the next section. 
2.4 Performance of the MRBB as a coordinating river basin organiza-
tion 
Evaluation of the performance of river basin organizations was a key goal of the papers in this 
special issue. In this section, we evaluate the MRBB relative to four interrelated performance 
considerations identified in (Huitema and Meijerink 2014) (i.e., coordination, accountability, 
legitimacy, and environmental effectiveness). This facilitates our consideration of the potential 
for a more adaptive approach to transboundary water governance in the MRB. Except as noted 




Coordination is arguably one of the MRBB's most important functions. However, despite the 
Master Agreement's promotion of a more holistic approach to management of the waters of the 
basin, the kind of coordination that the Board can undertake is circumscribed by the authority 
rules contained in the Master Agreement (Table 2.1). To illustrate, nothing in the wording of the 
Master Agreement requires or permits the MRBB to respond proactively to developments in any 
jurisdiction even if these developments have transboundary implications (Donihee, et al. 2000). 
The Board could play a legitimate role as an intervener in provincial planning and regulatory 
processes to provide information or advance general principles. However, advancing specific 
positions supporting or opposing particular projects would run contrary to the Agreement's 
clauses relating to cooperation and respect for each of the parties' jurisdiction (Donihee, et al. 
2000). 
Concern for jurisdictional interests has meant that at times, the MRBB struggles to adopt a 
whole-basin perspective, according to several interviewees (KI 1; KI 3; KI 7). Although the 
MRBB provides a forum to share information, one interviewee commented that there is no 
mechanism or requirement that other jurisdictions modify internal management procedures in 
response to concerns raised at meetings (KI 11). This is reinforced by provisions of the Master 
Agreement that protect jurisdictional autonomy to make resource management decisions. In fact, 
coordinating the sometimes competing interests that exist in the basin regarding industrial 
development has been a challenge. For example, flow regulation by hydroelectric facilities in 
British Columbia has been a long-standing concern for downstream jurisdictions Alberta and the 
NWT (NRBSB 1996). Yet, when British Columbia approved its third dam on the Peace River, the 
project's approval conditions did not incorporate the immediate downstream concerns regarding 
the adequacy of proposed minimum flows from the dam (British Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 2014b; Moore 2014). 
The Master Agreement does permit jurisdictions to strengthen the coordination function 
through bilateral agreements. For instance, the bilateral agreements completed in 2015 contain 
specific requirements and obligations regarding notification and consultation. Significantly, they 
assign notification and consultation functions to the BMCs. It is possible that the experiences and 
perspectives from each of the separate BMCs could be brought to the MRBB. However, the 
agreement and appendices are silent on whether the BMCs will coordinate with one another or 
the Board. This omission is a concern because coordination and vertical information sharing via 
nested institutions are key components of adaptive transboundary governance. 
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Dispute resolution is a common function of river basin organizations in other parts of the 
world (Huitema and Meijerink 2014). By helping to resolve disputes, river basin organizations 
can support coordinated approaches to the governance of shared basins. The MRBB can play a 
role in resolving disputes when questions or disputes relating to the Master Agreement are 
brought directly to the Board by a member (Donihee, et al. 2000) or a BMC (Government of 
Alberta and Government of the Northwest Territories 2015; Government of British Columbia and 
Government of the Northwest Territories 2015). However, reflecting the limited and carefully 
constrained role that the parties to the Master Agreement wanted when it was negotiated, the 
Board can only issue conclusion and recommendations in such cases, and the parties involved 
need not respond. Furthermore, as Saunders (2012) notes, the Master Agreement does not permit 
either a judicial role or any form of binding arbitration - meaning that the dispute resolution 
procedures it contains are weak. The pattern of avoiding binding, judicial dispute resolution was 
replicated in the recently completed bilateral water management agreements. 
The Board has a mandate to recommend objectives for water quality and quantity, which is 
another avenue for coordination that would support a bioregional perspective. However, it does 
not have the authority to ensure or require that the basin jurisdictions have common policies (KI 
4). Completed bilateral water management agreements do contain provisions to develop specific 
surface and ground water quality and quantity objectives and biological objectives. Objectives 
have yet to be determined, but will be based on learning plans developed and implemented by 
BMC (Government of Alberta and Government of the Northwest Territories 2015; Government 
of British Columbia and Government of the Northwest Territories 2015). However, the bilateral 
agreements indicate that monitoring and reporting associated with water quality and quantity 
objectives will be undertaken by BMCs, not the MRBB, which may challenge a bioregional 
approach to governance in the basin. 
The MRBB has a mandate to conduct research and to generate information that contributes 
to a bioregional perspective on water-related issues. In fact, this is one of the two roles assigned 
to the MRBB in the bilateral agreements. In a thorough assessment of the Master Agreement from 
a legal perspective prepared for the Board, Donihee, et al., (2000) suggested that bilateral 
agreements are not necessarily required for the Board to address basin-wide issues relating to the 
sustainable use of water resources or aquatic ecosystems in a more proactive fashion. Despite this 
opinion, the Board has not pursued this opportunity. Instead, it has focused its energy on the 
production of State of the Environment reports; submissions of these to the Ministers is required 
every five years under the terms of the Agreement. Two such reports have been submitted 
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(MRBB 2003a; MRBB 2012). The second report was several years overdue; it provided a brief 
overview and summary of key issues in the basin raised in the first report (MRBB 2012). 
The Board has a special mandate to involve Aboriginal peoples in its deliberations, and to 
integrate traditional knowledge, an important feature of the agreement that can contribute to 
adaptive governance in the basin. Aboriginal Board members are explicitly not representatives of 
the general public. Instead, they are supposed to represent the interests of Indigenous peoples in 
the provinces/territories from which they were appointed. This is a complex task because of the 
diversity of Indigenous peoples in each jurisdiction; as noted, the basin is home to distinct First 
Nations, Métis and Inuvialuit peoples. Due to the existence of land claims agreements in the 
territories that assign specific governance functions to Indigenous peoples, the legal position of 
Indigenous peoples in those jurisdictions differs from the position of Indigenous peoples in the 
provincial portions of the basin. Practical challenges also exist relating to the ability of the 
Aboriginal members of the Board to participate in its activities. For instance, resources to support 
capacity building have been insufficient (KI 7). Most significantly for the subject of coordination, 
the role that has been permitted to the Aboriginal Board members has been described as "token" 
by a senior territorial official (KI 2); this is completely unacceptable from the perspective of 
NWT, the interviewee suggested, where Aboriginal governments are viewed as partners with the 
territorial government (Box 1). 
The Board's performance of its coordination functions should not be surprising in light of 
the constraints under which it operates. For its day-to-day work, the Board has a Secretariat with 
a staff of one person (MRBB 2013). Interviewees emphasized that the budget of the MRBB, 
which has not been increased since 1997, is too limited to undertake significant original research. 
Additionally, as a former Executive Director noted, the different jurisdictions have struggled to 
come to agreement on what research initiative should be undertaken with the limited funds that 
are available (KI 7). He attributes this in part to the Board's composition. Along with several 
other interviewees, he noted that the Board is dominated by bureaucrats, and that this can work 
against a broader perspective because the government members are focused too strongly on the 
interests of their own jurisdictions. Funds also have been insufficient to coordinate the various 
monitoring programs within the basin jurisdictions (KI 5). The fact that the recent monitoring 
program instituted in 2012 for the oil sands due to public and scientific concerns is a joint 
initiative between Canada and Alberta (Government of Canada and Government of Alberta 
2012), and does not involve the MRBB, raises questions about the relevance of the Board, and the 
strength of the political commitment to shared management of the basin. The Government of the 
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NWT (2012) has requested (unsuccessfully) that Aboriginal partners be involved in the 
implementation of the monitoring program. In 2014, the Auditor General of Canada reviewed the 
monitoring program's performance and noted that, "further efforts are needed to meet 
commitments to engage stakeholders, including First Nations and Métis, and incorporate TEK 
[traditional ecological knowledge]" (Auditor General of Canada 2014, 17). 
2.4.2 Accountability 
How accountability should be evaluated in a case such as the MRBB is complicated and 
contested. The MRBB was created by Ministers from the respective jurisdictions. It exists at the 
pleasure of these Ministers and is formally accountable only to them; from this perspective, a 
former Board member suggested, accountability is not a concern (KI 4). In contrast, other 
interviewees pointed to larger accountability questions. For example, the respective Ministers are 
under no obligation to present reports from the Board to their respective legislatures, or to the 
general public (KI 3). Hence, the Ministers themselves are not regularly accountable for the 
success or failure of the Board to achieve its mandate, or for the extent to which the terms of the 
Master Agreement are met (KI 5). The fact that water is rarely a key priority for Ministers 
(Clancy 2014), with perhaps the more recent exception of Minister Miltenberger, has contributed 
to the low level of political attention the Board has received.  
The Board's accountability to Indigenous peoples in the basin also is an important question 
that deserves consideration (KI 5). In terms of the legal text of the Agreement, the Board is not 
specifically accountable to Indigenous peoples in the same way it is accountable to the Ministers. 
From the perspective of the NWT, however, the question of accountability to Indigenous peoples 
is less clear cut. As noted previously, Aboriginal governments are viewed as partners by the 
government of the NWT (Box 1). This stands in contrast to the general perspective of the 
provincial and federal governments in Canada towards Indigenous peoples (Phare 2009). Gaps in 
mechanisms to engage the public and uneven approaches to engaging Indigenous peoples in the 
basin may challenge adaptive governance. 
Key informants reported varying levels of satisfaction regarding the extent to which the 
Board was fulfilling its mandate. Referring to the kinds of issues discussed above, some 
interviewees suggested that the Board was not particularly effective in fulfilling its mandate 
under the Master Agreement, and, importantly, was not being held to account. For example, the 
Board is required to submit reports annually. However, it did not publish any annual reports 
during the years 2007-2011 and fulfilled its overdue reporting requirements with an update in 
2013 (MRBB 2013). As noted earlier, the MRBB was late in delivering its second State of the 
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Aquatic Ecosystem reports. The Board also has a specific mandate to incorporate traditional 
ecological knowledge, but has struggled to do so according to interviewees. In a recent report, the 
Board itself acknowledged that, "when compared with the availability of western science, 
Traditional Knowledge is underrepresented in all areas of the Mackenzie River Basin" (MRBB 
2012, 10). 
These kinds of concerns speak to accountability, in the sense that historically it does not 
seem to have mattered to all the signatories to the Master Agreement whether or not the Board 
fulfills its mandate. In fairness, however, it must be emphasized that it is entirely within the 
power of the basin jurisdictions (with the consent of all parties) to increase the Board's budget, to 
change the instructions given to government members regarding their role on the Board, to 
encourage the Board to expand its activities within its mandate, to provide it with the support it 
would need to integrate traditional ecological knowledge more effectively - or even to 
reconstitute it through a new agreement. Any of these activities would require the consent of all 
basin jurisdictions. Although most jurisdictions agree that modifying the budget is necessary, 
agreement on the precise nature of the changes has not been forthcoming (KI 3; (MRBB 2013)). 
2.4.3 Legitimacy 
As in the case of accountability, multiple perspectives exist regarding the legitimacy of the 
MRBB. The concept of "legitimacy" is conventionally defined as the approval of institutions by 
those subject to their actions (Gearey and Jeffrey 2006; Suchman 1995). The MRBB has the 
legitimacy that flows to bodies constituted under agreements entered into by parties that 
themselves have legitimacy. It certainly has not exceeded its mandate, or even (arguably) reached 
the limits of its mandate (Donihee, et al. 2000; Saunders 2012). 
Legitimacy is often evaluated in terms of "inputs" and "outputs" (Huitema and Meijerink 
2014). On the input side, the Board has provided a forum for the parties to share information. 
Discussions around the board table are private, and minutes of these discussions are not publicly 
available. Thus the MRBB creates a safe environment in which dialogue can occur and 
contentious issues can be discussed (KI 3; KI 6). The fact that it has a poor track record of 
engaging the general public within the basin, or indeed being known to residents of the basin - a 
problem identified by several respondents also does not undermine its legitimacy from this 
perspective; this kind of engagement was not sought by the signatories to the Master Agreement, 
although strengthening ties to the public may be necessary to establish a more adaptive approach 
in the basin. Where the MRBB clearly falls short on the input side is in meeting the requirement 
to engage Aboriginal peoples and to make effective use of traditional ecological knowledge. The 
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Board itself identified this as a deficiency (MRBB 2012). The Board's Traditional Knowledge 
and Strengthening Aboriginal Partners Committee, has been working to encourage best practices 
in gathering and incorporating traditional knowledge in environmental monitoring and assessment 
to address this deficiency (Stevenson 2012). 
On the "output" side, the Board falls short relative to its specific mandate to provide annual 
reports and State of the Environment reports every five years. Numerous relevant concerns 
relating to output legitimacy were identified above. Importantly, some interviewees pointed to the 
slow pace at which bilateral agreements have been developed as evidence of the Board's 
ineffectiveness. This criticism is unfair, we suggest, because the Master Agreement assigns the 
Board no role in the negotiation of the bilateral agreements. The rate of progress in negotiating 
the bilateral agreements has been determined entirely by the signatories to the Agreement, rather 
than by the Board. 
2.4.4 Environmental effectiveness 
The Master Agreement includes protection of the ecological integrity of the MRB as a guiding 
principle, but the recently completed bilateral water management agreements assign 
responsibilities for monitoring and reporting on environmental performance to BMCs, which are 
separate from the MRBB. Poor or limited baseline data and inadequate monitoring have made 
evaluating environmental performance within the basin difficult (MRBB 2012). As a result, 
assessing the environmental performance of the MRBB is challenging because of gaps in 
knowledge regarding pre and post-MRBB environmental conditions. Unfortunately, these gaps in 
knowledge may challenge adaptive governance, which requires ecological baselines that can be 
used to measure changing ecosystem dynamics. However, it is important to remember that the 
MRBB does not have the authority to intervene directly in the environmental decision-making of 
the parties. Any evaluation of the environmental performance of the Board must be conducted 
with reference to the constraints under which it functions. Ultimately, it is the provinces, 
territories and federal government that are responsible for environmental outcomes within the 
basin. Their responsibilities are being pursued through the bilateral agreements and BMCs, within 
which the MRBB is not given an ongoing role. 
2.5 Conclusions 
A bioregional approach was established in the MRB in 1997, with the signing of the Master 
Agreement and creation of the MRBB. However, based on our assessment of the MRBB's 
coordination, accountability, legitimacy and environmental effectiveness, we question whether a 
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bioregional, adaptive approach has been achieved in this basin. Our concerns are based on several 
pieces of evidence. First, the fairly marginal role the MRBB has historically played in the basin, 
and the recently completed bilateral agreements which assign the Board very limited roles, 
suggest that it may not play an engaged and active role in promoting bioregional governance in 
the basin. Second, challenges associated with including traditional knowledge invite questions 
regarding the extent to which knowledge from multiple sources will meaningfully inform 
monitoring and decision making. That the bilateral agreements acknowledge that traditional 
knowledge, along with scientific and local knowledge, will inform the creation of specific water 
quality, quantity and biological objectives is a positive improvement in terms of the inclusion 
necessary to contribute to adaptive governance. However, the agreements have not yet been 
implemented. Furthermore, because there is no indication in the agreements that the BMCs will 
coordinate with one another, or with the Board, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the 
extent to which a nested, multi-level approach has been achieved. Finally, although the Master 
Agreement that created the Board can be characterized as flexible, because it avoids precise 
definitions and leaves details to be specified by bilateral agreements, that openness has also 
formed the institutional context in which industrial developments with transboundary 
implications have continued to expand in upstream portions of the MRB. This leads us to our 
concluding reflections: although institutional design that facilitates coordination is necessary, it is 
far from sufficient. Ultimately, institutions work according to the political contexts in which they 
are embedded. 
Consider first the MRBB, the only institution designed to coordinate at the scale of the 
bioregion. Its limited financial support, staffing and the desire of jurisdictions to maintain 
autonomy to make decisions about resource development without external interference has 
resulted in it playing a reactive and limited role in the basin. Jurisdictions have not opted to 
strongly reinforce a bioregional approach through the bilateral agreements. Instead of 
reinvigorating the Board to play a more proactive role through recently completed bilateral 
agreements, BMCs are assigned many of the MRBB's core functions of coordination and 
monitoring. The bilateral agreements and appendices are silent on whether coordination will 
occur between and among the BMCs and the MRBB. Therefore, the extent to which vertical and 
horizontal information sharing will occur as the agreements are implemented, is uncertain. This 
omission is unfortunate; as one interviewee remarked, sufficiently protecting and, in some cases, 
restoring the ecosystem integrity requires a much more cooperative and inclusive collaborative 
effort than has been forthcoming (KI 17). The creation of BMCs alongside the MRBB does create 
a multi-level design and, at face value, provides a nested approach to bioregional governance. 
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However, the Board's limited mandate and funding mean that it cannot proactively respond to 
emerging issues in the basin. The interjurisdictional consensus required to alter the MRBB’s 
instructions and funding arrangements has not been forthcoming. Furthermore, capitalizing on the 
nested approach will likely require a much more inclusive and coordinated approach than has 
existed. 
As several interviewees pointed out, concerns to respect jurisdictional autonomy have 
meant that underlying issues associated with how hydroelectric facilities are operated, and the 
pace and scale of oil sands development, are not up for discussion at the interjurisdictional level 
(KI 3; KI 18). As noted previously, the federal government tends not to intervene in resource 
matters perceived to be provincial (Saunders 2014), and in recent years has pursued increasing 
resource development, which critics suggest has restricted its agenda for environmental protection 
(Clancy 2014). The fact that the MRBB has struggled to meaningfully incorporate traditional 
knowledge is also another deficiency considering the importance of including a variety of 
knowledges in monitoring and decision-making to adaptive governance. The Board's work to 
address this shortcoming is promising. The fact that traditional knowledge, along with scientific, 
social scientific and local knowledge, may be used to develop transboundary water quality and 
quantity objectives indicates a desire and willingness to incorporate multiple sources of 
information in the implementation of bilateral management agreements. However, it is important 
to recognize that the provinces and territories approach consultation with Indigenous peoples very 
differently and these differences may challenge the meaningful inclusion of Indigenous peoples 
and traditional knowledge across the entire basin. Historical and current power asymmetries have 
made including traditional knowledge difficult in the past (Stevenson 2012), and the bilateral 
agreements do not directly address Canada's colonial legacy, such as the significant disparities in 
health, education and income that exists between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians 
(Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015). 
We close by returning to one of the underlying themes of this special issue: the importance 
and limitations of institutional design. The constraints under which the MRBB operates exist by 
design. At the time the Master Agreement was negotiated, the jurisdictions desired an institution 
to coordinate information exchange but with no authority to intervene in interjurisdictional 
matters. The consensus that existed regarding principles of ecosystem integrity and sustainable 
water management fell apart when momentum and resources were insufficient to fully implement 
the agreement (KI 1). The interjurisdictional cooperation and willingness to collaborate that 
existed in the 1970s and 1980s has greatly diminished today. The federal government has been 
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hesitant to play a leadership role in environmental matters. This hesitance is compounded by 
recently completed devolution agreements with the territories, through which responsibilities of 
resource management in the territories were transferred from the federal government to the 
territorial governments. Furthermore, in recent years, it has pursued a policy of reducing 
regulatory burdens for industry, including restricting the scope and application of federal 
environmental protections for water (Clancy 2014). 
Paradoxically, this case study illustrates that while institutional design that facilitates 
coordination is necessary, it is far from sufficient. The presence of a river basin organization does 
not necessarily result in adaptive governance. The ability to effectively coordinate and to manage 
the MRB according to principles of ecosystem integrity and sustainability depends strongly on 
the desire of the jurisdictions to do so. As we have demonstrated, that desire has not always been 
consistent in the MRB. The bilateral agreements represent a renewed commitment to the 
principles of the agreement and perhaps a new beginning for cooperative and adaptive 
governance in the basin. The extent to which they can contribute to a bioregional, adaptive 
approach to governance in the basin will require addressing deficiencies associated with including 
traditional knowledge and coordinating the various interests at stake in resource development in 
the basin. It will certainly require coordination between separate BMCs, either organically or 
through the MRBB. Achieving this level of coordination could make governance in the MRB a 
positive example of an adaptive governance regime that proactively responds to emerging threats 
in the basin. 
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3 Chapter Three 
 
A power analysis of the role of collaboration in transboundary wa-
ter governance in Canada’s Mackenzie River Basin 
3.1 Introduction 
Collaborative approaches to environmental governance are valued for a number of reasons. 
Proponents claim they provide opportunities for representatives from multiple sectors – private, 
public, civil society, Indigenous – to work together to address shared problems (Holley, et al. 
2012). Collaboration encourages pooling resources, sharing knowledge and learning, to 
accomplish collectively what participants may struggle to do individually (Gray 1989). In 
contexts of complexity and uncertainty, collaboration can encourage participants to explore 
innovative and adaptive solutions (Innes and Booher 2010; Margerum 2011). These qualities of 
collaboration suggest it may be appropriate for governance in transboundary water systems, 
which are characterized by multiple jurisdictions, interests, values and perspectives, complex and 
uncertain social-ecological dynamics, and upstream-downstream asymmetries (Birdsong 2008). 
In federal and international transboundary watersheds, multi-level collaborations may contribute 
to adaptive and inclusive governance (Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008). However, the 
potentially positive role of collaboration may be tempered by power dynamics in transboundary 
systems. Power – the ability to create or prevent change (Sayer 2012) – is critical to what 
collaboration can actually achieve in transboundary systems. 
The collaborative water governance literature tends to focus on more obvious dimensions of 
power, such as inclusion and agenda control (Brisbois and de Loë 2015). In contrast, the 
transboundary water governance literature highlights the less obvious ways in which power 
works, such as through ideas and values that prevent overt conflict (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). 
Unlike the collaboration literature, which considers the roles of non-governmental actors, the 
transboundary water governance literature focuses on the interactions of governments, and thus, 
less is known about the role of collaboration in transboundary contexts. Collaboration that 
involves non-governmental actors may have a key role encouraging adaptive transboundary water 
governance (Akamani and Wilson 2011). Non-governmental actors may also be positioned to 
challenge existing power asymmetries in transboundary systems (Zawahri and Hensengerth 
2012). This paper contributes to the literatures on collaboration and transboundary water 
governance by considering the role of multi-level collaborations that involve non-governmental 
actors in transboundary contexts. The focus is on two related questions: to what extent, and how, 
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do power dynamics impact collaboration in a transboundary context; and, based on this power 
analysis, what is the role of multi-level collaboration in transboundary water governance? Both 
questions are addressed through a multiple case study of collaboration in an important federal 
transboundary basin: Canada’s Mackenzie River Basin (MRB).  
The MRB drains approximately one-fifth of Canada’s land mass. It is a jurisdictionally-
complex basin in which territorial, provincial, federal and Indigenous governments have 
important responsibilities for water. The MRB is also ecologically complex; it has three major 
deltas, some of the deepest lakes in North America and habitat for numerous species at risk, 
including the Whooping Crane and Woodland Caribou. Numerous environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs) are interested and involved in various aspects of 
governance for water in this basin because of the immense ecosystem services it provides 
(Anielski and Wilson 2009; WWF-Canada 2009). At the same time, the MRB is the site of 
increasing resource development within Canada, including fossil fuel extraction and hydroelectric 
development. Development pressures, coupled with social and environmental changes resulting 
from climate change, are creating significant governance challenges in this basin (MRBB 2012). 
Hence, it provides an ideal setting for exploring the role of collaboration in transboundary water 
governance. 
3.2 Transboundary water governance, collaboration and power 
When political boundaries intersect water bodies, significant challenges can result for 
governments, ENGOs, and industries that manage, use, value and share water. Institutional 
fragmentation, conflicting values and uses of water, sovereignty and power dynamics make 
transboundary water governance challenging. Climate change, population growth and increasing 
industrial development further complicate water management and create the need for adaptive 
and flexible approaches to governing transboundary waters (Cooley and Gleick 2011; 
Falkenmark and Jägerskog 2010). These kinds of challenges exist to different degrees in 
international and sub-federal transboundary water bodies throughout the world (Delli Priscoli and 
Wolf 2009). A body of literature has grown that emphasizes cooperation and coordination 
between governments to prevent and reduce conflicts and to contribute to environmental 
sustainability in transboundary water systems. However, power analysis of international 
transboundary basins reveal that cooperation and conflict can coexist and that cooperation is not 
necessarily universally beneficial (Zeitoun et al. 2011). Thus, it is necessary to consider 
contextual and power-related factors that can constrain cooperation over transboundary waters.  
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Powerful actors can benefit from geographic position and superior material, technical and 
financial capacity as well as less obvious power dynamics such as the ability to determine the 
scope of factors to be considered in discussions about transboundary water governance (Zeitoun 
and Warner 2006). More powerful actors also benefit from underlying ideas and norms regarding 
values that inform decisions about water uses in transboundary systems. Power analyses of 
transboundary water interactions emphasize the importance of considering underlying power 
dynamics even in apparently cooperative contexts. However, this literature has a government-
centred focus that neglects the roles of industry, ENGOs and members of the public (Lopes 
2012). This focus neglects to consider that the roles of non-governmental actors that are 
increasingly involved in environmental governance in multiple forums and at multiple levels 
(Andonova and Mitchell 2010), which can have important roles in transboundary water 
governance (Gerlak 2015; Zawahri and Hensengerth 2012).  
The transboundary water governance literature’s treatment of non-governmental actors can 
be contrasted with that of the collaboration literature. Collaboration, by definition, involves a 
variety of state and non-governmental actors sharing resources, learning from one another, and 
working together on shared problems to inform policy or practice (Ansell and Gash 2007; 
Emerson, et al. 2012). Collaboration is a label assigned to a broad class of governance activities, 
including collaborative planning exercises that emphasize ideals of deliberative democracy (Innes 
and Booher 2010), collaborative public management between various government agencies and 
members of the public (McGuire 2006), and collaborative environmental governance that is 
concerned with inclusion, learning  and consensus-based decision making at a variety of scales 
(Margerum 2011). The theme that unites these perspectives is an emphasis on the involvement of 
a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors, resource sharing and developing 
solutions to common problems. Collaboration is celebrated for encouraging learning about 
diverse perspectives and creating innovative solutions participants find acceptable, even in 
contexts of power asymmetry or high stakes decision-making  (Ansell and Gash 2007; Emerson, 
et al. 2012; Innes and Booher 2010). However, as noted previously, and discussed below, 
attention to power dynamics in this literature is limited.  
In transboundary water systems, collaboration can take place for a variety of reasons, such 
as monitoring programs at the local level (Raadgever, et al. 2008), developing recommendations 
for governments (Cosens 2010), or conducting basin-wide planning activities (Berardo and 
Gerlak 2012). In large transboundary basins, collaboration may provide local information that 
feeds into higher level decision making processes (Green, et al. 2013), providing decision-makers 
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with a greater diversity of information (Raadgever, et al. 2008). Others suggest that collaboration 
can result in more inclusive and improved transboundary water governance that better respects 
the diversity of interests, rights and values in transboundary basins (Dore 2014). In this respect, 
Raadgever, et al. (2008) include collaboration as a key component of adaptive transboundary 
water governance. Nested, multi-level collaborations that are inclusive, share information 
vertically and horizontally, and have the power to act at appropriate scales, can contribute to 
adaptive approaches to transboundary water governance (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Green, et al. 
2013). Adaptiveness is a key component of sustainable water governance (Pahl-Wostl 2007) and 
environmental governance in general (Lockwood, et al. 2010). Therefore, multi-level 
collaborations (e.g., collaborations that take place among a variety of actors at local, regional and 
basin-wide levels) are posed to make a significant contribution to governance in transboundary 
water systems. 
While power features prominently in the transboundary water governance literature, it 
receives much less attention in the collaboration literature. Brisbois and de Loë’s (2015) 
systematic review of the collaborative water governance literature found that when power is 
considered, it is often in the most obvious ways, such as inclusion, resources to participate or 
government retention of decision-making authority. Such analyses neglect the more difficult but 
potentially more significant dimensions of power discussed below (e.g., agenda-setting and 
discursive power). In several models of collaboration, power is considered a part of the contextual 
environment alongside other variables examined (Ansell and Gash 2007; Emerson, et al. 2012). 
Some studies of power tend to focus on how power dynamics operate within collaborative 
processes (Purdy 2012), neglecting to consider how collaboration intersects with broader political 
and economic forces that inform the context in which collaboration takes place. Empirical studies 
suggest that a closer investigation of the impact of power dynamics on collaboration is warranted. 
Even if power is not explicitly named, it is apparent that power-related effects are present in 
numerous cases. For example, evidence from collaborations in Australia (Holley, et al. 2012), 
Canada (Norman and Bakker 2008) and South Africa (Mirumachi and Van Wyk 2010) suggest 
that governments are sometimes unwilling to share decision-making authority with collaborative 
groups. Kallis, et al. (2009) suggest that collaboration is not always inclusive of marginalized 
interests. Industry actors have been found to have greater influence over agenda-setting than other 
participants in collaborative processes (Cook 2015). Broader political and economic contexts in 
which collaborations exist may constrain the outcomes they can produce (Brisbois and de Loë 
2016). These kinds of challenges relate to power dynamics within and outside of collaborative 
forums. They suggest that despite the presence of well-facilitated process or interdependencies 
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between participants, power dynamics can influence the outcomes of collaboration. This insight is 
particularly pertinent to assessing the influence of power dynamics on collaboration in 
transboundary water systems. The ability to contribute to adaptiveness in transboundary contexts 
rests, in part, on the ability of collaborations to produce outcomes that impact decisions at various 
levels within transboundary systems (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Green, et al. 2013).  
There are a number of different approaches to conceptualizing power within the social 
sciences. Definitions of power are related to views on whether power is a capacity exercised by 
agents, endowed in structures that determine or strongly influence actions, and whether power 
should be understood as zero or positive-sum (Dowding 2012; Haugaard 2012). Behavioural 
(Dahl 1957), structural (Gould, et al. 2004) and post-structural approaches to power (Digeser 
1992) offer different perspectives on the matters above. Steven Lukes’ (2005) power theory 
provides the foundation for this paper because it is helpful for analysing for resource management 
contexts that have the appearance of inclusivity and agreement (Caine and Krogman 2010), such 
as collaboration. Lukes’ power theory is an agent-centred approach premised on the notion that it 
is possible to assign responsibility for domination that occurs intentionally or unintentionally by 
individuals or groups (Hayward and Lukes 2008). 
 Lukes suggests that power works through three overlapping dimensions.  In power’s most 
obvious form, what Lukes refers to as the first dimension, a powerful actor prevails in decisions. 
This dimension of power is often associated with or referred to as the pluralist perspective on 
power (Dahl 1957). In collaborative processes, power’s first dimension may appear in the extent 
to which participants feel as though their voices are being heard and interests considered during 
collaboration (Purdy 2012). The financial, technical and legislative resources available to 
participants to make and implement their decisions also evince power’s first dimension (Holley, 
et al. 2012). Powerful actors prevail in decisions but they can also determine decision-making 
agendas so that decisions contrary to their interests never occur, or so that relevant concerns are 
not considered part of the decision-making agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). This less 
apparent form of power is the second dimension in Lukes’ theory. In collaboration, power’s 
second dimension may manifest in limitations to the scope of decision-making, activities assigned 
or information that is available to collaborative groups as well as who participates in 
collaboration (Cook 2015; Huxham and Vangen 2005). The third dimension of power is what 
Lukes considers the most insidious and most effective – this form of power works through 
underlying values and ideas that support the view of the status quo as natural, beneficial and 
inevitable. To the extent that these beliefs and values are adopted, overt conflict is avoided. 
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Benefiting from this form power does not necessarily require active participation in collaboration. 
To assess how power’s third dimension impacts collaboration it is necessary to consider the 
broader context in which collaboration is situated – how do the ideas and values advocated by 
collaborative groups intersect with ideas and values dominant in the broader political context? 
Are those ideas compatible or do they conflict? If they conflict, which ideas are predominant in 
decisions? Ultimately, the three dimensions of power impact the outcomes collaborations are 
capable of achieving. Table 3.1 provides definitions of each form of power as well as indicators 
used to assess power dynamics in this study. 
Table 3.1: Power indicators  
Form of power 
(2005) 
Indicators Examples  Identification/evidence 
1
st
 dimension: the 
ability to prevail in 








 Financial and 
technical capacity 
(Holley, et al. 
2012) 
 Capacity to make 
and implement 
decisions (Holley, 
et al. 2012; Purdy 
2012) 
 Inclusion of 
various 
perspectives 
(Kallis, et al. 2009) 
 Policy documents, policy 
prescriptions of non-
governmental organizations 
and Indigenous governments 
 Interview data 
2
nd
 dimension: the 
ability to set the 
agenda (Bachrach and 










 Decisions not to 
act (non-
decisions) 
 Control of the 
decision-making 
agenda (Cook 
2015; Purdy 2012) 
 Control of 







 Policy documents, policy 
prescriptions of non-
governmental organizations 
and Indigenous governments 




discursive power - the 
ability to construct, 
impose and/or benefit 
from dominant ideas 
(Lukes 2005) 





 Ability to 
construct, represent 
or benefit from an 
idea (Purdy 2012) 





 Policy documents, speeches 




3.3 Empirical context: the Mackenzie River Basin 
The MRB (Figure 3.1) provides an excellent context in which to explore the impact of power 
dynamics on and the role of collaboration in transboundary water systems. The MRB is a large, 
northward draining system. Its headwaters begin in the Peace and Athabasca sub-basins, which 
emerge in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta, respectively. The Peace and Athabasca 
Rivers meet at the Peace-Athabasca Delta (PAD) in Alberta. Approximately 80% of the delta is 
located within Wood Buffalo National Park. At the delta, the Peace River turns north to become 
the Slave River, which flows into the Northwest Territories (NWT) and discharges into Great 
Slave Lake. The Mackenzie River drains Great Slave Lake’s northwestern corner, and receives 
flows from the Liard and Peel Rivers, which flow from upstream British Columbia and the 
Yukon, respectively, before discharging into the Arctic Ocean’s Beaufort Sea.  
The MRB contains numerous large freshwater lakes and boreal, tundra and delta 
ecosystems. Deltas in the basin provide important staging and breeding grounds for a significant 
number of migratory birds, including the endangered Whooping Crane, which resides for part of 
the year in the PAD (MRBB 2003b). The ecosystems in the MRB provide habitat for species 
including moose, caribou, beaver and muskrat, which are important components of the traditional 
livelihoods of Indigenous peoples in the basin. The MRB has been recognized for its international 
significance in an era in which freshwater ecosystems are among the most rapidly degrading in 
the world (Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy 2013). 
The MRB’s ecological complexity is matched by its jurisdictional complexity. There is 
overlapping and fragmented jurisdiction for water in this basin. The provinces and territories have 
the majority of decision-making authority for water in Canada; they are responsible for water 
allocation, land use planning and energy development. Canada’s federal government also has 
important water related responsibilities for fisheries, navigation, and national parks in the MRB. 
In addition to the provincial and federal governments, Indigenous peoples also have important 
rights and responsibilities to water in the MRB (Phare 2009).  
Industrial developments in upstream jurisdictions British Columbia and Alberta, coupled 
with climate warming, are key drivers of change  in the MRB (MRBB 2012). Changes in the 
timing of freeze-up, thaw and peak river flows have been observed in the MRB and are 
anticipated into the future (MRBB 2012). Two existing hydroelectric facilities operated by a 
crown corporation, BC Hydro, on the Peace River in British Columbia, provide approximately 
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30% of the province’s generation capacity (MRBB 2003b). A third dam was approved in 
November 2014. Currently, many downstream residents, including Indigenous peoples with 
rights to fish, trap and hunt in the PAD, are concerned that upstream flow regulation has been a 
contributing factor in a multi-decadal drying event observed in the PAD (Carver 2012).  
Figure 3.1: The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada 
 
Oil sands mining within Alberta is another major industrial project in the MRB. The 
Athabasca sub-basin in Alberta contains the world’s third largest proven oil reserve (Alberta 
Energy 2014). Over 600 km2 of land, including 170km2 of tailings ponds, are currently under 
development in the Athabasca sub-basin (MRBB 2012). Oil sands mining is expected to increase 
from 2.3 to 4.8 million barrels of oil per day within the next 15 years (Alberta Energy Regulator 
2015). Surface and in-situ mining has fragmented terrestrial ecosystems and impacted water 
resources within the Athabasca sub-basin. The nature and extent of pollution resulting from oil 
sands mining is currently a matter of scientific debate (Hodson 2013). Recent studies have linked 
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oil sands mining with the presence of contaminants downstream, including mercury, polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons and arsenic (Kelly, et al. 2009; Kelly, et al. 2010; Kurek, et al. 2013). 
Others, however, suggest that some contaminants attributed to oil sands mining are deposited via 
natural sources in the air and water (Hall, et al. 2012; Wiklund, et al. 2012). Downstream 
communities in Alberta and the NWT are concerned about the risks posed by upstream oil sands 
mining. Concerns related to upstream development were driving forces in the creation of the 
collaborative groups we assessed. 
3.4 Methods 
A multiple case study approach was used in this study to support an in-depth exploration of 
power dynamics and to allow for cross-case comparison among different cases (Gerring 2007; 
Yin 2009). Cases were selected according to several criteria. First, all cases had to be situated 
within the geographic boundary of the MRB. Second, the cases had to conform to the 
characteristics of collaboration outlined in Section 1.1, including the participation of government 
and non-governmental actors, resource sharing and working together to solve common problems. 
Data accessibility and the willingness of key informants to participate also informed selection of 
the cases. The cases that met these criteria include the Slave River and Delta Partnership (SRDP), 
the Peace-Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program (PADEMP), and the MRBB. The 
SRDP is a relatively local, community based collaboration. PADEMP is a regional, 
interjurisdictional collaboration focused on the PAD, whereas the MRBB operates at the scale of 
the MRB. The cases, a mix of a local partnership, regional program and basin-level board, 
provide an opportunity to consider if and how power dynamics impact collaboration at different 
levels. They facilitate our consideration of how power dynamics impact multi-level collaborations 
in transboundary basins, which has been identified as a key feature of adaptive transboundary 
water governance in the literature (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et 
al. 2008). The cases are described in more detail below. 
3.4.1 Case studies 
3.4.1.1 The Slave River and Delta Partnership 
The SRDP was created in 2010 as a part of the Government of the NWT’s water stewardship 
strategy (Government of the Northwest Territories 2011). The partnership was designed, in part, 
to address local community concerns about the impacts of upstream developments on ecosystem 
health. Supporting and including traditional and local knowledge in community-based ecosystem 
monitoring is a specific objective in the partnership (AANDC and GNWT 2012). Local 
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community members had been concerned for many years about the impacts of developments in 
upstream jurisdictions such as pulp mills and hydroelectric facilities and more recent oil sands 
development activities. The SRDP includes federal, territorial and Aboriginal governments, 
municipalities, members of the public and a research institute and is open to anyone who wants to 
participate. A steering committee determines key monitoring priorities and paid staff undertake 
monitoring. Decisions about monitoring priorities are determined collectively by members of the 
SRDP. To date, monitoring has focused on water quality, fish health and general aquatic 
ecosystem health. The SRDP also engages with academic research institutions to undertake 
additional monitoring and communicates research findings to members of the communities in the 
Slave River watershed. 
3.4.1.2 The Peace-Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program 
PADEMP was formed in 2008 under the leadership of Parks Canada, the federal agency with 
jurisdiction in Wood Buffalo National Park; this agency serves as the chair of PADEMP. 
PADEMP was created because there was a need for consistent, ecosystem-based monitoring that 
includes western science and traditional knowledge and that included local residents in 
determining monitoring priorities in the region. Concerns regarding the impact of upstream 
activities, including hydroelectric facilities in British Columbia (NRBSB 1996), and oil sands 
mining in Alberta (Parks Canada 2011) on the ecology of the PAD also inspired the creation of 
PADEMP. Further, the conveners of PADEMP recognized that collecting baseline information 
about the state of the delta was necessary to permit measuring the extent of future changes 
anticipated as a result of climate change, hydroelectricity generation and oil sands mining. A 
steering committee including Indigenous governments, federal, territorial and provincial 
governments and ENGOs directs PADEMP’s activities (Macmillan 2013). They work together to 
determine monitoring priorities, undertake monitoring and discuss vulnerabilities in the PAD. 
Key work undertaken by PADEMP includes relationship building between the partners, 
collecting and synthesizing existing information on the delta, work on developing a Vulnerability 
Assessment Report for the PAD and coordinating activities with other monitoring groups in the 
region (Macmillan 2013). 
3.4.1.3 The Mackenzie River Basin Board 
The MRBB is the oldest of the three collaborative cases included in the study. It was created by 
the 1997 Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement (Government of 
Canada, et al. 1997), which also details the key roles and responsibilities of the MRBB. The 
agreement includes guiding principles relating to ecological integrity, sustainable water use and 
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the prevention of harm. Key roles for the MRBB include coordinating information sharing among 
jurisdictions, developing state of the environment reports, incorporating traditional knowledge, 
and communicating with Aboriginal peoples in the basin in culturally appropriate ways. The 
MRBB has 13 members – one representative per province and territory, one Aboriginal member 
per province and territory, and three representatives from the federal government. To date the 
MRBB has produced two State of the Aquatic Ecosystem Reports (MRBB 2003b; MRBB 2012), 
a Bilateral Water Management Guidance Document (MRBB 2009), and a report on best practices 
in incorporating traditional knowledge into environmental monitoring and assessments 
(Stevenson 2012). It has also supported the development of bilateral water management 
agreements among provinces and territories in the basin that contain specific water quality, 
quantity and biological objectives. 
3.4.2 Data collection and analysis 
Data used in the analysis were derived from semi-structured interviews, document analysis and 
personal observations. Twenty-six semi-structured interviews were conducted in support of this 
research. Seventeen interview participants were involved in or knowledgeable about more than 
one of the collaborative groups studied. Nine interviews support our analysis of the SRDP, 
fourteen for PADEMP and nineteen for the MRBB. Interviewees were current or former 
employees of provincial, territorial, federal governments, Indigenous governments and ENGOs. 
They were contacted based on their involvement in the collaborations studied. Interviews were 
conducted between August 2012 and May 2015. All interviews but one were audio-recorded. 
Recorded interviews were immediately transcribed verbatim and returned to participants to verify 
the transcript. In addition to interviews, 160 documents, including policy documents, published 
studies, news articles, meeting minutes, ENGO publications, Indigenous government publications 
and transcripts of regulatory hearings, were reviewed. Additional sources of insight include 
personal observations made at meetings, open houses and regulatory hearings attended by the first 
author.  
A qualitative content analysis approach was used in this study to explore if and how power 
dynamics impacted collaboration. Qualitative content analysis is useful for interpreting large 
quantities of qualitative data for meanings which may not be explicit in the text (Schreier 2012), 
such as power dynamics. Power theory and empirical findings from the collaboration literature 
were used to generate categories – first-, second- and third- dimensional power (identified in 
Table 3.1) and associated indicators – to deductively code interview transcripts and documents. 
Collectively, these dimensions of power can impact the roles assumed and outcomes achieved by 
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collaboration in the basin. Reports of feelings of inclusion in collaboration, or resources to 
undertake collaborative activities, were coded as ‘first dimensional power’, the ability to prevail 
in decisions. Concerns associated with restricted agendas, the ability to influence policy decisions 
or exclusion were coded as manifestations of power’s second dimension – the ability to set the 
agenda. Finally, dominant ideas or underlying values expressed by the collaborative groups were 
coded as power’s third dimension, discursive power, and compared against broader ideas and 
values in the contexts in which collaborations were embedded, particularly against justifications 
or ideas expressed in support of resource use decisions participants in collaborations were 
concerned about. 
 Using various data sources, including documents, interviews and personal observations, 
facilitated triangulation to ensure study rigor. Data were coded and analyzed using the qualitative 
data analysis software NVivo QSR 10. After coding was complete, results were compiled and 
compared to draw out findings across the three cases. Given the nature of the cases we included 
in this study, which included a local partnership, regional program and a basin-level board, 
systematic cross-case comparisons were inappropriate. To address this issue, we considered how 
power dynamics impacted each case and compared findings across the levels at which 
collaborations were situated (local, regional, basin-wide). Such an analysis is relevant to the 
transboundary water governance literature that identifies linkages between collaborations at 
different levels as desirable. We then considered how our power-based analysis corresponded to 
key themes in the collaboration literature regarding inclusion, information sharing, and adaptive 
and innovative solutions and what our findings implied for the role of collaboration in 
transboundary contexts.  
3.5 Findings 
In this section, we present findings based on our analysis of first-, second- and third-dimensional 
power, as organized in Table 3.1. We report evidence that all three forms of power acted as 
constraints on collaboration in the MRB. In the next section, we consider our findings based on a 
cross-case analysis and offer some concluding reflections on the role of collaboration in 
transboundary systems.  
3.5.1 The ability to prevail in decisions 
The ability to prevail in decisions is the most obvious manifestation of power. It also tends to be 
considered most often in studies of collaboration for water (Brisbois and de Loë 2015). There are 
multiple ways in which power’s first dimension can impact collaboration (Table 3.1). Here, the 
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emphasis is on financial capacity and the extent to which participants reported that their 
perspectives and interests were considered in collaboration. Each of these factors can contribute 
to the ability to prevail in decisions – power’s first dimension. 
Adequate funding is essential to ensuring the collaborations have capacity to undertake their 
programs (Holley, et al. 2012). Notably, participants in all three collaborations reported 
struggling for adequate funding. The MRBB is the only group for which there is consistent 
funding. Each of the participating governments contribute to the MRBB’s $280 000 budget, 
which has not been adjusted for inflation since the MRBB was created in 1997. Attempts to 
increase funding have not been successful (MRBB 2013). For both PADEMP and the SRDP, 
securing consistent, multi-year funding has been a challenge (Confidential interview [CI]14; CI 
19; CI 20). The partnerships rely, in part, on external sources to fund monitoring programs. 
Reliance on periodic, external funding impacts their abilities to undertake multi-year planning (CI 
20; CI 26). Ultimately, this places the work that the collaborative monitoring programs can do in 
a precarious position. For example, one participant in PADEMP reported that “we would like to 
have a program coordinator position and staff but it’s difficult to do when we don’t know year to 
year what our resources are going to be” (CI 14). It is also true that many participants in the 
SRDP and PADEMP struggle for capacity to attend and contribute to meetings, which is another 
constraint on collaborative activities (CI 19; 20; 22; 25).  
Coding revealed that many of the participants in each of the collaborations were satisfied 
with the extent to which their interests and perspectives were heard, a noteworthy finding. For 
instance, one key informant in the MRBB case reported that despite having a much smaller 
population and being a downstream government, one positive aspect of the MRBB is that, despite 
these differences, each representative has an equal say in decisions undertaken by the MRBB (CI 
15). A key informant involved in PADEMP reported that excellent facilitation has resulted in an 
inclusive model where various interests and perspectives are heard, which made PADEMP, in 
this person’s view “a mini-metaphor for how things could be done well” in the region (CI 24). 
This perspective is reinforced by PADEMP reports that emphasize participants are satisfied that 
useful information that addresses their concerns is shared and discussed during PADEMP 
meetings (Straka, et al. 2014). A participant in the SRDP reported observations that collaboration 
is breaking down barriers and that “there is no silo here. Everybody talks” (CI 22). Another 
participant in the SRDP reported feeling included despite representing a relatively smaller 
organization (CI 21).   
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There was one important exception to the generally positive view of inclusivity of views 
and perspectives in the collaborations considered. Several key informants from the MRBB case 
reported perceptions that, historically, Aboriginal members of the MRBB participate as observers 
and are not always fully engaged (CI 4; 5). For example, one former Executive Director of the 
MRBB reported that during his tenure he observed that Aboriginal participants “weren’t really 
listened to, or given a whole lot of credibility” (CI 4). This is a deficiency that the MRBB has 
been working to address. For example, in 2009 it formed that Traditional Knowledge and 
Aboriginal Partnerships Steering Committee, in part to develop mechanisms to include 
Aboriginal peoples and traditional knowledge in Board activities (MRBB 2013). However, 
challenges associated with the appointment of Aboriginal representatives persist. There are 
diverse Indigenous peoples within the basin, including Cree, Dene, Métis and Inuvialuit, who 
have quite different perspectives and interests. Selecting one individual to represent all 
Indigenous peoples in each jurisdiction is problematic for that reason. Challenges associated with 
including Indigenous representatives and traditional knowledge in the case of the MRBB exist in 
contrast to PADEMP and the SRDP. For instance, interviewees reported that there was “strong 
involvement for . . . First Nations” (CI 25) and “they tend to do things quite inclusively with First 
Nations and Métis” (CI 24) in PADEMP and the SRDP. 
3.5.2 Agenda-setting power 
The second dimension of power is more subtle than the first, and regards the ability to prevent 
decisions or actions contrary to one’s interests from taking place. This power dynamic works 
through mechanisms such as the conscious exclusion of issues, failing to take action when it is 
possible to do so, and restricting or controlling access to information. It may also manifest in 
actors who are excluded or decline to participate in collaboration (Table 3.1). In this section, the 
focus is on agendas collaborative groups assume, participants involved and the information 
available to fulfill their mandates. 
Although many participants from all three cases indicated that they were satisfied with the 
extent to which their interests and perspectives were heard in collaborations, it is important to 
acknowledge the narrow scope of decision-making allocated to the three collaborative programs. 
The collaborations make decisions about monitoring priorities, indicators and means by which to 
share and present information. These are all important roles. However, they are disconnected 
from the major development decisions in the basin that create the need for collaboration across 
jurisdictional boundaries. Decisions about upstream developments, such as a recently approved 
oil sands mine expansion (JRP 2013) or hydroelectric dams (British Columbia Environmental 
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Assessment Office 2014b) are made outside of collaborations. The agendas of collaborative 
groups considered in this paper do not include influencing those decisions.  
Key informants involved in PADEMP reported that one of the most difficult issues the 
group faced was whether to play an advocacy role, and thus to make recommendations to 
governments regarding protection of the ecological and cultural integrity of the PAD (CI 14; 24). 
In the words of one interviewee,  
some of the participants wanted PADEMP to be able to make 
recommendations to government that would support ecological integrity in 
the delta and the cultural integrity of the delta. However, because we have 
government participants in the program, there was some – there is a concern 
for some government members about government making recommendations 
to itself . . . we just about lost the whole thing over that (CI 14). 
The reluctance of some government participants to assume an advocacy role resulted in a more 
restricted agenda of undertaking monitoring, sharing information and making recommendations 
to Parks Canada to support its management plan for Wood Buffalo National Park. Importantly, 
Parks Canada does not have jurisdiction over the development decisions happening upstream of 
the Park. As a result, members of PADEMP do not have the mandate to present a collective voice 
on behalf of PADEMP in regulatory hearings about upstream development decisions, despite the 
interest of many participants in doing so. For example, despite longstanding concern that 
upstream flow regulation on the Peace River in British Columbia has contributed to a multi-
decadal drying event in the PAD, PADEMP did not provide or present a collective voice based on 
that perspective at recent regulatory hearings for the third dam. In the words of one interviewee 
“nobody spoke for PADEMP” (CI 24) at the hearings. In fact, connecting decision-makers with 
information discussed within PADEMP has been identified by participants as a future priority 
(Straka, et al. 2014). 
Key informants involved in the SRDP reported different perspectives on the scope and 
ownership of the monitoring group’s agenda. One participant indicated that having local 
communities participate heavily in the program results in a feeling of local ownership (CI 22), a 
perspective that is reinforced by public statements about the SRDP (Bell 2011b). Another 
interviewee observed that,  
right now the model of community-based monitoring is government or 
universities have an idea of what they want to monitor, they go into the 
community and discuss it and the community will support it or suggest 
changes and then the organization will do monitoring and involve 
 85 
community in aspects of that. The community isn’t actually driving the 
process (CI 13).  
This observation speaks to an underlying power dynamic regarding who actually determines 
monitoring agendas. The differences in perspective highlight different interpretations of the 
agenda the SRDP has assumed. It also reflects an underlying tension related to power’s second 
dimension – uncertainty about which actors actually determine the SRDP’s monitoring agenda. 
The fact that some of the major concerns that inspired the creation of the SRDP related to 
upstream hydroelectric facilities and oil sands mining (AANDC and GNWT 2012) are outside of 
the  government of the NWT’s jurisdiction also complicates the kinds of actions and activities it 
can engage in to ensure the ecological integrity of the Slave River and Delta. For example, the 
Government of the NWT requested, unsuccessfully, that a recent environmental assessment (EA) 
of a third hydroelectric dam on the Peace River in British Columbia should include considerations 
of effects downstream to the Slave River and Delta (GNWT 2013).  
In the case of the MRBB, members indicated that it is an effective forum to share 
perspectives and information. However, one interviewee pointed out that although perspectives 
and interests can be shared, there is no way to track whether or not they impact decisions being 
made upstream (CI 11). Analysis of interview transcripts revealed that concerns related to the 
pace and scale of development activities within upstream jurisdictions have not been considered 
appropriate topics of discussion in the MRBB (CI 15; 18). For instance, one former Board 
member stated that, 
Alberta was, if nothing else, completely consistent from day one that 
nothing they will discuss will be done in a way that jeopardizes the 
economic model of the oil sands. Similarly, British Columbia had the same 
overarching concern when it came to the Bennett Dam . . . they were not 
prepared to bring into discussion at all the economic model of the Bennett 
Dam (CI 15). 
This restriction on items for discussion is compounded, in part, by the MRBB’s mandate, which 
protects each jurisdiction’s autonomy to make resource management decisions (Government of 
Canada, et al. 1997). From the perspective of inclusive transboundary water governance, this is 
an important limitation to the MRBB’s role in the basin. It also reflects the strong interest of 
governments to protect their jurisdictional interests from unwanted intrusion by their neighbours. 
In fact, the MRBB could adopt a much more engaged role in the basin but has opted for a more 
conservative approach of providing State of the Aquatic Ecosystem Reports (Morris and de Loë 
2016) (Chapter Two). A legal opinion provided to the board regarding its role in governance in 
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the basin indicated the MRBB could provide information about the basin as a “friend of the 
tribunal” in EA hearings in the basin or more strongly advocate the principles of the Master 
Agreement that created the MRBB (Donihee, et al. 2000). However, the predominance of civil 
servants on the board has impacted the MRBB’s scope because, at times, members of the MRBB 
are collectively unable to see past the interests of their own jurisdiction and consider the needs of 
the basin (CI 1; 4; 5). The constrained role that the MRBB has assumed is also undoubtedly 
related to the relatively small amount of funding to which it is allocated (Morris and de Loë 
2016).  
It is also important to consider who does not participate in collaboration, or who is excluded 
from participating. In the case of PADEMP, industry does not participate, despite its influence on 
the regional landscape and despite the request of at least one industry organization to be involved. 
In responding to the request, members of PADEMP’s exercised their power to exclude industry. 
Concerns that industry might misuse information discussed within PADEMP and or unduly 
influence PADEMP’s objectives and agendas resulted in the decision to decline the request to 
participate (CI 24). It is important to note that industry has a significant presence in other 
monitoring programs in the oil sands region. In fact, several government interviewees reported 
that industry has many avenues to influence other monitoring programs (CI 25; 26). Coding 
revealed that not having industry participate allows participants to share information freely (CI 
24, 25, 26). The absence of industry may contribute to one of PADEMP’s strengths, in that it is 
identified as a community-driven effort (CI 25). One interviewee reported that PADEMP 
“is…one of the multi-stakeholder organizations that does have pretty good buy-in from a range of 
participations – everyone from First Nations and Aboriginal peoples all the way through to 
different levels of government” (CI 26). 
In considering participation, it is also of note that Parks Canada, which manages the federal 
Wood Buffalo National Park, the largest national park in Canada which straddles the Alberta-
NWT border (see Figure 3.1) and receives water from upstream where major hydroelectric, pulp 
mill and oil sands developments are taking place, does not have a seat on the MRBB 
(Government of Canada, et al. 1997). This is despite the fact that Parks Canada was heavily 
involved in interjurisdictional monitoring initiatives that preceded the creation of the Board 
(NRBSB 1996) and has an obvious interest in development activities upstream. Thus, the official 
perspective of Parks Canada is missing from the MRBB. In contrast to PADEMP and the MRBB, 
the SRDP has a relatively open and inclusive model of participation. Officials involved in guiding 
the program indicated that any participant who indicated a desire to become involved in the 
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SRDP would be permitted to do so (CI 19; 20), a perspective that is reinforced by public 
invitations to attend SRDP activities (Bell 2011a).  
Another aspect of power considered was the information available to collaborations. 
Proponents of collaboration suggest that it encourages information sharing and blending. The 
ability to create innovative and adaptive solutions rests on adequate information (Emerson, et al. 
2012). One of the ways in which power’s second dimension works is through decisions not to 
collect pertinent information or the absence of essential information. If information is unavailable 
to collaborative participants, yet it could have been made available, power’s second, agenda-
setting dimension is at work. It is notable, then, that information deficiencies regarding ecological 
baseline information existed in the broader context of all three cases (Dagg 2012; MRBB 2012; 
Straka, et al. 2014). This expression of power resulted from the broader political and economic 
contexts in which collaborations are embedded, and not power within the collaborative processes 
themselves. However, it is an important deficiency because of the need for quality ecological 
baseline data to measure the extent of environmental changes occurring in the region, which is of 
concern for many of the participants in collaboration. The most striking information deficiency 
was apparent in the case of the MRBB. Board members acknowledge that the commitment to 
consider and include traditional knowledge is uneven across jurisdictions (CI 3; 5; 11). A 
government representative stated that, “If you look at our history – have we been utilizing 
traditional knowledge very well? I would say ‘no’”, although this person indicated efforts were 
being made to address this deficiency (CI 3). Despite the explicit mandate to do so, the MRBB 
has struggled to collect and include traditional knowledge in its activities, which is related to 
institutional biases that favour western science over traditional knowledge (Stevenson 2012).  
This deficiency, of the MRBB, contrasts with the PADEMP and SRDP, both of which 
prioritized including traditional knowledge early on in program development, so that Indigenous 
peoples were included as partners in program design. For example, one participant in PADEMP 
reported that “we didn’t want traditional knowledge to be an afterthought, or an add on. We 
wanted both ways [western science and traditional knowledge] of looking at the world to be 
considered from the start of the program” (CI 14). In reference to the SRDP, an interviewee 
reported that “from the very beginning it was all of the Aboriginal groups that were involved” 
along with scientists and local communities (CI 20). As a result, participants reported positive 
experiences associated with the inclusion of traditional knowledge. For example, although there 
are challenges reporting and incorporating traditional knowledge and western science, one 
interviewee stated that PADEMP has “done a great job” of incorporating traditional knowledge in 
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its work (CI 24). Another interviewee involved in the SRDP reported that “all of those knowledge 
systems [local, traditional and scientific] are part of what we’re doing” [CI 20]. 
3.5.3 Discursive power 
Discursive power is the least obvious form of power. It works in very subtle ways, and is evident 
in ideas that disguise underlying asymmetries or are presented as universally beneficial and 
desirable. Assessing discursive power requires considering the broader context in which 
collaboration is situated and necessarily requires description. None of the collaborative groups 
have regulatory decision-making powers. They generate and share information. These are 
important roles but they do not directly inform major decisions about resource development being 
made in the basin. Therefore, to address discursive power the focus shifted to comparing the 
underlying ideas driving collaboration with those influencing major development decisions. The 
ideas promoted by the collaborations, as evident in the materials they produce and their work 
products, emphasized protecting ecological integrity and promoting sustainability. For example, 
PADEMP’s official mandate is to develop “a collaborative approach to long-term monitoring and 
reporting on the health of the Peace-Athabasca Delta, using both Western Science and Traditional 
Knowledge, in support of effective environmental stewardship” (PADEMP  2015). The SRDP is 
nested within the NWT’s water strategy, which has as its primary goal that waters within the 
NWT remain clean, abundant and productive for all time (AANDC and GNWT 2012). Part of the 
MRBB’s mandate is to fulfil the underlying principles of the Master Agreement, which include 
the protection of ecological integrity and encouraging sustainable water use (Government of 
Canada, et al. 1997).  
The predominant ideas in these collaborations are tempered by the other dimensions of 
power – the funding and the scope of decision-making available to them. How they intersect with 
key decisions about development in the basin underscores their roles in the basin. Decisions to 
proceed with development are made even when there are significant, adverse, and in some cases, 
irreversible environmental impacts and significant and adverse impacts to traditional use by 
Indigenous peoples. In justifying decisions, provincial decision-makers refer to jobs and 
economic growth; they tradeoff ecological integrity for expanding energy development. For 
example, the review panel of the most recently approved oil sands mining expansion in the Lower 
Athabasca region found that the project would create significant, adverse impacts to “wetlands, 
traditional plant potential areas, wetland-reliant species at risk, migratory birds that are reliant on 
wetland-reliant or species at risk, and biodiversity” and significant adverse cumulative effects on 
Aboriginal traditional land use, rights and culture (JRP 2013, 5). Yet, it recommended the 
 89 
project’s approval because of the significant economic benefits that would accrue to the province 
of Alberta, a recommendation that was ultimately accepted by the provincial decision makers 
(JRP 2013). In neighbouring British Columbia, a third hydroelectric dam on the Peace River was 
approved for construction, despite a review panel’s finding that building that dam “would 
significantly affect the current use of land and resources for traditional purposes by Aboriginal 
peoples” and contribute to significant cumulative effects on “fish, vegetation and ecological 
communities, wildlife, current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes, and heritage” 
(JRP 2014, v). Despite these findings, and opposition to the dam by local First Nations and First 
Nations leadership in BC (First Nations Summit 2014), the provincial and federal governments 
approved the project. In particular, the provincial government justified the decision by appealing 
to sentiments that electricity generated by the dam will fuel economic growth in the province 
(Clark  2014).  
The ideas about growth and economic development that are used as justifications for 
approving major resource developments contradict the ideas promoted by each of the 
collaborative groups related to ecological integrity, the maintenance of traditional livelihoods and 
sustainability. The fact that the collaborations were created in response to the pace and scale of 
upstream development decisions, but have been unable to successfully influence the rationale for 
major development decisions, suggests that power’s third dimension has acted as a constraint on 
the outcomes they produce. This problem was acknowledged by some participants who suggested 
that context is a constraint on collaboration. For instance, one interviewee stated that, “Alberta is 
a wicked landscape. There is a lot of money and interests at play” (CI 24). Another reflected, in 
reference to sustainability and ecosystem integrity as guiding principles in the Master Agreement: 
“so what? It’s all about money and power and control” (CI 13). 
3.6 Multi-level collaborations in a transboundary context 
Here we draw out findings across the cases related to power dynamics and multi-level 
collaboration in a transboundary context. While certain power dynamics were present across 
cases, such as constraints on finances and the ability to influence resource development decisions, 
it is important to recognize differences between these collaborations. They provide an opportunity 
to consider how power impacts collaboration at different levels, and implications for the potential 
of multi-level collaborations to contribute to adaptive transboundary governance. Ultimately, this 
analysis informs our consideration of the role of collaboration in transboundary basins and the 
extent to which they contribute to sustainability in transboundary water systems.  
 90 
The SRDP is a local, community based monitoring program. The involvement of 
government as a convener, funder and facilitator of the SRDP had significant implications. For 
example, questions remain about the extent to which the SRDP is truly community-driven. 
However, unlike the other three collaborations, there is a clear conduit of influence between the 
work that the SRDP does and water management in the NWT, because it is nested within the 
NWT’s water policy. For example, monitoring of benthic invertebrates undertaken and supported 
by the SRDP is informing the implementation of the NWT’s bilateral water management 
agreement with Alberta (Government of Alberta and Government of Northwest Territories 2015). 
However, as discussed above, the NWT is not always successful in having its concerns addressed 
in regulatory proceedings for upstream activities that could potentially impact ecosystems within 
its jurisdiction, as has been found in the case of upstream dams in British Columbia (Sanderson, 
et al. 2012). 
Power dynamics within the regional collaboration, PADEMP, were a bit more complex. A 
finding that emerged is that PADEMP itself is viewed positively by participants in the program 
and this may be linked to the absence of industry. Participants within PADEMP exercised 
decision-making and agenda-setting power by declining industry requests to become involved in 
PADEMP. However, pathways of influence between PADEMP and government policies and 
development decisions impacting the PAD, a role desired by some participants, are less clear. In 
part, this is because PADEMP’s agenda was influenced by government members hesitant to make 
policy recommendations to the governments they represent. This hesitancy resulted in the 
compromise that PADEMP would make recommendations to Parks Canada for developing its 
management plan for Wood Buffalo National Park. However, one of the reasons PADEMP was 
formed was because of concerns about the ecological and cultural integrity of the PAD and 
although it has been involved in some monitoring within the Delta there is no collective 
PADEMP voice in major development decisions. Major decisions about oil sands mining and 
hydroelectric facilities upstream are outside of Parks Canada’s jurisdiction.  
The historic failure to adequately consider and include traditional knowledge in MRBB 
activities is evidence of power’s second dimension acting as a constraint on the outcomes the 
MRBB produces. Struggles to incorporate traditional knowledge at the basin-wide level also 
contrast with the relative success or strengths of the regional and local collaborative groups 
PADEMP and SRDP. It is undoubtedly compounded by deficiencies in funding to the Board. 
This observation speaks to an underlying theme with respect to the MRBB – the unwillingness, 
and inability, of participating governments to empower the Board to play the role envisioned in 
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the Master Agreement. According to the Board’s mandate, bound by the 1997 Master Agreement, 
the Board can recommend uniform water quality and quantity objectives, participate in regulatory 
hearings to provide information on the basin and the principles of the Master Agreement. The 
Board has been hesitant to play this role. This is a clear example of non-decision making power 
typical of power’s second dimension. It is buttressed by a political and economic context in which 
provincial autonomy to make decisions about resource development is highly valued.  
We observe that pathways of policy influence are less clear as collaborations are scaled up. 
Ultimately, limited evidence that collaborations influence resource management decisions 
introduces uncertainty about the extent to which multi-level collaborations contribute to an 
adaptive and inclusive approach to transboundary water governance in the MRB. Some of the 
assumed benefits of collaboration in transboundary contexts are that information and perspectives 
can flow between multi-level processes to enable well-informed policy decisions that are 
inclusive of the variety of interests and perspectives in transboundary basins (Akamani and 
Wilson 2011; Green, et al. 2013). However, in the cases discussed in this paper, power dynamics, 
including limits to funding, constraints on agendas and information, and values predominant in 
broader political and economic contexts, have tempered the extent to which collaborations are 
able to influence governance processes at other levels. For instance, collaborations have not 
directly informed or influenced major water use decisions regarding hydroelectric facilities or oil 
sands development, despite the fact that they were created in response to concerns about the pace 
and scale of development upstream. Therefore, there is a fundamental disconnect between the 
conditions that created the need for collaboration and what collaboration is currently capable of 
producing in the MRB.    
3.7  Discussion and conclusion 
Collaboration is valued in transboundary water systems because it may encourage inclusive and 
better informed transboundary water governance (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Green, et al. 2013). 
Theories of power suggest that power dynamics can result in governance activities that advantage 
certain interests over others through the ability to prevail in decisions, determine agendas and 
benefit from underlying ideas. Although power analyses have featured in the transboundary water 
governance literature, less is known about how power dynamics impact collaboration. Findings 
from this research suggest that power dynamics warrant exploration when considering the roles 
that collaboration actually plays in transboundary water governance. Our research confirms that 
limited funding, the influence of government participants, information gaps and underlying ideas 
that reinforce major development decisions in the basin constrain what collaborations do in the 
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MRB. This research also adds empirical findings related to the role of discursive power and 
broader political and economic contexts as a constraint on what collaborations achieve.  
Our findings regarding the relatively strong influence of government members as agenda-
setters, are consistent with observations regarding the dominant role of governments in 
collaboration (Brisbois and de Loë 2016; Hardy 2010; Holley, et al. 2012). Critically, this finding 
reinforces the fact that governments are not like other participants in collaboration: they have 
much greater capacity to fund, set agendas and make resource management decisions as 
compared with other participants. Partly as a result of government involvement in collaborations 
in the MRB, they are playing roles of information generators, disseminators and facilitators. 
These are important, even necessary, roles but they are not directly feeding into major 
development decisions upstream that have encouraged the creation of the SRDP and PADEMP, 
and certainly do not exceed the MRBB’s potentially expansive mandate. This highlights 
deficiencies in the ability of multi-level collaborations to influence or undertake decisions at 
appropriate scales, a key mechanism of adaptive transboundary water governance (Green, et al. 
2013) and sustainable water governance (Pahl-Wostl 2007). The collaborations we studied simply 
do not possess the power to directly inform development decisions. Our research therefore adds 
an important caution to the transboundary water governance literature that celebrates multi-level 
institutional arrangements. There is a need to consider the ways in which power impacts multi-
level collaborations in transboundary contexts. 
This points to a final observation about the ways in which power dynamics impact 
collaboration in transboundary contexts. Rather than treating power asymmetries as another 
contextual consideration, it is necessary to systematically consider the various ways in which 
power dynamics impact collaboration. Furthermore, it is essential to consider the broader 
governance context in which collaborations are embedded (Brisbois and de Loë 2016). Political 
and economic contexts may create the need for collaborations to exist, but they can also act as a 
constraint on the outcomes they produce. In the context of the MRB, concerns to preserve 
jurisdictional autonomy and values associated with jobs and economic growth produced by major 
resource developments, constrain the outcomes collaborations can produce. Considering context 
as a possible constraint provides a more comprehensive understanding of the roles that 
collaboration plays and how they intersect with other key decision-making initiatives.  
It is possible that, over time, the collaborative monitoring programs will have greater 
influence over development decisions in the basin. Both PADEMP and the SRDP are relatively 
recent collaborations. They may provide momentum toward a transformation in governance or 
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principles of resource management decision-making in the basin that puts ecological integrity, 
Aboriginal rights and title and treaty rights and reconciliation, as primary concerns. They are 
current positive examples of ways in which traditional knowledge can be incorporated in 
collaborations in the basin. To the extent that they are able to influence resource management 
decisions and enable action to promote their values, they may contribute to the more sustainable 
approach to transboundary water governance in the MRB that multi-level collaboration promises. 
However, that role is currently tempered by existing power dynamics in the basin. 
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4 Chapter Four 
 
A power-analysis of federal transboundary water governance: wa-
ter use decisions in upstream jurisdictions as constraints on sus-
tainability 
4.1 Introduction 
Achieving sustainability, the maintenance and/or promotion of ecosystem integrity and human 
well-being, is a critical governance challenge. In transboundary water systems, where water 
crosses international and/or federal political boundaries, sovereignty, institutional fragmentation 
and competing values for and uses of water complicate transboundary water governance. Social 
and environmental changes resulting from population growth, industrial development and the 
impacts of climate change on water add complexity. Power dynamics among the actors involved 
in transboundary water governance may further challenge sustainability. Power, the ability to 
achieve preferable outcomes (Lukes 2005) by creating or preventing a change in policy or 
practice (Sayer 2012), is not distributed equally among actors involved in transboundary water 
governance (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Power imbalances can make it difficult or impossible to 
achieve characteristics of governance that contribute to sustainability, such as legitimacy, 
transparency, inclusion, fairness, integration, equity, capability and adaptability (Lockwood, et al. 
2010). 
Growing concern regarding freshwater scarcity, pollution and the impacts of climate change 
has informed a body of scholarship that encourages completing interjurisdictional water 
management agreements in both the international (Elhance 2000; Eliasson 2015; Tir and Stinnett 
2012) and federal contexts (Draper 2007; Muys, et al. 2007). Reflecting this concern, much of the 
transboundary water governance literature assesses interactions at the interjurisdictional level and 
the development and implementation of water management agreements among government 
actors. This focus sits uneasily with acknowledgements that environmental politics, including 
transboundary water governance, takes place across multiple local, regional, national and 
international levels (Andonova and Mitchell 2010; Newell 2008; Suhardiman and Giordano 
2012). Even when governments complete interjurisdictional agreements, they may retain 
significant autonomy to make decisions about resource management with potential transboundary 
implications within their jurisdictional boundaries. Extending analysis in transboundary settings 
to jurisdictional level decision-making can offer a needed perspective on constraints and 
opportunities for sustainable transboundary water governance. A power analysis can help to 
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reveal interests that are advantaged in resource management decisions made within jurisdictions. 
Principles of governance that contribute to sustainability can be used to consider if and how 
power dynamics constrain sustainable transboundary water governance.  
In this paper, we undertake a power analysis of two major water use decisions within 
upstream jurisdictions in a federal transboundary water system. The decisions involve a large 
hydroelectric dam and the development of water withdrawal rules for oil sands mining. Our 
analysis reveals that power dynamics that impact decisions within jurisdictions confer advantages 
to the proponents of increasing resource development through decisions, agenda-setting and 
underlying ideas. We suggest these power dynamics, which impacted resource management 
decisions within jurisdictions, constrain governance that contributes to sustainability at the 
interjurisdictional level – particularly inclusion, transparency and fairness. 
4.2 Transboundary water governance, levels and power  
The transboundary water governance literature is populated with both case studies and large N 
quantitative studies that analyze the actions of governments at the interjurisdictional level. 
Analyses have identified factors that influence the negotiation of water management agreements 
(Dinar 2009; Lindemann 2008), ideal features of agreements (Draper 2007; Kliot, et al. 2001; 
Raadgever, et al. 2008) and whether transboundary institutions are resilient or can deal with 
water variability (Dinar, et al. 2015; Tir and Stinnett 2012). They have also assessed the content 
of international water treaties (Conca, et al. 2006; Giordano, et al. 2014), federal transboundary 
water management agreements (Burchi 2008) and whether federal transboundary agreements 
mitigate or contribute to risks associated with water variability (Garrick, et al. 2013). In general, 
successful transboundary water governance is viewed as an outcome when cooperative 
agreements or treaties regarding transboundary waters are completed (Bernauer 2002). However, 
assumptions that cooperation is necessarily beneficial are challenged by scholars who point out 
that power asymmetries may result in cooperation that disguises conflicts (Zeitoun, et al. 2011), 
leading to unsustainable transboundary water governance. Furthermore, the presence of an 
agreement does not ensure its implementation or that it will actually influence internal, 
jurisdictional level decision-making (Conca, et al. 2006) or that it will enable effective 
transboundary water governance (Warner and Zawahri 2012). 
Power analyses of transboundary water governance have illuminated that cooperation and 
conflict can coexist. However, they exhibit the government-centric and interjurisdictional focused 
tendencies typical in the broader transboundary water governance literature (Lopes 2012; 
Suhardiman and Giordano 2012). This focus results, in part, from a concern for the negotiation of 
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water management agreements in the international context, a responsibility that is the domain of 
sovereign states (Blatter and Ingram 2000). Jurisdictions retain significant decision making 
authority regarding waters that flow within their territory even when they sign interjurisdictional 
water management agreements. Hence, their internal decision-making processes warrant 
consideration (Warner and Zawahri 2012), and may in fact be crucial factors that can constrain 
and enable possibilities for more sustainable transboundary water governance. By assessing the 
multiple levels of governance involved in transboundary water systems, a more nuanced and 
comprehensive perspective on the ways in which power impacts transboundary water governance 
is possible (Suhardiman and Giordano 2012). 
In federal countries, multiple levels of government are involved in transboundary water 
governance. Federalism – characterized by the division of authority and some autonomy between 
central and decentralized governments, each of which are democratically elected (Anderson 
2008) – complicates transboundary water governance by assigning responsibilities for water to 
more than one level of government. When sub-federal governments, such as provinces and states, 
have jurisdiction for water comparable to those of countries, transboundary water governance can 
be prone to challenges similar to those in the international context (Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009; 
Garrick, et al. 2014), including power dynamics. However, this view is not universally accepted. 
For example, Zeitoun, et al. (2011) argue that the presence of a central government and well-
developed regulations within federal countries make federal transboundary water systems unlike 
their international counterparts. Given the enormous variability in how responsibility for water is 
assigned to different levels of government in federations around the world, there likely is support 
for both perspectives on this issue in different empirical examples.  
Unfortunately, explicit power analyses of sub-federal transboundary water systems are 
sparse. There is a wide range of variability in the world’s 28 federal countries (Anderson 2008), 
with varying degrees of decentralization and willingness on the part of federal governments to 
intervene or even test the limits of their own jurisdiction regarding water (Garrick, et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, while it is true that there are well developed laws and regulations within countries 
and sub-federal jurisdictions that do not exist at the international level, institutions within 
jurisdictions may be power-laden in ways that can advantage certain interests over others (Raik, 
et al. 2008). How those advantages are distributed and accumulate may lead to unsustainable 
transboundary water governance within federations. Empirically assessing how power dynamics 
impact federal transboundary water governance is thus an important contribution to the literature. 
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Perhaps one of the reasons that power analysis of federal transboundary water governance is 
relatively sparse is because of the conceptual diversity that exists regarding theories of power in 
the social sciences. Power can be understood as a capacity exercised by agents (Dahl 1957), 
endowed in structures (Gould, et al. 2004) or productive and totalizing (Digeser 1992). Some 
scholarship on power in the international context has adopted a framework of hydro-hegemony 
based on Lukes’ and Gramscian power theories applied in the international context (Zeitoun and 
Warner 2006). While the framework on hydro-hegemony is informative, it was developed in 
relation to conflict-prone regions in the Middle East and North Africa and may be less applicable 
to federal contexts where sub-federal governments typically do not possess authority for military 
matters. Although overt military conflicts over water are rare in the international context (Wolf 
1998), the potential threat of violence alters power dynamics as it is among the many tactics that 
might be used by the powerful to achieve their interests (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Importantly, 
this does not mean that power dynamics do not impact federal systems - only that how they do 
may be different from the international context. To assess power dynamics in a federal context, 
we adopt a framework based on Steven Lukes’ power theory (see Table 4.1) because it is useful 
for assessing how power impacts resource management decisions (Caine and Krogman 2010), the 
focus of this paper. 
Lukes argues that the ability to achieve preferable outcomes rests on three overlapping 
dimensions of power (Lukes 2005). The first dimension of power is based on Dahl’s (1957) 
perspective that power is exercised when an actor prevails in policy decisions despite opposition. 
It can be observed by attending to who participates in decision-making and who prevails. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) critique this dimension of power by pointing out power dynamics 
can result in issues being organized out of policy discussions, either by conscious restriction on 
decision-making agendas or the hesitancy of actors to raise issues perceived to be contrary to a 
powerful actor’s interests. The power to restrict decision-making agendas by excluding issues is 
what Lukes refers to as power’s second dimension and what we call agenda-setting power. It can 
be identified by attending to which interests are considered in policy processes or decision-
making, whether actors object to constraints on decision-making, and decisions not to take action 
when it is possible to do so. Information deficiencies and institutional biases can also evince 
power’s second dimension. Lukes argues that it is a mistake to conflate power with conflict over 
policy decisions or policy making agendas. Power is also a capacity of institutions and 
organizations which can result in certain interests never being fully realized and articulated. 
Power’s third dimension can prevent conflict from ever taking place. While the first two 
dimensions focus on observable conflicts over decision making and non-decision-making, 
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respectively, and can be observed, the third dimension is concerned with cultural factors that may 
socialize individuals to accept the status quo as natural, immutable and beneficial, even when it is 
contrary to their actual interests. The third, more difficulty to identify, dimension works through 
dominant ideas and values that disguise latent conflicts and existing inequities (Lukes 2005). 
Table 4.1: Power indicators 
Dimension of power Indicators Examples  Evidence/data 
1
st
: the ability to 
prevail in decisions 
(Dahl 1957; Lukes 
2005) 




 Major water 
infrastructure projects 
(Zeitoun and Warner 
2006) 
 Geographic position 
(Cascão and Zeitoun 
2010; Dinar 2009) 
 Financial and 
technical capacity 
(Cascão and Zeitoun 
2010) 







 Personal observations 
2
nd
: the ability to set 
the agenda (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1962; 
Lukes 2005) 
 Observable conflicts 
over the decision-
making agenda 




 Decisions not to act 
(non-decisions) 
 Appeals to 
international 
norms/international 
law (Zeitoun, et al. 
2011; Zeitoun and 
Warner 2006) 






2002; Zeitoun and 
Warner 2006) 













 Personal observations 
3
rd
: discursive power - 
the ability to 
construct, impose 
and/or benefit from 
dominant ideas (Lukes 
2005) 




 Ability to construct 
dominant ideas about 




2002; Zeitoun, et al. 
2011) 
 Political and economic 
context 
 Policy documents and 
speeches, specifically 
arguments/justification




Given the enormous diversity that exists in terms of the decentralization of responsibilities 
for water in federations, achieving governance that contributes to sustainability in federal 
transboundary water systems may be challenged by power dynamics. In federal systems, sub-
federal governments can retain significant decision-making authority for water that flows within 
jurisdictional boundaries. Therefore, we investigate the ways in which power dynamics impact 
internal water use decisions within sub-federal governments that may have implications for 
transboundary water systems. Doing so enables us to consider the ways in which power dynamics 
constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance in federations.  
Importantly, there is no universal blueprint to achieve sustainability. Sustainability, 
premised on the notion that ecological degradation and social inequalities are integrally related, 
requires governance arrangements that address both problems (Gibson, et al. 2005). Given the 
extent of water degradation and pollution worldwide (Vörösmarty, et al. 2010), enabling 
sustainability is an urgent governance challenge (Pahl-Wostl, et al. 2012). However, achieving 
sustainability can be complicated by power dynamics (Newell 2012). It is possible to assess the 
extent to which governance contributes to sustainability using established criteria. In this paper, 
we draw on criteria proposed by Lockwood, et al. (2010) to assess the extent to which major 
water use decisions, and the power dynamics implicated in those decisions, act as a major  
Table 4.2: Governance principles for sustainability: criteria and evaluative questions 
Criteria Evaluative questions 
Legitimacy Do actors have the authority to govern based in legislation or stakeholder acceptance? 
Transparency Are decision-making processes visible? 
Is the reasoning behind decisions apparent? 
Is information related to decisions and performance publicly available? 
Inclusiveness Are there opportunities to participate in and impact governance processes? 
Fairness Are decisions free of systematic bias? 
Are the distributions of costs and benefits associated with decisions adequately 
considered? 
Integration Is there coordination across and between different levels of government? 
Do different government agency policies align? 
Capability Can individuals or organizations deliver on their commitments? 
Adaptability Are new sources of knowledge and learning incorporated? 
Are threats, risks and opportunities anticipated? 
Is governance reflective? 
Source: Adapted from Lockwood, et al 2010. 
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constraint on governance that contributes to sustainability. The criteria include legitimacy, 
transparency, inclusiveness, fairness, integration, capability and adaptability. Corresponding 
evaluative questions are identified in Table 4.2. Other sustainability assessments exist that 
incorporate biophysical criteria (cf. Gibson 2006; Wiek and Larson 2012). The criteria elaborated 
by Lockwood, et al. (2010) emphasize social dimensions of governance that may be impacted by 
power dynamics. 
4.3 Empirical context: the Peace and Athabasca Rivers 
The Peace and Athabasca rivers emerge in the Rocky Mountains of British Columbia and 
Alberta, respectively. They converge in northern Alberta at the Peace-Athabasca Delta (PAD), a 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage 
Site and a Wetland of International Significance under the Ramsar Convention. Approximately 
80% of the PAD exists in Wood Buffalo National Park (NRBSB 1996), which is managed by the 
federal agency Parks Canada. It is also encompasses the traditional territories of local First 
Nations and Métis who exercise constitutionally-protected treaty and Aboriginal rights to fish, 
hunt and trap in the delta and surrounding areas. As shown in Figure 4.1, the Peace River turns 
northward, is joined by outflow from the PAD, and becomes the Slave River which drains into 
Great Slave Lake in the Northwest Territories. On its journey from the northwestern corner of 
Great Slave Lake to the Beaufort Sea within the Northwest Territories, the Mackenzie River is 
joined by the Liard and Peel Rivers, which flow from British Columbia and the Yukon Territory, 
respectively.  
At 1.8 million km
2
, the MRB drains approximately one-fifth of Canada’s land mass. 
Jurisdiction for water in the MRB is divided as follows:  
 Three provinces (Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan) and three territories 
(Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut), have the majority of water use 
decision-making authority and distinct legislation and policy pertaining to water 
under Canada’s constitution and devolution agreements;  
 The federal government has constitutional responsibilities for matters such as 
transboundary water resources, First Nations, navigation, fisheries and national 
parks;  
 Indigenous peoples, called Aboriginal peoples in Canada’s Constitution, have treaty 
rights and Aboriginal rights and title in the basin, the exercise of which depends on 
adequate quality and quantity of water (Phare 2009).  
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Figure 4.1: The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada 
 
Although the federal government possesses potentially broad powers for water governance, 
in practice is has largely deferred to the provinces, which have specific powers over water related 
to ownership of land and natural resources and jurisdiction for property (Saunders 2014). 
Therefore, upstream-downstream asymmetries and coordination challenges exist in the MRB as 
they do in the international context, because Canada is a highly decentralized federation in which 
the provinces and territories assume primary roles for water governance (Saunders and Wenig 
2007).  Concerns regarding upstream hydroelectric development in British Columbia have 
persisted for decades (NRBSB 1996). More recently, the pace and scale of oil sands development 
in upstream Alberta have emerged as a major concern downstream in the NWT (AANDC and 
GNWT 2012). In addition to the governments and Indigenous peoples, ENGOs and industry 
actors are also have strong interests in how the basin is governed.  
In 1997, governments in the MRB signed the Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary 
Waters Master Agreement (the Master Agreement) in response to perceived coordination 
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challenges. The Master Agreement encourages governments to cooperatively manage the MRB 
according to underlying principles of maintaining ecological integrity, ensuring sustainable use, 
prior notification of developments and the right of each jurisdiction to use water so long as it does 
not harm neighbouring jurisdictions (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). It includes 
commitments to use traditional knowledge and to communicate with Aboriginal peoples in the 
basin in culturally-relevant ways. The Master Agreement also creates provisions for the 
negotiation of bilateral water management agreements currently being completed. The Master 
Agreement contains many forward-looking principles but it is non-binding. The provinces and 
territories retain significant decision-making authority regarding water and can complement, 
contradict or challenge the principles of the agreement in their internal decision-making. Given 
their proprietary, legislative and regulatory authority over water, and the geographic positions that 
British Columbia and Alberta enjoy relative to their downstream neighbours (Figure 4.1), the 
ways in which power dynamics impact the provinces’ internal water use decisions can have 
significant implications for transboundary water governance outcomes. 
The Peace and Athabasca basins are home to the majority of the MRB’s population (MRBB 
2003b). They also host some of the most significant industrial developments currently underway 
in Canada.  There are two major dams on the Peace River in British Columbia. A third, the Site C 
Dam, was recently approved (British Columbia Ministry of Environment 2014). The existing 
dams provide approximately 30% of British Columbia’s 12000 MW of generating capacity, to 
which the Site C Dam will contribute an additional 1100 MW (BC Hydro 2014b). The Williston 
Reservoir, the fourth largest reservoir in the world (Church 2014), created by the Bennett Dam, is 
a significant asset in British Columbia’s integrated electricity system; it is the largest of British 
Columbia’s two multi-year storage reservoirs and can be used flexibly to match generation with 
demand, making it an incredibly valuable resource (BC Hydro 2003a).  
Oil sands extraction is a predominant economic activity in the lower Athabasca watershed. 
Production from the oil sands is expected to grow from 2.3 to 4.8 billion barrels of oil per day by 
2030 (Alberta Energy Regulator 2015). There are six surface mines and approximately three 
times as many in-situ mines within the Athabasca sub-basin in Alberta. The economic 
implications of oil sands mining are significant for the provincial and federal governments. In 
2013-2014, the government of Alberta collected approximately $5 billion in royalties from 
bitumen mining operators, which represents approximately 56% of the total non-renewable 
resource royalties collected in the province (Government of Alberta 2015b). The Canadian 
Energy Research Institute estimates that within the next twenty-five years the government of 
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Alberta will collect approximately $300 billion in oil-sands related taxes and $600 billion in oil 
sands royalties (Canadian Energy Research Institute 2014). The federal government is estimated 
to collect approximately $570 billion in oil-sands related taxes. 
The cumulative effects of flow regulation from hydro dams on the Peace River (Creery 
1979; Peace Athabasca Delta Committee 1970) and water quality and quantity impacts of oil 
sands mining in the Athabasca sub-basin have figured prominently in downstream concerns 
(AANDC and GNWT 2012). Much of that concern has centered on impacts to the PAD and the 
Slave River and Delta. Flows on the Peace River are regulated according to electricity demand in 
British Columbia; in general, flows are higher in winter and lower in spring and summer than 
they would have been without regulation (Prowse, et al. 2002). Flow regulation on the Peace 
River has long been believed to be a significant driver in a multi-decadal drying event currently 
being experienced in the delta (Adams 1996; Peace Athabasca Delta Committee 1970). There are 
conflicting scientific perspectives on whether that drying is the result of natural variability and 
climate change (Wolfe, et al. 2012) or is due to a combination of climate change and flow 
regulation (Beltaos 2014).  
Flow regulation is also believed to impact sedimentation in downstream jurisdictions. For 
example, a longitudinal study of the impacts of flow regulation on sediment transport in 
downstream reaches of the Peace River indicates a trend of increasing sediment deposition. 
Regulated flows are insufficient to transport sediment throughout the river system, resulting in the 
creation of sandbars and accumulated sediment at tributary mouths downstream in Alberta, which 
can negatively impact river ecology and navigability (Church 2014). Monitoring programs in the 
Slave River and Delta detect higher than expected levels of total dissolved solids, organic carbon, 
potassium, sulphate and phosphorous in the spring and summer seasons and no change in other 
substances such as calcium, magnesium, sodium and hardness, which is believed to be linked to 
upstream flow regulation (Sanderson, et al. 2012).  
Water withdrawals from the Athabasca River, although they are a small fraction of the 
Athabasca’s average annual flow (Government of Alberta 2015c), are of concern based on river 
navigability, impacts to the Athabasca portion of the delta (Candler, et al. 2010) and the timing of 
withdrawals (Lebel, et al. 2011). For instance, Parks Canada, which manages Wood Buffalo 
National Park, has stated that, “the Athabasca River Delta is far more sensitive to changes caused 
by oil sands development than the mainstem Athabasca River” (Parks Canada 2011, 10). It is 
important to acknowledge that the Peace River is by far the greater influence on flows in the 
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Slave (Sanderson, et al. 2012). However, both rivers have important roles in recharging the PAD 
(Prowse, et al. 2002; Wolfe, et al. 2006).  
There is conflicting evidence and scientific perspectives regarding the extent to which 
contaminants present in the Athabasca region are the result of oil sands extraction (Hodson 2013). 
Some studies link the deposition of contaminants such as mercury and polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons with the onset and increase in oil sands extraction (Kelly, et al. 2009; Kurek, et al. 
2013). Others suggest that some contaminants attributed to oil sands extraction activities are 
naturally occurring or the result of other industrial processes (Hall, et al. 2012; Wiklund, et al. 
2012). Regardless, there are serious concerns about the impacts of oil sands development on 
downstream communities in the NWT. For example, the 170km
2
 of tailing ponds in the 
Athabasca region, some of which are adjacent and leak into the Athabasca River, contain toxic 
compounds including napthenic acids, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and metals (Timoney 
and Lee 2009). A failure of one of these ponds would have catastrophic impacts on the 
transboundary environment (Grant, et al. 2010). The nature and extent of contaminant deposition 
has figured strongly in downstream concerns (AANDC and GNWT 2012).  
In response to the pace and scale of development in the region and at the request of 
Indigenous governments and ENGOs, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee requested that 
provincial and federal governments conduct an assessment of cumulative impacts of hydroelectric 
facilities and oil sands mining on the PAD (UNESCO 2015). Given the extent of concerns 
regarding upstream development activities on downstream jurisdictions, the ways in which water 
is used in upstream jurisdictions has transboundary implications. Concerns about upstream 
development have been expressed by downstream communities, governments and international 
organizations. As we will demonstrate in our findings section, the ways in which power dynamics 
have influenced water use decision making in upstream jurisdictions constrains sustainability at 
the interjurisdictional level. Specifically, power dynamics confer advantages to the proponents of 
increasing resource development and marginalize alternative interests and perspectives.   
4.4 Methods 
This purpose of this paper is to assess if and how power dynamics impact water use decisions 
within British Columbia and Alberta in the Peace and Athabasca sub-basins, and then to consider 
implications for governance that contributes to sustainability in federal transboundary water 
systems. To achieve this purpose, we adopted a multiple-case approach to undertake detailed, in-
depth analysis of evaluative questions (Gerring 2007; Yin 2009). The analysis presented in this 
paper draws evidence from two cases of water use decisions on the Peace and Athabasca Rivers 
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(Figure 4.1). The first case is the environmental assessment (EA) for the Site C Dam on the Peace 
River in British Columbia, including subsequent provincial and federal approvals and the 
provincial decision to invest in building the dam. The second case considered is the development 
of the Surface Water Quantity Management Framework (the Framework) for the Lower 
Athabasca River. Cases were selected according to several criteria. First, the water use decisions 
made in each case pertain to key governance pressures in the basin that have transboundary 
implications (MRBB 2012). They are also relatively recent decisions undertaken according to 
each province’s internal policy priorities – the cases are situated entirely in one upstream 
jurisdiction. Data accessibility was the final criterion used to select both cases.    
4.4.1 Case studies 
4.4.1.1 The Site C Dam  
The Site C Dam on the Peace River will be constructed and operated by BC Hydro, a crown 
corporation that serves approximately 95% of the province’s population, and owns and operates 
the existing dams on the Peace River. It will sit approximately 60 km upstream of the British 
Columbia-Alberta border and create a reservoir that will flood approximately 83 km of the Peace 
River Valley. At approximately 1 km long and 60 metres high, with a reservoir of approximately 
165 million m
3
, the Site C Dam is a large dam (World Commission on Dams 2000). Importantly, 
Site C’s operation will be coordinated with the two existing dams (Figure 4.1) to capitalize on 
water storage provided by the Williston Reservoir, which, at capacity, can store approximately 74 
km
3
, a volume much greater than the average annual inflow of 1080 m
3
/s. The Site C Dam has 
been considered an option to generate electricity since the 1950s, when British Columbia pursed 
the “two rivers” policy of locating all of major hydro projects on the Columbia and Peace Rivers 
(Loo and Stanley 2011). The project was initially reviewed and rejected by the British Columbia 
Utilities Commission (BCUC) in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s based on the 
finding that the energy generated by Site C was not needed in the province at the time (BCUC 
1983).  
BC Hydro’s case for building the dam rests on several key premises. The load forecasting 
conducted by BC Hydro anticipates a 40% increase in electricity demand within the next 20 
years, due to population growth and economic expansion. BC Hydro estimates that demand-side 
management will not eliminate the need for additional generation in the province (BC Hydro 
2014b). Another premise upon which BC Hydro’s case rests are claims that the environmental 
impacts of building Site C are significantly less than alternatives because of its ability to 
capitalize on preexisting dams. BC Hydro argues that the Site C Dam can deliver “35 per cent of 
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the energy produced at the W.A.C. Bennett Dam, with only 5 per cent of the reservoir” (BC 
Hydro 2014b, 33).  Finally, BC Hydro maintains that the Site C project is the least expensive of 
alternatives considered, including wind, solar and smaller run of river projects, because costs are 
reliable and will decline over time.   
While the province of British Columbia has primary jurisdiction to allocate water to 
hydroelectric dams and to approve their construction, the federal government also has 
responsibilities under Canada’s constitution for navigation and fisheries that a major dam could 
impact. Therefore, a cooperative, joint environmental review process was established to assess 
the project’s potential social, cultural, heritage and environmental effects (JRP 2014). In Canada, 
EAs are key decision-making tools intended to identify and minimize adverse impacts associated 
with development. Twenty-three Indigenous groups, five ENGOs and one individual were 
eligible for funding to participate in the various stages of the EA (Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 2012a; 2012b). Many more groups participated without funding. The 
governments of Alberta and the Northwest Territories participated in a technical working group 
on downstream effects to inform the EA process (BC Hydro 2013b). The government of Alberta 
submitted comments to the EA office throughout the EA process (Harrison 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 
Moore 2013; 2014).   
A report prepared by the Joint Review Panel (JRP), which provided recommendations 
regarding whether, and under what conditions, the dam should be built, was released in May 2014 
(JRP 2014). In November 2014, the provincial and federal governments announced their 
approvals and conditions for the Site C project’s construction and operation (Aglukkaq 2014; 
British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office 2014b) and in December 2014, the province 
of BC announced its decision to invest in the $8.8 billion project (Clark  2014). The EA process 
took place over 4 years, from when the province announced the Site C dam would be reviewed in 
2010, to when it announced its investment decision.   
4.4.1.2 The Surface Water Quantity Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca 
River 
The second case considered in this paper is the development of the Surface Water Quantity 
Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca River (the Framework) within Alberta. This 
framework establishes cumulative water withdrawal rules for the Lower Athabasca River. The 
Athabasca River is important ecologically as the longest free-flowing river in Alberta and the 
largest direct contributor of flows to the PAD (Lebel, et al. 2011). Flows in the Athabasca support 
Aboriginal navigation and the exercise of treaty rights to hunt, fish and trap in traditional 
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territories. The Athabasca River is also the largest source of water for oil sands mining, which 
requires approximately 3.1 barrels of water to 1 barrel of oil produced (Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers 2015). Water used by industry that cannot be returned to the river because it 
is heavily contaminated is stored in large tailing ponds in the region. Tailing ponds and the water 
quantity and water quality impacts of oil sands mining are concerns for the downstream NWT 
(Grant, et al. 2010; Sanderson, et al. 2012)  
The Framework contributes to Alberta’s Land Use Policy, which requires the creation of 
land use plans to manage cumulative effects in seven land use areas, including the Lower 
Athabasca region. A Land Use Plan establishes broad goals for a region, to which air, water 
quality, water quantity and biodiversity management frameworks developed under the auspices of 
the Land Use Plan contribute. The plan for the Lower Athabasca region is one of the province’s 
key strategies to manage the cumulative impacts of oil sands development in the Lower 
Athabasca region (Government of Alberta 2012). 
Rules established in the Framework were several years in the making. The government of 
Alberta first identified environmental flows policies as necessary to manage the cumulative 
impacts of growth of the oil sands industry in 1999 (Alberta Environment 1999). In the early 
2000s, the Cumulative Environmental Management Association (CEMA), a multi-stakeholder 
advisory committee comprised of the oil sands industry, ENGOs, Indigenous groups, and the 
provincial and federal governments was tasked with developing recommendations for an 
environmental flows policy for the Lower Athabasca River (Clipperton 2005). Several factors, 
including increasing attention to oil sands water-use issues highlighted by ENGOs (Woynillowicz 
and Severson-Baker 2006), academics (Schindler, et al. 2007), government advisors (Oil Sands 
Ministerial Committee 2006) and EA review panels associated with oil sands mining expansion  
(JRPa 2004a; JRPb 2004b), made developing an environmental flows policy a priority issue. 
When CEMA was unable to provide consensus-based recommendations, Alberta Environment 
and the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans issued a provisionary water withdrawal rule-
set based on CEMA’s work (Alberta Environment and Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada 2007). They acknowledged that a second phase would be necessary to undertake 
additional studies and make recommendations for protecting the Lower Athabasca River over the 
long term. This work was assigned to the Phase 2 Framework Committee (P2FC), which 
ultimately developed the recommendations accepted by the government of Alberta in the 
Framework. 
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The P2FC began its work in 2008. Several Indigenous groups who were involved in the 
earlier process withdrew from CEMA in 2007 and declined to participate in Phase 2, in part 
because they believed that earlier process did not sufficiently integrate their concerns and 
interests (JRP 2007). The Mikisew Cree First Nation (MCFN) and Athabasca Chipewyan First 
Nation (ACFN) opted to provide their own recommendations to government (Candler, et al. 
2010). The Fort McKay First Nation and Fort Chipewyan Métis participated. Three ENGOs who 
were not involved in the earlier process did participate in the P2FC. All six mining companies 
(Suncor, Syncrude, Canadian Natural Resources Limited, Imperial Oil, Shell and Total) with 
operations that withdrawal water from the Athabasca River participated in the process, as did 
representatives of the provincial and federal governments. The P2FC provided non-consensus 
recommendations to the government in 2010 (Ohlson, et al. 2010). The P2FC’s recommendations 
were reviewed by a federal science advisory committee in the spring of 2010 (Canadian Science 
Advisory Secretariat 2010). In 2013, engagement sessions regarding a draft of the Framework, 
which was based on the P2FC’s recommendations, were held with ENGO and industry 
participants in the P2FC. Separate sessions were held with First Nations and Métis in 2014. In 
March 2015, Alberta released the Framework, which adopts the withdrawal rules recommended 
by the P2FC (Government of Alberta 2015c).  
The Framework dictates weekly rules for water withdrawals from the Lower Athabasca 
River that is based on flow. Flows in the Athabasca River vary inter and intra-annually, with low 
flows usually experienced in the mid-winter months and higher flows in late spring/early summer. 
Generally, withdrawals are restricted as flows decrease. During the summer to late fall months, 
when flows are greater than 111.6 m
3
/s, up to 29 m
3
/s may be withdrawn from the Athabasca 
River. During the winter, the maximum amount that may be withdrawn is 16 m
3
/s and only if 
flows are greater than 270 m
3
/s. In all seasons, if flows drop below 87 m
3
/s, no more than 4.4 m
3
/s 
may be withdrawn – 2 m3/s each for Suncor and Syncrude and 0.2m3/s each for Shell and 
Canadian Natural Resources Limited. Other operators, including Total and Imperial Oil, are not 
permitted to withdraw water if flows drop below 87 m
3
/s.  
The Framework also identifies indicators that will be used to track changes over time. 
Indicators include upstream water use, river flow, oil sands water use, seasonal flow exceedances 
and Aboriginal navigation. Adaptive management triggers are used to detect whether conditions 
are within the range of variability assumed during the development of the withdrawal rules. 
Adaptive management triggers, if triggered, require a management response, which may include 
additional monitoring or modifications to the withdrawal rules (Government of Alberta 2015c). 
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Adaptive management triggers include upstream water use, long-term seasonal flows, oil sands 
water use, cumulative oil sands water use relative to flow, high oil sands water use during low 
summer/fall flows, ecological indicators and a preliminary Aboriginal Navigation Index 
(Government of Alberta 2015c). Importantly, the Framework also acknowledges that rules are 
intended to “augment and complement . . . future transboundary commitments” with the NWT 
(Government of Alberta 2015c, 9).  
4.4.2 Data collection and analysis 
Data used to conduct this analysis include semi-structured interviews and extensive review of 
policy documents, press releases and submissions to the EA agency. The first author interviewed 
nineteen individuals either directly involved in the development of the P2FC’s recommendations 
and the Framework or in other aspects of transboundary water governance in the MRB. Nine 
interviews support the P2FC case, whereas ten regarded transboundary water governance in 
general in the MRB and support our analysis of the Site C dam case. Interviewees were contacted 
because of their involvement in the P2FC case or transboundary water governance; they include 
representatives of industry, ENGOs, Indigenous organizations and provincial, territorial and 
federal governments. All interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim by the first author 
and returned to participants for verification. A substantial amount of data regarding the Site C EA 
was available through the Canadian EA registry, where all submissions received during the EA 
were posted. Furthermore, many documents regarding the P2FC are publicly available. A total of 
251 documents were analyzed for this study. Personal observations made and informal 
conversations had when the first author attended the EA hearings for the Site C dam in December 
2013 and January 2014 supplement data collected for the Site C case. Data were stored and 
organized in NVivo QSR10, which was also used to code data according to themes in Table 4.1. 
Qualitative content analysis was used as a systematic method to identify the ways in which 
power impacted water use decisions for each case (Schreier 2012). Data were coded according to 
themes and indicators associated with the three dimensions of power identified in Table 4.1. 
Findings are detailed in section 4.5 of this paper. Coding data from each case according to the 
same categories facilitated our cross-case analysis and allowed for more generalized findings 
(Schreier 2012) regarding the ways in which power dynamics within jurisdictions can impact 
sustainability at the interjurisdictional level. After compiling our findings across cases, we 
considered whether they operated as a constraint or enabler of governance that contributes to 
sustainability, using Lockwood, et al.’s (2010) criteria identified in Table 4.2. Section 4.6 
highlights findings from this analysis that had significant implications for several of the criteria. 
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4.5 Results 
In this section, we present our findings for each case according to the dimensions of power 
identified in Table 4.1. We discuss evidence that power dynamics, in each dimension, favored the 
proponents of increasing resource development. In the following section, we discuss how these 
findings suggest that water use decisions act as a constraint on sustainability at the 
interjurisdictional level.  
4.5.1 The power to prevail in decisions 
In both cases, water use decisions advantaged the proponents of resource development, despite 
opposition. In the case of the Site C Dam, the decision to proceed with the EA and the decision 
by the provincial and federal governments to grant BC Hydro the environmental approvals 
necessary to build the dam, were met with considerable opposition. The government of Alberta, 
because of concerns regarding downstream impacts, indicated that it preferred a bilateral 
agreement to be completed under the Master Agreement before BC proceeded with the dam’s 
assessment (Chabaylo 2010). Following announcements that the dam would proceed to the EA 
phase, 16 First Nations issued a declaration to the provincial government, stating that they were 
opposed to the dam and would use all lawful means to oppose its approval and construction (Doig 
River First Nation, et al. 2010). Several First Nations voiced their opposition to the dam 
consistently throughout the EA based on impacts to Aboriginal and treaty rights, impacts to 
wildlife and the perceived inadequacy of BC Hydro’s consideration of alternative means of 
generating power (Treaty 8 Tribal Association 2014). They were joined by ENGOs and local 
landowners who opposed the dam based on losses to agricultural land, their homes, impacts on 
wildlife and doubts about whether building the dam is necessary (Francis and Bishop 2014; 
Howard and Johnston 2014; Peace Valley Landowner Association 2014). Potential impacts to the 
PAD also featured strongly in downstream First Nations opposition to the dam (Carver 2012). 
However, as described above, building the Site C Dam was touted by BC Hydro as the preferred 
option to meet growing electricity demands in British Columbia based on its relative cost 
effectiveness and environmental performance (BC Hydro 2014b).  
BC Hydro’s receipt of federal and provincial environmental approvals and the provincial 
government’s decision to invest the $8.8 billion necessary to build the dam, are evidence of BC 
Hydro’s interests in building the dam prevailing over others. In response to the provincial and 
federal approvals, several First Nations groups denounced the decision, requesting that the 
provincial and federal governments “immediately cease proceeding with the proposed Site C 
Dam project” (First Nations Summit 2014). Local landowners and First Nations launched six 
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separate legal challenges of the decision in provincial and federal courts (Axmann and 
Cytrynbaum 2015b). Four challenges were dismissed and two were withdrawn (Axmann and 
Cytrynbaum 2015a; Junger and Hill 2015). However, as of mid-2016, opposition to the decision 
to approve the Site C dam persists. 
The decision to adopt the P2FC’s non-consensus recommendations in the Framework also 
favoured the interests of oil sands mining companies. Industry operators argued that the 
recommended rule set was an acceptable balance of social, environmental and economic 
objectives. One interviewee reported that the biggest success of the P2FC process was that 
“government has virtually adopted it [the recommendation] verbatim” (Confidential interview 
[CI] 1). ENGOs dissented on the basis that the rule set was not sufficiently precautionary and 
protective of the ecosystem at low flow conditions (Dyer 2014; Lebel, et al. 2011). They 
requested that withdrawals should cease at the low-flow threshold – 87m3/s – rather than allow an 
exemption for certain operators. ENGO representatives requested that an ecosystem base flow, 
below which no withdrawals would be permitted, should be implemented. They were joined by 
Indigenous groups (Fekete 2014) and the federal science advisory committee, which agreed that 
at a certain threshold, water withdrawals from the Athabasca should cease (Canadian Science 
Advisory Secretariat 2010). Review panels of new oil sands mines also encouraged governments 
to adopt an ecosystem base-flow, a recommendation that the government of Canada accepted 
(Government of Canada 2008). Ultimately, because the P2FC’s recommendations were adopted 
in the Framework, the interests of industry prevailed over ENGOs and Indigenous participants. 
The process also did not directly include residents of the NWT, who were interested in being 
engaged in the process (Straka, et al. 2014). 
4.5.2 The power to set the agenda 
The second dimension of power is the ability to determine the agenda in ways that are preferable 
to a powerful actor’s interests. This may result in a decision to exclude issues or information or 
ensure they are considered irrelevant in a decision-making process. Ultimately, controlling the 
decision making agenda can prevent articulating and debating alternatives or issues that may 
challenge a powerful actor’s interests. The second dimension of power is also evident in decisions 
not to act when it is possible to do so (Lukes 2005). Here, we present evidence that power’s 
second, agenda-setting dimension advantaged the proponents of increasing resource development 
in the Peace and Athabasca river basins. 
The government of BC created a regulatory environment conducive to approving the Site C 
dam. Site C was exempt from review by the BCUC, an arm’s-length agency designed to regulate 
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BC’s utilities. The BCUC has explicit responsibilities for reviewing load forecasting and cost 
estimates of energy projects – two of the major premises upon which BC Hydro’s case for the 
dam rested (BC Hydro 2014b). Over three decades ago, the BCUC reviewed and rejected the Site 
C dam on the basis that the power it would generate was not needed. Throughout the EA, a 
number of participants requested that the proposal for the Site C Dam be subject to review by the 
BCUC (Boon and Boon 2014; Johansson 2014; Treaty 8 Tribal Association 2014). This was a 
position with which the review panel agreed. One of the JRP’s recommendations to the BC 
government was that, if BC decides to move forward with the dam, it should require the BCUC to 
review BC Hydro’s load forecasting and costs estimates. The panel noted it did not have the time 
or resources to undertake a rigorous investigation of these components of the Site C project’s 
environmental impact statement (JRP 2014). The BC government considered this 
recommendation to be beyond the scope of the panel’s mandate (British Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 2014a). The BCUC could have provided a thorough assessment of BC 
Hydro’s load forecasting and cost estimates but because the BC government exercised its agenda 
setting power to exclude it from the process.  
The information BC Hydro was not required to submit in the environmental impact 
statement also benefited its case for the dam. Throughout the EA, numerous participants in the 
EA process, including local and downstream First Nations and Métis organizations, the 
government of Alberta, Parks Canada, Environment Canada and ENGOs, requested that BC 
Hydro provide a cumulative effects assessment that included the impacts of the existing dams 
(Environment Canada 2012a; Fraser 2012; Kyle 2012; Treaty 8 Tribal Association 2012). 
Downstream governments and First Nations and Métis argued that this cumulative effects 
assessment should extent to the PAD (Environment Canada 2012b; Harrison 2012b; MacMillan 
2012). The government of the NWT requested that the effects assessment extend to the Slave 
River and Delta (Government of the Northwest Territories 2013). Local and downstream First 
Nations and ENGOs also argued that cumulative effects should be measured according to a pre-
industrial baseline (Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and Mikisew Cree First Nation 2014; 
Deninu Kue FIrst Nation 2014; Howard and Johnston 2014; Treaty 8 Tribal Association 2014). 
Instead, BC Hydro provided a narrative description of changes experienced since the two dams 
were constructed and conducted a cumulative effects assessment based on a current baseline. The 
assessment did not include cumulative impacts to the PAD. Many participants considered this 
assessment deficient. For example, Environment Canada, a federal agency, noted that, “the 
narrative provided by BC Hydro in the EIS [environmental impact statement] lacks important 
information about known effects of flow regulation on the hydrology of the PAD and Lake 
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Athabasca” (Environment Canada 2013, 11). Representatives of downstream First Nations argued 
that the EA process “was nothing more than providing the optics that issues were being dealt 
with” and indicated that BC Hydro ignored concerns associated with historic, current and future 
impacts to the PAD from upstream hydro facilities (Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency 
and British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office 2014, 117). 
BC Hydro argued that there was insufficient evidence to provide a cumulative effects 
assessment based on a pre-dam baseline, a position that was rejected by the review panel (JRP 
2014). The absence of information about the cumulative effects of the existing dams benefited 
BC Hydro in important ways. Many participants, including local and downstream First Nations, 
argued that there are current, ongoing and unresolved impacts associated with the operation of the 
existing dams which a new dam would compound (Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and 
Mikisew Cree First Nation 2014; Treaty 8 Tribal Association 2014). The previous two dams were 
not subject to environmental reviews typical of current standards, raising, in the Treaty 8 Tribal 
Association’s view, questions about the ethics of building another dam based on a regime that 
was never rigorously reviewed for impacts. Their representatives stated that, “by constructing a 
third dam that relies on the continuation of … adverse effects, BC Hydro appears content to 
foreclose the possibility of remedying these ongoing adverse effects in the future” (Treaty 8 
Tribal Association 2014, 102). The failure to conduct a fulsome cumulative effects assessment 
also raises questions about the environmental performance of Site C relative to alternatives, 
particularly as the significant impacts of building the two existing dams were essentially 
grandfathered in to the current assessment. 
Finally, the government of Alberta indicated throughout the EA process that it was 
concerned that the operation of the Site C dam will exacerbate negative impacts associated with 
flow regulation downstream in Alberta (Moore 2013). In several submissions to the JRP, 
representatives of Alberta wrote that designated minimum flow releases of 390 m
3
/s from the Site 
C dam were expected to be inadequate to protect Alberta’s interests (Moore 2013; 2014). 
Specifically, in its final submission to the JRP, the government of Alberta stated that its concerns 
regarding flows “were not adequately addressed” during the EA and that, as specified, minimum 
design flows “will cause undue risk to Alberta infrastructure” (Moore 2014, 3), a concern 
downstream residents have reported to public servants in Alberta (CI 2; 3). Despite voicing their 
concerns, approvals for the dam accepted design flows proposed by BC Hydro (British Columbia 
Environmental Assessment Office 2014b). The government of Alberta was unable to set the 
decision-making agenda regarding flow releases in a way that protected its interests.  
 114 
The development of the Framework for the Lower Athabasca was constrained in ways that 
excluded lower-growth possibilities for oil sands development. Members of the P2FC, whose 
recommendations were adopted in the Framework, only deliberated options that corresponded to 
a high-growth scenario for oil sands mining (Ohlson, et al. 2010). Withdrawal rules considered 
during the process corresponded to a full-build out scenario of oil sands mining requiring average 
cumulative demands of 16 m
3
/s and peak demand of 29 m
3
/s (Ohlson, et al. 2010). While 
considering a high-growth scenario may be prudent planning, it also eliminated alternatives that 
entailed scaling back production in the oil sands, which several participants indicated may be 
desirable. For example, one participant reported that “we thought that some scenarios should have 
included reducing production and that was off limits. So, really that was a flaw in the process 
because we think that’s a responsible and viable option but the government and industry weren’t 
willing to entertain that” (CI 4). In contrast, representatives of industry reported that they did not 
perceive any constraints on interests or issues up for discussion in the P2FC (CI 1; CI 9). 
Ultimately, this constraint benefited industry and governments interested in expanding oil sands 
mining in the region.  
The P2FC did not achieve consensus on recommendations provided to governments. One of 
the reasons that they failed to achieve consensus was because of exemptions to the low flow 
cutoff (CI 4; CI 5). Two license holders, Syncrude and Suncor, can each continue to withdraw 2 
m
3
/s of water at the low flow threshold. CNRL and Shell can continue to withdraw 0.2 m
3
/s of 
water to prevent infrastructure from freezing. Therefore, a total of 4.4 m
3
/s can continue to be 
withdrawn when flows are at 87 m
3
/s. Syncrude and Suncor both hold senior licenses to withdraw 
water from the Athabasca River that were issued during the 1960s. Under Alberta’s prior 
allocation system, they hold senior rights to withdraw water. During the P2FC process, whether 
the senior licenses could be amended and whether the Committee had the authority to recommend 
doing so was a subject of disagreement among participants (Ohlson, et al. 2010). Several 
participants thought that there should be a complete cutoff at 87 m
3
/s, that doing so would be 
precautionary and within the rights of province, which ultimately owns the resource (Lebel, et al. 
2011; CI4; CI5). They also suggested that the low-flow threshold is a 1-in-100 year flow event 
and that the probability of frequent restrictions is unlikely (Alberta Wilderness Association et al. 
2015). However, others put forward the position that it was not within the P2FC’s mandate to 
consider restrictions on water licenses (Ohlson, et al. 2010). Ultimately, the government of 
Alberta opted not to implement potential regulatory tools or assert its ownership of water to cut 
off withdrawals at 87 m
3
/s. The federal government also failed to adopt recommendations 
regarding an ecosystem base flow cutoff with it had agreed to do in response to previous EAs 
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(Government of Canada 2008) and the science review process (Canadian Science Advisory 
Secretariat 2010). Both the government of Alberta and the government of Canada exercised their 
power to not require restrictions on senior license holders, which ultimately favored the interests 
of those industry actors. 
The ACFN and MCFN did not participate in the P2FC process. They provided separate 
recommendations to government, which were based on flows necessary to navigate a fully loaded 
boat with an outboard motor (Candler, et al. 2010), the preferred way to access hunting and 
fishing areas in the Athabasca River and delta, during the spring, summer and late fall seasons. 
Navigation in the Athabasca River is central to the ability of the ACFN and MCFN to practice 
constitutionally-protected Aboriginal and treaty rights to hunt, fish and trap in the delta. 
Information gathered from river users by independent consultants indicate that at flows of 1600 
m
3
/s members of the ACFN and MCFN can freely navigate the Athabasca River and delta. 
However, at 400 m
3
/s, river users report significant disruptions in navigation and access to 
preferred fishing and hunting grounds (Candler, et al. 2010). The ACFN and MCFN argued that 
when they cannot navigate the Athabasca River during critical hunting and fishing times, their 
treaty rights are negatively impacted. When flows are permitted at the lower threshold of 400m
3
/s 
in the late summer and fall seasons, requirements to consult and accommodate the ACFN and 
MCFN arise because of adverse impacts to treaty rights (Candler, et al. 2010). Under Canadian 
law, governments cannot infringe upon treaty rights without appropriate justification and a clear 
and reasonable purpose. In any case, as soon as treaty rights may be impacted governments have 
a duty to consult with affected Indigenous peoples. 
The government of Alberta responded to the ACFN and MCFN’s recommendations by 
including Aboriginal navigation as an indicator and developing an Aboriginal Navigation Index 
as an adaptive management trigger in the Framework. Recall that indicators serve as an early 
warning system that conditions may be changing whereas adaptive management triggers require a 
management response such as additional study or new rules about withdrawals. Alberta intends to 
include the ACFN and MCFN in monitoring and tracking river conditions (Government of 
Alberta 2015c).  
The inclusion of Aboriginal navigation as an indicator and an Aboriginal Navigation Index 
as an adaptive management trigger represents an effort to include concerns raised by the ACFN 
and MCFN. In fact, government interviewees indicated that concerns raised during Indigenous 
engagement sessions resulted in the most significant revisions to the Framework (CI 6; CI 7). 
However, questions remain about the extent to which the Framework will protect rights to 
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navigation during the hunting season. For instance, the ACFN and MCFN indicated that late 
summer and fall are especially critical for river navigation but that it is also during these seasons 
when most disruptions are experienced (Candler, et al. 2010; CI 8). The withdrawal rules for the 
summer/fall season in the Framework stipulate that at weekly flows of more than 111.6m
3
/s, up to 
29m
3
/s of water may be withdrawn. The Framework also contains a statement that cumulative 
withdraws may eventually exceed this limit, which was also the upper threshold considered 
during the Phase 2 process. According to a representative of the MCFN, this was “a giant red flag 
for us” (CI 8); although Aboriginal navigation is considered in the Framework, rules do not 
restrict withdraws to protect Aboriginal navigation, despite requests by the ACFN and MCFN 
that they do so. The failure to include the necessary tools to do so indicates power’s second 




4.5.3 The power of ideas 
The proponents of increasing resource development in the Peace and Athabasca sub-basins 
benefited from underlying ideas that create the context and rationale for the water use decisions 
considered in this paper. Power’s third dimension is the most difficult to identify because of the 
subtle, less obvious ways in which it works. To assess power’s third dimension, we considered 
arguments used to justify the water use decisions and the broader context in which they are 
embedded. Underlying ideas associated with the positive economic benefits of increasing 
resource development reinforced the advantage of the proponents of expanding hydroelectricity 
development and oil sands mining in the Peace and Athabasca river basins.  
When the government of British Columbia announced its approval of the Site C Dam in 
November 2014, it asserted that “Site C is in the public interest and the benefits provided by the 
project outweigh the risks of significant adverse environmental, social and heritage effects” 
(British Columbia Ministry of Environment 2014). The federal government’s approval contained 
a similar statement that “the environmental effects of the proposed Site C Clean Energy Project 
are justified in the circumstances” (Aglukkaq 2014). The relevant circumstances appear to be the 
transparent, thorough review process, the “jobs and economic growth” the construction of the 
project will provide, and consultation with First Nations. The federal minister’s statement also 
referred to the lower greenhouse gas emissions the project will generate relative to alternatives. 
When Premier Christy Clark announced the province’s decision to invest $8.8 billion in the dam 
in December 2014, she referred to five principles that guided the decision: necessity; 
affordability; reliability; sustainability and; conservation (Clark  2014). While she referred to 
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necessity, she did not provide a clear explanation for how the BC provincial government had 
determined that the power the dam would generate was needed on the timeline laid out. Instead, 
Premier Clark relied heavily on the argument that investing in Site C will ensure economic 
growth, wealth and opportunity for British Columbians (Clark  2014). 
Importantly, the review panel for Site C found that in light of the significant, adverse 
environmental, social and heritage impacts, and impacts to traditional use by First Nations, that 
approving the project could only be justified by a clear and unambiguous need for the power that 
the dam will generate (JRP 2014). It also stated that BC Hydro had not demonstrated the need for 
the power on the timeline considered.  Economic benefits, as well as the relatively lower 
greenhouse gas emissions the project will generate, stood in as justifications for approving the 
dam rather than a clear and unambiguous need for the electricity generated by the dam. The 
province’s approval of Site C and its failure to subject BC Hydro’s load forecasting to 
independent review, rested upon ideological ideas about the benefits of increasing resource 
development. It is possible to envision that a much different decision would have been reached if 
reconciliation with First Nations in BC, premised upon the international benchmark of prior, 
informed consent, were the foundational idea informing the decision.  
Similar appeals to economic benefits were made in decisions regarding expanding oil sands 
mining and Alberta’s broader energy development strategy, to which the Framework contributes 
as a tool to manage cumulative effects. For example, the Lower Athabasca Regional Plan claims 
that, “the responsible development of Alberta’s oil sands resource is the platform for continued 
economic growth and success that brings with it tremendous benefits to the people of Alberta” 
(Government of Alberta 2012, 25); this goal that is taken from Alberta’s 2008 energy strategy 
(Government of Alberta 2008).  
In Alberta, determining whether a project is in the public interest requires considering 
environmental, social and environmental impacts. In recommendations for approving oil sands 
mines, review panels justify approving expanding oil sands mines by referring to the economic 
benefits that will accrue to Alberta and Canada as a result of increasing oil sands mining. This is 
despite the fact that the cumulative impacts of oil sands mining in the Lower Athabasca region 
are creating significant and adverse impacts to wetlands, wetland species at risk and migratory 
birds, biodiversity and Aboriginal rights and culture, and potentially irreversible impact to 
wetlands and wetland dependent species (JRP 2013). As one legal scholar has noted, “for projects 
that are extensive in scope promising benefits over a long period of time such as oil sands 
development, the presumed interests of the public at large in the development of the resource 
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appears to be insurmountable” (Low 2011, 38).  The public interest is equated with economic 
benefits and economic growth. 
Justifying controversial energy developments by appealing to economic benefits associated 
with industrial development is an ideological argument that disguises existing inequities.  The 
economic benefits of oil sands mining are not equitably distributed within Alberta, which has the 
highest level of income inequality (Flanagan 2015) and the highest gendered income inequality 
(Lahey 2015) in all of Canada. Furthermore, the presence of unresolved concerns regarding 
consultation and accommodation with First Nations in the Lower Athabasca region mean that 
there are outstanding legal and ethical issues regarding the impacts of the pace and scale of oil 
sands development (Mantyka-Pringle, et al. 2015). These factors suggest it is reasonable to 
question how and why pursuing and facilitating a high growth scenario for oil sands mining is 
desirable and in the public interest, given existing financial inequities and impacts to Aboriginal 
and treaty rights. Yet, the fact that economic benefits stand in as justification disguises the 
existing sources of controversy over development in this region. It is possible to envision that 
entirely different decisions would be reached if biodiversity preservation and/or reconciliation 
with First Nations were the underlying ideas informing decisions. 
4.6 Analysis and discussion 
In this section, we compare findings across cases, linking evidence regarding how power 
dynamics impacted major water use decisions with implications for sustainable transboundary 
water governance. In relatively pristine basins such as the MRB, identifying power-related 
challenges to achieving sustainability can help to address governance deficiencies and enable 
governance that contributes to sustainability. In this section, we draw out findings related to 
transparency, inclusiveness and fairness as critical procedural aspects of governance that 
contributes to sustainability (Lockwood, et al. 2010). We have made inferences about the extent 
to which these characteristics of governance have been met based the power analysis we 
conducted. As detailed in Table 4.2, transparency regards whether decision-making processes are 
visible, reasoning behind decisions apparent and information about decisions publically available. 
Inclusion refers to opportunities to participate in and the ability to influence decisions about 
resource management. Fairness is met if decisions are free of systemic biases and distributions of 
costs and benefits are considered. In the following, we argue that the ways in which power was 
expressed in the water use decisions we considered worked as constraints on these characteristics 
of governance that contributes to sustainability.  
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4.6.1 Power dynamics and sustainable transboundary water governance 
In both the case of the Site C dam and the development of the Framework, concern about the 
transboundary impacts of resource development associated with each decision existed. The most 
direct evidence that downstream concerns were excluded from serious consideration in policy 
decisions is presented in case of the Site C Dam. Concerns regarding the impacts of flow 
regulation on downstream jurisdictions have existed for several decades and date back to when 
the construction of the first dam was completed in 1968 (Creery 1979; Peace Athabasca Delta 
Committee 1970). Downstream governments and residents had opportunities to participate in the 
EA process but they had limited influence on the actual decision that was reached. The failure to 
incorporate concerns expressed by the governments of Alberta and the NWT and federal agencies 
such as Parks Canada related to flow regulation throughout the EA process provides a vivid 
example of how power dynamics worked in the decision to approve Site C. Specifically, power 
dynamics within BC’s internal decision-making process worked to exclude downstream concerns 
from impacting the decision to approve the dam. We suggest these reflect aspects of power’s 
second dimension related to the ability to influence institutional arrangements so that decisions 
contrary to a powerful actor’s interests are not reached (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 2005). 
The failure to include and incorporate these interests in decisions about development is a 
constraint on sustainability – specifically, inclusion of downstream interests was not achieved. 
Importantly, the ways in which power operated as a constraint on inclusion also impacted 
transparency. Valuable information about the cumulative effects of the existing dams was not 
included in the EA, creating open questions about the justification for approving Site C – 
particularly its environmental performance relative to alternatives and cumulative effects on 
downstream jurisdictions.    
There were opportunities for representatives from various sectors to participate in the 
development of the Framework. However, unlike the case of Site C dam, there was no direct 
involvement of the downstream government of the NWT. As discussed above, some residents of 
the NWT indicated they believed they should have been engaged in the process (Straka, et al. 
2014). The absence of direct engagement with the NWT can be explained by the fact that 
although there are concerns about oil sands development on the NWT downstream, the Peace 
River is by far the larger contributor to the Slave River’s flow. Water withdrawals on the 
Athabasca River are currently very small relative to the Athabasca River’s average annual flow 
(Government of Alberta 2015c). Withdrawals are unlikely to have a significant negative impact 
on the total volume of water delivered to the NWT. Although the NWT was not directly involved 
in the development of the Framework, downstream interests and transboundary obligations were 
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recognized in the final policy document. For example, the Framework acknowledges that its rules 
will add to and complement transboundary commitments with the NWT (Government of Alberta 
2015c).  This admission exists in stark contrast to the unwillingness of British Columbia to 
accommodate Alberta’s concerns about minimum design flows, the NWT’s concerns that the 
Slave River and Delta should be included in the effects assessment, and longstanding concerns 
about the cumulative effects of flow regulation on the PAD. Constraints related to agenda-setting,  
Table 4.3: Summary of power analysis findings 
Power Findings: the Site C case Findings: the Framework  
1
st
 dimension: the 
ability to prevail in 
decisions 
 BC Hydro receives provincial and 
federal approvals to build the Site 
C dam despite opposition from 
local landowners, ENGOs, First 
Nations and downstream First 
Nations and governments  
 The government of Alberta adopts the 
non-consensus recommendations 
made by the P2FC, on which First 
Nations and ENGOs dissented but 
industry reportedly was satisfied 
2
nd
 dimension: the 
ability to set the 
agenda 
 BC Hydro’s load forecasting and 
cost estimates exempt from BCUC 
review  
 The environmental impact 
statement submitted by BC Hydro 
excludes the cumulative effects of 
existing dams  
 The government of Alberta is 
unable, despite its submissions to 
the JRP, to alter BC Hydro’s 
proposed minimum designed flow 
from the Site C Dam, which is 
accepted in provincial approvals  
 The P2FC did not consider low-
growth oil sands scenarios, despite the 
preference of some participants to do 
so  
 The ACFN and MCFN declined to 
participate in the P2FC 
 The government of Alberta was  
unwilling to assert its authority to 
modify/amend senior water licenses to 
implement a full water withdrawal 
cut-off  
 The federal government is unwilling 
to take action to encourage the 
implementation of an ecosystem base 
flow, despite its acceptance of 
recommendations to do so from a 




 dimension: the 
ability to 
construct/impose 
and/or benefit from 
dominant ideas 
 The government of BC approves 
the construction of the Site C dam, 
touting its environmental 
performance relative to alternatives 
and its role in promoting economic 
growth, despite the fact that the 
review panel found that the need 
for the dam had not been laid out 
on the timeline established by BC 
Hydro and concerns about 
significant impacts to Indigenous 
peoples  
 Oil sands mining is identified as a 
priority activity in the Lower 
Athabasca region and is supported by 
the Framework 
 Continued expansion is justified as 
being in the public interest based on 
jobs and economic growth derived 
from increasing resource extraction, 
marginalizing concerns about income 
inequality in Alberta and Aboriginal 
rights and title and treaty rights  
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such as the unwillingness of industry or government to entertain scaling back production or the 
hesitance of the provincial government to update historic water licenses, do suggest issues with 
inclusivity – as in the Site C case, ENGO and First Nations participants did not achieve their 
objectives. 
The more important power dynamic associated with the development of the Framework is 
the assumption that a full-build out scenario for oil sands development is desirable and beneficial. 
This relates to our findings associated with power’s third dimension and is consistent across both 
cases. Appeals to the economic benefits of expanding resource development justify highly 
controversial decisions that have significant, and in some cases, irreversible ecological impacts 
and significant impacts to Aboriginal and treaty rights and the traditional cultures of Indigenous 
peoples in the Peace and Athabasca sub-basins. The economic imperative of increasing resource 
development despite significant, negative impacts may not be compatible with the Master 
Agreement’s vision of maintaining ecosystem integrity and sustainable water management. 
Therefore, ideas expressed to justify the decisions may be among the most significant constraints 
on achieving sustainability at the interjurisdictional level. Findings regarding inclusion, 
transparency and how power’s third dimension operated in both cases, evince that decisions were 
not free of systemic biases, a significant challenge to enabling governance that contributes to 
sustainability.   
Making decisions that incorporate the multiple interests present in water governance 
presents a formidable challenge in many contexts. Water, a multi-use resource, is valued for a 
diversity of reasons, some of which compete. It is unlikely that all actors will be equally satisfied 
with a given decision. However, when decisions repeatedly favour certain interests over others, it 
indicates a structural pattern that may prevent alternative interests from being realized. In both 
cases, we found that the proponents of increasing resource development achieved their interests 
via decisions, despite opposition. In the case of Site C, there has been consistent and vociferous 
opposition to the dam as well as concerns raised by downstream governments about the impacts 
of flow regulation on downstream environments. The Framework’s non-consensus 
recommendations that were adopted by the Alberta government also favoured the interests of 
industry who supported the recommendations, with ENGOs and First Nations dissenting. The 
predominant influence of interests associated with industrial development should be interpreted in 
a context in which governments have committed to upholding principles of ecological integrity 
and sustainable water management via an interjurisdictional agreement. In considering the cases 
of water use decisions, it is clear that the interjurisdictional agreement is not a major influencing 
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factor on decisions. The predominance of industry interests and assumed benefits of economic 
growth suggest an inherently biased context. 
4.6.2 Assessing power-related challenges within federations by analyzing internal water 
use decisions 
Our findings reveal that even in a federation characterized by apparently cooperative 
intergovernmental relations, power dynamics can act as a constraint on sustainable transboundary 
water governance. Examining water use decisions within jurisdictions is critical to appreciating 
this perspective. It is within jurisdictions that major water use decisions are made that can impact 
downstream environments.  
Our findings also challenge perspectives in the transboundary water governance literature 
that federal transboundary water systems are fundamentally dissimilar from their international 
counterparts because of the presence of a central government that can intervene in sub-federal 
disputes (Zeitoun, et al. 2011). Whether a federal government actually does this, is in part, a 
function of power dynamics and levels of decentralization. We demonstrate that, in the cases 
considered here, the presence of a federal government does not guarantee its intrusive 
involvement in interprovincial affairs. The federal government did not intervene to protect or 
promote Alberta’s interests, or downstream First Nations and Métis interests, in the Site C case. It 
also failed to adopt its own recommendation regarding an ecosystem base flow for the Lower 
Athabasca River. This can be explained, in part, by the general unwillingness of the federal 
government to intervene in environmental matters perceived to be provincial unless there is a 
clear electoral advantage (Harrison 1996).  
In both cases, we found that the proponents of industrial development prevailed in 
decisions, agenda-setting and benefited from underlying ideas. This is despite the existence of 
well-developed legislation and regulations regarding EAs and water allocation that enable a 
broader set of interests and actors to be involved in decisions. This brings us to another point, 
increasingly acknowledged in the transboundary water governance literature: the need to expand 
the scope of consideration beyond governmental actors (Lopes 2012; Suhardiman and Giordano 
2012). In both the case of the Site C and the Framework, ENGOs and industry actors had key 
roles in the process. Advantages to industry are foiled by the limited success ENGOs achieved. 
This is not to suggest that ENGOs did not gain anything from participating. However, they did 
not achieve key objectives. Considering their participation enriches consideration of how power 
dynamics are challenged and/or reinforced in transboundary systems. Case studies such as those 
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presented in this paper also help to contribute to a more empirically-informed perspective on the 
power-related challenges associated with federal transboundary water governance. 
4.7 Conclusion 
We began this article by pointing out that many studies of transboundary water governance focus 
on interjurisdictional level interactions. However, we argue that the jurisdictional level warrants 
closer consideration. Particularly when jurisdictions retain the autonomy to make resource 
management decisions that can have transboundary impacts, it is necessary to consider their 
internal decision-making processes. A power analysis can help to reveal who prevails, sets the 
agenda and benefits from underlying ideas in conflicts over resource management. We have also 
argued that federal transboundary systems are not immune to challenges that arise because of 
power dynamics. Therefore, the case studies presented in this paper relate to water use decisions 
within sub-federal governments.     
Our power analysis revealed that decisions about resource management made within sub-
federal governments in transboundary systems constrained governance that contributes to 
sustainability at the interjurisdictional level. Specifically, procedural criteria related to 
transparency, inclusiveness and fairness were not achieved. We have also demonstrated that even 
apparently cooperative federal transboundary systems can be prone to challenges associated with 
power dynamics. A variety of governmental and non-governmental actors are involved in 
contestations over resource management within sub-federal jurisdictions in federal transboundary 
water systems. While there are important contextual differences between international and federal 
transboundary systems, it is a mistake to assume that federal systems are not challenged by power 
asymmetries. Assessing how power impacts resource management decisions within sub-federal 
governments can help to illuminate improvements that can enable a more sustainable governance 
future. So long as upstream jurisdictions make decisions with about water use that do not 
adequately consider and incorporate the interests of communities downstream, sustainability will 
be challenged. A sustainable way forward would be to meaningfully incorporate and consider 
downstream concerns in future decision-making. 
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5 Chapter Five 
 
Conclusion 
This purpose of this chapter is to review research findings presented individually in each chapter 
and to integrate them into this study’s conceptual whole. To do so, the research purposes and 
study objectives are first reviewed. Next, major research findings from each chapter are 
presented. In section 5.3, the significant, original contributions to knowledge made by this 
research and possible, preliminary recommendations for practice, are discussed. The limitations 
of this study and future areas of research are contemplated in section 5.4. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with reflections on conducting this research. 
5.1 Purpose and objectives 
The purpose of this research was to explore factors that constrain and enable sustainable 
transboundary water governance in a multi-level, federal context. To achieve this purpose, multi-
level governance processes were identified and assessed. A single case study was used to 
consider the design and performance of an interjurisdictional institution. Multiple case studies 
were used to assess the ways in which power dynamics impacted collaboration and water use 
decisions. The assessment of institutional design and performance and power analyses 
collectively facilitated a consideration of the roles and contributions of multi-level governance 
processes to sustainable transboundary water governance in a federal context. This research was 
undertaken in the empirical context of Canada’s Mackenzie River Basin (MRB). 
In the course of this study, four specific research objectives were pursued:  
1. Identify the jurisdictional levels at which federal transboundary water governance takes place 
in the MRB, Canada. 
2. Consider the design and performance of an interjurisdictional river basin organization (RBO), 
the Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB), in the MRB. 
3. Determine the ways in which first-, second- and third-dimensional power dynamics, according 
to Lukes (2005) impact a) collaboration and b) water use decisions within jurisdictions in the 
MRB. 
4. Assess the role and contribution of a) the MRBB, b) collaboration and c) water use decisions 
within jurisdictions to sustainable transboundary water governance within the MRB. 
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5.2 Major findings 
This section highlights findings from each of the manuscripts. Chapter Two assesses the design 
and performance of the Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB), an interjurisdictional RBO that 
coordinates at the scale of the MRB. The assessment of the design and performance of the RBO 
reinforced the need to consider multi-level governance processes, which was undertaken in 
Chapters Three and Four. Chapter Three considers the ways in which power dynamics impact 
multi-level local, regional and basin-wide collaborations in the MRB and discusses their roles in 
transboundary water governance. The limited roles played by the RBO and other collaborations 
reinforced the need to consider major water use decisions undertaken within upstream 
jurisdictions as a possible constraint on governance that contributes to sustainability in 
transboundary water systems. Therefore, Chapter Four assesses the ways in which power 
dynamics impacted major water use decisions regarding a hydroelectric dam in upstream British 
Columbia and a management framework for water withdrawals for oil sands mining in Alberta.  
In Chapter Two, a detailed case study of the MRBB, which is the only institution designed 
to coordinate jurisdictions in the MRB at the scale of the basin, was presented. A modified IAD 
framework (Huitema and Meijerink 2014; Ostrom 1986) was used to assess the design of the 
MRBB. Normative criteria including coordination, legitimacy, accountability and environmental 
effectiveness were used to consider the board’s performance. Additional criteria related to multi-
level design, knowledge integration, flexibility and responsiveness (Akamani and Wilson 2011; 
Folke, et al. 2005; Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008) facilitated a consideration of the 
extent to which the MRBB contributes to adaptive governance in the basin. Adaptiveness is a key 
component of governance that contributes to sustainability (Lockwood, et al. 2010; Pahl-Wostl 
2007). 
Chapter Two demonstrates that the MRBB is a coordinating RBO, with no authority 
independent of the governments that created it. Its role is to facilitate information exchange and to 
support implementation of the Master Agreement that created the Board. The Board’s 
institutional design facilitates coordination, and could contribute to legitimacy and accountability 
but contextual factors have resulted in mixed results regarding whether and to what effect the 
Board achieves these objectives. Concerns to preserve jurisdictional autonomy have limited the 
extent to which the Board coordinates the different interests and perspectives of basin 
jurisdictions. A lack of resources and political attention has meant that in some years the Board 
has failed to produce Annual Reports, timely updates to the State of the Aquatic Ecosystem 
Reports, and has struggled to include traditional knowledge; these deficiencies raise questions 
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about its legitimacy. The Board is formally accountable only to respective Ministers, whose 
attention to the Board has been intermittent over the years. Finally, a lack of environmental 
baseline data in the basin prevents evaluation of the board’s environmental effectiveness. 
However, it is worth noting that environmental management is not a role assigned to the board. 
Environmental management is the preserve of the respective provinces and territories. 
It is entirely possible that the board could play a more proactive role in the Basin. For 
instance, it could advance the general principles that underlie the Master Agreement in regulatory 
decisions or policy development within the provinces and territories (Donihee, et al. 2000). 
However, the hesitance of governments to empower the Board to play that role has meant that it 
has a relatively marginal and reactive role in the basin. Modifying the MRBB’s funding 
arrangement or role in the basin requires the consensus of the six jurisdictions that are party to the 
Master Agreement that created the board. The interjurisdictional consensus required to empower 
the board has not been forthcoming.  
The board’s role is further in question with the completion of Bilateral Water Management 
Agreements between Alberta and the Northwest Territories and British Columbia and the 
Northwest Territories, which envision a limited role for the board in the implementation of the 
agreements. The Bilateral Agreements create Bilateral Management Committees (BMCs) which 
will assume several of the Board’s core functions, including monitoring the implementation of the 
agreements. A multi-level design exists in the MRB but the extent to which it will facilitate 
adaptiveness is currently uncertain. Intent to coordinate BMCs with one another or the board is 
not mentioned explicitly in any of the agreements or appendices to the agreements. Finally, the 
board’s limited resources and limited use of traditional knowledge in board activities raise 
questions about the extent to which it can integrate knowledge and proactively respond to 
emerging issues in the basin. These factors limit the extent to which the MRBB contributes to an 
adaptive, basin-wide approach to governance in the MRB.  
A key finding from Chapter Two is that good institutional design is necessary but 
insufficient to realize effectively coordinated and adaptive transboundary water governance that 
contributes to sustainability. Given the relatively limited role the board has played in the basin, 
the findings also emphasized the need to consider governance processes beyond the 
interjurisdictional in transboundary water systems as potential factors that can constrain or enable 
sustainable transboundary water governance. This is a concern reflected in recent scholarship on 
transboundary water governance, which emphasizes the need to consider transboundary water 
systems as multi-level systems (Cosens 2010; Warner and Zawahri 2012). Therefore, Chapters 
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Three and Four assess collaboration and water use decisions made within jurisdictions as possible 
factors that constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance.  
In Chapter Three, multiple-case studies of collaboration in the MRB are presented. 
Characteristics such as inclusion, knowledge sharing, learning and the development of innovative 
and adaptive solutions to intractable problems may make collaboration ideal in transboundary 
settings (Dore 2014; Dore and Lebel 2010). Further, inclusion of relevant actors at various levels 
may enable well-informed solutions to develop at appropriate levels within large basins, which 
may contribute to adaptive transboundary water governance (Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 
2008), and thus, sustainability. However, the relative paucity of attention to issues of power in the 
collaborative water governance literature (Brisbois and de Loë 2015), especially as compared 
with the transboundary water governance literature (e.g., Lopes 2012; Warner and Zawahri 2012; 
Zeitoun, et al. 2011; Zeitoun, et al. 2013), mean that the potential contribution of collaboration in 
a transboundary setting is uncertain. In response to this shortcoming in the literature, Chapter 
Three presents a power-analysis framework to consider the ways in which power dynamics 
impact three collaborations in the MRB, which also facilitated a consideration of the role of 
collaboration in the basin. The three collaborations considered are the Slave River and Delta 
Partnership (SRDP), which is a relatively local, community-based ecosystem monitoring program 
in the Northwest Territories, the Peace-Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program 
(PADEMP), a regional, community-based ecosystem monitoring program and the MRBB, which 
operates at the scale of the basin.  
The power analysis resulted in several key findings related to how power dynamics 
impacted collaborations and their roles in the MRB. The first key finding that emerged is that 
many participants are satisfied with the extent to which their perspectives are heard and 
considered in the collaborations. For example, several key informants involved in different cases 
reported that despite representing relatively smaller organizations, they felt as though their 
interests were considered in the collaborative process. This finding is consistent with observations 
that collaboration facilitates positive reflections from participants related to process (Koontz and 
Thomas 2006). It also reinforces one of the potential benefits of collaboration in transboundary 
settings related to inclusion (Dore 2014). However, assessing power’s second and third 
dimensions revealed constraints on the roles that collaborations assume in the basin that emerged 
from existing power dynamics. Government actors have key roles determining the agendas 
assumed by the collaborations. For instance, instead of playing proactive or advocacy roles, as 
desired by some participants, collaborations play roles of information generation and sharing, as 
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preferred by some government participants. As such, power dynamics act as a constraint on the 
outcomes that can be produced by collaboration by enabling relatively powerful government 
actors to restrict the agendas they assume. 
One of the potential benefits of collaborations in transboundary settings is to encourage 
information sharing between different levels and to enable well-informed responses at the 
appropriate level (Green, et al. 2013). Clear conduits of information sharing between the 
collaborations and provincial/territorial/federal resource management institutions exist in the 
cases of the SRDP and PADEMP. The SRDP is the local-level collaboration that is nested within 
the government of the Northwest Territories’ water stewardship strategy. Recommendations 
made by PADEMP are intended to inform Parks Canada’s Management Plan for Wood Buffalo 
National Park. These linkages may be necessary to enable the identification and solving of 
potential problems at the appropriate level (Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008). However, 
there is no evidence that either Parks Canada or the Government of the Northwest Territories 
have successfully impacted upstream water use decisions related to hydroelectric facilities or oil 
sands mining that have created the need for collaboration. This finding speaks to an underlying 
power dynamic related to what objectives collaborations can actually achieve in the basin. 
Promoting and enhancing ecological and cultural integrity likely requires influencing decisions 
undertaken upstream that threaten both. If power is considered as the ability to achieve preferable 
outcomes, either by creating or preventing change, collaboration in the basin is marginalized by 
resource management decisions undertaken outside of collaborative forums. This finding 
highlights the importance of considering the political context in which collaborations are 
embedded. Others note the importance of local contextual factors (Koontz 2005) or broader 
institutional environments in which collaborations exist (Ananda and Proctor 2013; Emerson, et 
al. 2012). Using a power analysis framework, Chapter Three concludes that power dynamics in 
broader political and economic contexts act as a constraint on what collaborations can achieve 
and the roles that they assume. This finding is consistent with recent literature on collaborative 
water governance in Canada that emphasized the need to consider directly how political and 
economic contexts impact collaboration (Brisbois and de Loë 2016). It adds additional empirical 
evidence that contextual environments constrain what collaboration achieves. Well-facilitated and 
well-designed processes may not be sufficient to overcome contextual constraints. 
Findings from Chapter Three, regarding the fact that collaborations are disconnected from 
major water use decisions that created the impetus for collaboration, reinforced the need to 
consider the ways in which power dynamics impact water use decisions in upstream jurisdictions 
 129 
as a factor that can constrain and enable sustainable transboundary water governance. The role of 
political processes within jurisdictions has recently emerged as a key concern in some strands of 
the transboundary water governance literature (Suhardiman and Giordano 2014; Warner and 
Zawahri 2012; Zawahri and Hensengerth 2012). Chapter Three is, in part, a response to 
deficiencies in the transboundary water governance literature that has been concerned primarily 
with interjurisdictional interactions and governments (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Blatter and 
Ingram 2000; Lopes 2012). It also responds to a gap in the transboundary water governance 
literature related to the ways in which power dynamics may impact federal transboundary water 
systems, as discussed in the introductory section of Chapter Four. 
Chapter Four presented a cross-case analysis of two major water use decisions undertaken 
in upstream provinces. The water use decisions are related to key pressures on the MRB (MRBB 
2003b; MRBB 2012) and were undertaken within one jurisdiction. A power analysis reveals 
interests advantaged by decisions, agendas and underlying ideas and values in the provinces, and 
permits consideration of the ways in which governance that contributes to sustainability may be 
challenged. The first case regarded the environmental assessment (EA) and decision regarding the 
Site C hydroelectric dam on the Peace River in British Columbia. The second case involved the 
development of the Surface Water Quantity Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca 
River (the Framework), which dictates weekly rules for cumulative oil sands water withdrawals 
from the Athabasca River.  
The power analysis presented in Chapter Four resulted in several key findings related to 
how power dynamics impacted the major water use decisions. In both cases, the resulting 
decisions favoured the proponents of increasing resource development in the Peace and 
Athabasca river basins. Despite considerable local and downstream opposition, the provincial and 
federal governments approved the construction of the Site C dam. The Framework adopted the 
non-consensus recommendations of a multi-stakeholder committee. Environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs) and Indigenous governments dissented on the basis that the 
recommendations were not sufficiently protective of the aquatic ecosystem of the Athabasca 
River or treaty rights. The proponents of increasing resource development also benefited from 
information and alternatives not considered in each of the cases. For instance, the EA of the Site 
C dam did not include a cumulative effects assessment based on a pre-industrial case nor did it 
include a cumulative effects assessment of the downstream Peace-Athabasca Delta (PAD), which 
was a major concern for downstream governments and Indigenous peoples. Approvals for the Site 
C Dam’s operation ignored downstream Alberta’s interests regarding minimum flows necessary 
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to protect Alberta’s infrastructure. In the case of the Framework, the government of Alberta 
declined to assert its authority to revise senior water licenses on the Athabasca River. 
Furthermore, water withdrawal rules correspond to a high-growth scenario for oil sands mining, 
despite perspectives that curtailing growth should have been an option that was considered. 
Finally, for both cases, the major resource decisions are justified by the economic growth and 
jobs that will result from increasing resource development. This is despite the fact that there is 
evidence of substantial, negative impacts to ecosystems, Aboriginal land use and cultures and that 
there are considerable uncertainties about where the benefits of resource development actually 
accumulate. 
The ways in which power dynamics impacted major water use decisions represent a 
constraint on the transparency, inclusivity and fairness necessary for governance that contributes 
to sustainability (Lockwood, et al. 2010). A lack of inclusion was clearest in the case of the Site 
C Dam, where concerns about the downstream impacts of upstream development have existed for 
decades. Despite these concerns, the government of British Columbia has proceeded with 
building the dam and in the process perpetuated current and historical grievances associated with 
existing dams, upon which Site C’s operation will depend. Failing to include or incorporate the 
concerns expressed by downstream residents and governments resulted in key informational 
deficiencies. These ultimately benefited BC Hydro’s case for the Site C Dam, and resulted in a 
lack of transparency regarding the assumed justification for the dam – namely, that it has fewer 
environmental impacts than alternatives.  
In contrast, the rules developed for oil sands withdrawals acknowledge Alberta’s 
transboundary commitments with the NWT, even though residents and government officials were 
not directly involved in the development of the Framework. However, the inability of ENGOs 
and Indigenous governments to achieve a full water withdrawal cut-off and constraints on the 
agenda assumed by the P2FC suggest issues with inclusion. The bigger challenge associated with 
inclusion in the case of the Framework is whether it is truly the case that increasing oil sands 
development, which the Framework facilitates, is in the public interest as assumed. Concerns 
about irreversible impacts on ecosystems, negative impacts to Aboriginal and treaty rights and 
existing income inequalities in Alberta raise questions about whether the jobs and economic 
growth provided by oil sands development is truly in the public interest. Concerns regarding 
inclusion and transparency also speak to fairness – whether decisions are free of systemic bias. In 
both cases, developing governance arrangements that contribute to sustainability may require 
integrating and considering the diversity of perspectives that exist regarding resource 
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development in the basin and to prioritize reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. Such a path 
forward would require challenging dominant ideas in the current political and economic context 
that jobs and economic growth associated with resource development trump environmental 
concerns and reconciliation. 
Collectively, the findings from each chapter emphasize the need to consider transboundary 
water systems as multi-level and multi-actor. An exclusive focus on interjurisdictional 
agreements and interactions cannot reveal the multiplicity of other factors that can impact 
transboundary water governance. Broadening analysis permits a more fulsome consideration of 
the factors that constrain and enable governance that contributes to sustainability in federal 
transboundary water systems. Chapter Two details the relatively limited role, despite its potential, 
that the interjurisdictional institution has played in transboundary water governance in the MRB. 
Insufficient funding, a lack of explicit linkages among multi-level institutions embedded under 
the MRBB, and challenges associated with incorporating traditional knowledge, make the extent 
to which the MRBB contributes to adaptive transboundary water governance, a key criterion 
associated with sustainable water governance, uncertain. Chapter Three demonstrates that 
although participants report many positives associated with collaboration, such as inclusion, one 
of the major shortcomings of collaborative activities is that they are disconnected from major 
water use decisions made within the basin that have created the need for collaboration.  A power 
analysis reveals the dominant roles played by government actors and the constraints of broader 
political and economic contexts. It also highlighted the need to consider water use decisions made 
within jurisdictions as a possible constraint on sustainable transboundary water governance. 
Chapter Four demonstrates the important role of jurisdictional-level decision-making, particularly 
when jurisdictions retain the authority to make resource management decisions within their 
territories despite potential transboundary implications. Power dynamics resulted in decisions that 
were not inclusive of the variety of interests and perspectives regarding transboundary water 
governance, which ultimately challenged the achievement of transparency and fairness, which are 
critical procedural aspects of sustainable transboundary water governance.  
5.3 Contributions 
5.3.1 Academic contributions 
This study makes several contributions to the academic literature. First, it makes an empirical 
contribution to the transboundary water governance literature by considering the roles of multi-
level governance processes in a federal context. Second, it makes a theoretical contribution to the 
literature by highlighting the evaluative and explanatory benefits of using a power-analysis 
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framework to consider federal transboundary water governance. Third, using a power-analysis 
framework to consider collaboration strengthens the collaboration literature’s treatment of power.  
This study’s consideration of specific multi-level governance processes adds empirical 
contributions to the transboundary water governance literature. For instance, the assessment of 
the RBO, adds to the transboundary water governance literature an assessment of the design and 
performance of RBOs in context. Chapter Two provides a detailed, in-depth case study which 
facilitates a consideration of the extent to which RBOs contribute to adaptive transboundary 
water governance. The multi-case study presented in Chapter Three provides an empirical 
contribution to the transboundary water governance literature that considers collaboration a 
potentially desirable approach to governance in transboundary basins. Finally, the analysis of 
water use decisions in upstream jurisdictions adds to the literature that is increasingly interested 
in the role of political processes within jurisdictions as possible constraints on transboundary 
water governance. 
One of the major critiques of the transboundary water governance literature identified in 
this study is that it tends to focus on interjurisdictional-level interactions and the roles of 
governments in particular (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Blatter and Ingram 2000; Lopes 2012). 
This focus sits uneasily with increasing recognition and acknowledgements that transboundary 
water governance takes places across scales and levels and involves a range of governmental and 
non-governmental actors (Cosens 2010; Dore 2014; Dore and Lebel 2010; Gerlak 2015). This 
study, by considering the roles and contributions, and the involvement of a variety of actors in, an 
interjurisdictional institution, collaborations at local, regional and basin-wide levels and water use 
decision within jurisdictions in a federal context, makes a substantive contribution to the 
transboundary water governance literature. Considering the role of multi-level governance 
processes contextualizes the contributions of interjurisdictional institutions. In the cases 
considered, jurisdictions retained autonomy for resource management decisions which have 
significant impacts on transboundary water governance. There is only so much to be learned from 
assessing interjurisdictional institutions and interactions; accounts of transboundary water 
governance that consider only one level will inevitably be incomplete.  
An additional shortcoming associated with the transboundary water governance literature is 
that it tends to neglect power-related considerations in federal transboundary water systems. In 
general, federal transboundary systems have not received the scholarly attention that their 
international counterparts have (Garrick, et al. 2014). This is despite the fact that federal 
transboundary systems are prone to water use and allocation conflicts also seen in the 
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international context (Bhat 2009; Iyer 2013; Weibust 2014b), which suggest that power dynamics 
are at play. This study challenges assumptions that federal systems are not plagued by 
problematic manifestations of power because of well-developed regulations or the presence of a 
central government that can intervene in sub-federal disputes. Given the high degree of variability 
in terms of decentralization in the world’s 28 federal countries (Anderson 2008) and that there are 
over 300 watersheds intersected by federal political boundaries (Garrick, et al. 2013), there is 
much to be learned from assessing empirical cases. This dissertation, by using a power-analysis 
framework to consider transboundary water governance in a federal context, makes substantive 
theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. First, it develops and uses a simple but 
effective power analysis framework, and demonstrates the evaluative and explanatory value of 
using such a framework to study a federal context. Second, it highlights the ways in which power 
dynamics impact federal transboundary water governance in an empirical case. Specifically, 
power dynamics can privilege interests associated with expanding resource development despite 
concerns about potential impacts to downstream communities and jurisdictions. Findings from 
this research directly challenge assumptions in the international transboundary water governance 
literature about how power dynamics may or may not impact federal contexts (Zeitoun, et al. 
2011). 
Individual and multiple-case studies in this study also make specific contributions to the 
transboundary water governance and collaboration literatures. For instance, the assessment of the 
design and performance of an interjurisdictional RBO undertaken in Chapter Two contributes to 
the transboundary water governance literature that considers RBOs as key facilitators of adaptive 
transboundary water governance (Cooley and Gleick 2011; De Stefano, et al. 2012; Green, et al. 
2013; Suhardiman and Giordano 2012). Chapter Two highlights the necessity of considering the 
design and performance of interjurisdictional institutions in their political contexts – institutional 
design that can facilitate coordination is necessary but insufficient to realize an adaptive, basin 
wide approach to transboundary water governance. Chapter Two also extends Huitema and 
Meijerink’s (2014) performance criteria associated with RBOs by adding characteristics of 
adaptive transboundary water governance. Given the diversity that exists in the RBOs in the 
world (Huitema and Meijerink 2014), the study offers a substantive empirical contribution based 
on a detailed case study.  
Many of collaborative environmental governance’s promised benefits associated with 
inclusivity and adaptiveness are premised on the notion that collaboration can work well in 
contexts of power asymmetry (Ansell and Gash 2007; Fish, et al. 2010). Sometimes, these 
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assumptions are supported by studies that either ignore power or do not engage with the extensive 
literature on theories of power (Brisbois and de Loë 2015). As discussed in Chapters One and 
Three of this dissertation, the collaboration literature’s treatment of power has not been very well 
connected to the extensive debates regarding theories of power that might inform power-based 
assessments. Chapter Three, using a power analysis framework derived from theory, considers 
the ways in which power impacts collaboration and strengthens the collaboration literature’s 
consideration of power. It demonstrates the utility of a simple, but effective power-based analysis 
framework. Findings from Chapter Three reinforce observations regarding potentially dominant 
roles that government actors assume as agenda-setters, which is consistent with observations that 
governments are often dominant actors in collaborations (Hardy 2010; Holley, et al. 2012). It 
confirms the need to consider the distinct powers possessed by governments that are not available 
to other actors in collaboration. Findings from Chapter Three also demonstrate and confirm the 
necessity of considering how collaborations operate in their political and economic contexts, and 
the extent to which they intersect with governance processes at other levels. This is a concern 
others share (e.g., Ananda and Proctor 2013; Brisbois and de Loë 2015; Holley, et al. 2012; 
Koontz 2005). Explicitly considering power-related constraints in broader political and economic 
contexts contextualizes what collaborations can actually achieve, a key power-related concern.  
Considering the impact of power dynamics on collaboration facilitated an assessment of the 
role of multi-level collaborations in transboundary contexts. Multi-level collaborations may 
contribute to adaptive and inclusive transboundary water governance (Akamani and Wilson 2011; 
Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008). However, the relative paucity of power-based 
assessments of collaboration mean that collaborations may not be as appropriate as assumed in 
transboundary contexts characterized by power asymmetry. Findings from this research suggest 
that power dynamics constrain the contributions collaborations can make in transboundary 
contexts. Specifically, the disconnect that exists between what collaborations intend to achieve 
and the relative lack of success in influencing major resource management decisions that have 
created the need for collaborations, suggest that they may not be playing a role of empowering 
well-informed, responsive institutions. Again, this finding reinforced the need to consider the 
broader political and economic contexts in which collaborations in transboundary systems are 
embedded as constraints on or enablers of what collaborations can achieve. 
Finally, Chapter Four provides an assessment of how power dynamics impacted water use 
decisions within jurisdictions in a federal transboundary water system. It also considers the 
implications of how power dynamics impacted decisions within jurisdictions for governance that 
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contributes to sustainability in transboundary systems. It adds to the literature a consideration of 
political processes within jurisdictions as possible constraints on transboundary water 
governance. Previous studies have argued that it is important to consider domestic political 
processes when considering transboundary water governance outcomes (Warner and Zawahri 
2012) and that it is necessary do consider power within multi-level governance contexts (da 
Silveria and Richards 2013). Empirical research has identified that institutional fragmentation 
within jurisdictions can result in challenges to sustainable transboundary water governance 
(Suhardiman and Giordano 2014). However, the lobbying efforts of non-governmental actors 
may also encourage the adoption of practices and policies within jurisdictions that can enable 
more sustainable transboundary water governance (Gerlak 2015; Lopes 2012; Zawahri and 
Hensengerth 2012). Chapter Four adds an additional empirical case study that demonstrates that 
power dynamics within jurisdictions can result in resource management decisions that lack 
inclusivity, transparency and fairness and act as a constraint on sustainable transboundary water 
governance. These dynamics existed despite the presence of a federal government and well-
developed regulations and legislation within each jurisdiction. Findings from Chapter Four 
address a key deficiency in the transboundary water governance literature regarding the lack of 
systematic assessments of how internal political processes can impact transboundary water 
governance outcomes (Warner and Zawahri 2012). 
One of the overarching goals of this study was to consider the role and contributions that 
the MRBB, collaboration and major water use decisions make to governance that can enable 
sustainability in the MRB. Much of the literature suggests that RBOs such as the MRBB, as 
enablers of adaptiveness, can play key roles contributing to sustainability in transboundary 
contexts (Cooley and Gleick 2011; e.g., De Stefano, et al. 2012; Green, et al. 2013). The analysis 
presented in this dissertation in Chapter Two suggests that the MRBB plays a coordinating role 
among government actors at the scale of the basin that is beneficial. However, inadequate 
resources, a historic inability to incorporate traditional knowledge in MRBB activities, the 
reluctance of government participants to adopt a basin-wide vision for the MRB, mean that it is 
not playing a proactive, basin-wide coordinating role required to contribute to adaptive 
governance. Empowering the board, providing sufficient resources and making explicit linkages 
between the MRBB, BMCs and perhaps local level collaborations may address some of the 
MRBB’s current shortcomings.  
Chapter Three’s analysis of the MRBB adds power dynamics as a critical factor that 
constrains what the MRBB can achieve. It also highlights the important roles that local and 
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regional level collaborations play, by adopting models of inclusivity and working with local 
Indigenous peoples as partners. However, one of the expected contributions of collaborations that 
contribute to sustainability in transboundary systems is the ability to influence decisions being 
made at other levels (Green, et al. 2013). Constraints on the agendas assumed by collaborations, 
and the fact that decisions are being made in upstream jurisdictions where collaborations have 
relatively limited influence, impeded their ability to meaningfully impact decisions in ways that 
can contribute to sustainability. This finding reveals the need to consider power dynamics when 
assessing the contributions multi-level collaborations make to transboundary water governance. 
Empowering collaborations to make explicit policy recommendations to the MRBB or associated 
governments may work to address some of these deficiencies.  
The importance of internal political processes in jurisdictions in transboundary systems has 
emerged as a key concern (Warner and Zawahri 2012). The analysis in Chapter Four reveals that 
they may operate as among the most significant constraints on achieving governance that 
contributes to sustainability. Specifically, the ability to prevail in decisions, determine the agenda 
and benefit from underlying decisions advantaged the proponents of increasing resource 
development. Power dynamics made achieving transparency, inclusiveness and fairness at the 
interjurisdictional level difficult, by leaving critical information out of the discussion, by failing 
to incorporate the relevant concerns of downstream actors and through decisions systemically 
biased in favour of development interests. If decisions made within jurisdictions act as major 
constraints on governance that contributes to sustainability, significant gains may also be made at 
these locations.  
Others have highlighted that ENGOs can play critical roles by providing information 
(Hensengerth and Zawahri 2012) or lobbying governments to adopt environmental policies in 
transboundary basins (Gerlak 2015; Lopes 2012). Findings from this study suggest that non-
governmental actors can have important roles to play to encourage governance that contributes to 
sustainability in the MRB. In the cases of collaboration or in the development of the Framework, 
although some participants did not achieve the objectives they had intended, they did report 
benefiting from the process and were able to make improvements to existing governance 
arrangements. For instance, even though, at the time that the Framework was being developed, 
there was a widespread perception that the government of Alberta was not serious about 
considering, and even biased against, environmental interests, interviewees stated that there was 
still benefit in participating in the policy development process because it offered an avenue to 
influence government policy. Although industry’s interests were advantaged in the process, 
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environmental and Indigenous groups made small, incremental gains. The Framework recognizes 
the value of a withdrawal cut-off limit and has incorporated an Aboriginal Navigation Index 
(Government of Alberta 2015c), as a result of interests expressed by ENGOs and Indigenous 
governments. Similarly, even if the collaborations such as PADEMP are not playing advocacy 
roles, they are improving relationships and providing a positive example of ways to incorporate 
traditional knowledge in ecosystem monitoring (Chapter Three). Such gains can be discounted 
using a power-analysis framework that considers power as dominating, as discussed in section 
5.4. However, they may be critical for enabling the long-term project that enabling sustainability 
is. Therefore, one important limitation to the power theory used in this dissertation is the inability 
to tease out gains made by actors even when they do not achieve their preferred outcomes. 
It is also true that enabling greater sustainability in the MRB will likely require the addition 
of biophysical criteria to sustainability assessment criteria. Given the rapid pace of resource 
development in this basin, and anticipated environmental changes, adequate biophysical metrics 
can help to identify thresholds and limits to development. It is possible that, even if governance 
principles associated with sustainability are achieved, biophysical limits could be tested. 
Furthermore, although Lockwood et al.’s (2010) criteria are helpful as a general guide to consider 
if and how governance contributes to sustainability, criteria based on the expectations and desires 
of the inhabitants of the MRB would certainly enrich the discussion. This is particularly 
important in light of the MRB’s Indigenous population, who have constitutionally-protected 
Aboriginal rights and title and treaty rights in the basin and may have entirely different 
expectations and desires regarding sustainability. Furthermore, it may be the case that, using 
alternative principles reveals important implications of power not revealed using Lockwood et 
al.’s (2010) general criteria. 
This study also confirms a well-known weakness of the IAD framework with respect to 
power. As others have argued (Clement 2010), it is necessary to supplement the IAD framework 
with power theory to tease out power dynamics in action situations. Using a power theory can 
highlight issues such as inclusion, resources and the perspectives adopted by participants as 
constraints that can be challenged and possibly changed.  
5.3.2 Recommendations for practice 
In this section, a few recommendations for practice are offered to practitioners of transboundary 
water governance in federations. The recommendations emerge directly from the research 
undertaken for this study. Given the fact that there are over 300 federal transboundary watersheds 
in the world (Garrick, et al. 2013), some of these recommendations may be helpful for other 
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federal contexts. However, as this research has demonstrated, and as I firmly believe, context is 
vitally important to consider and should inform the practices adopted. Additional case studies, or 
comparison of the unique context of the MRB with other federal contexts, may reveal the extent 
to which these recommendations could be generalized for or transferred elsewhere.  
Good institutional design is insufficient 
The Master Agreement that created the MRBB, and the institutional design of the MRBB itself, 
generally reflects what was considered best practice in international transboundary water 
governance in the 1990s (Giordano and Wolf 2003; McCaffrey 2007). For instance, the Master 
Agreement iterates a commitment to ecological integrity, sustainable resource management and 
preventing harm to neighbouring jurisdictions.  It created an interjurisdictional board intended to 
implement the Master Agreement that operates at the scale of the basin; the board is also intended 
to engage and communicate with Aboriginal peoples in the basin in culturally-relevant ways. The 
Master Agreement also reflects the political realities of a highly decentralized federation: it 
acknowledges the importance of jurisdictional interests by protecting jurisdictional autonomy to 
make resource management decisions. Without such an admission, it is unlikely the jurisdictions 
would have been willing to sign the Master Agreement. 
Despite this design, the MRBB has not realized its potential to be a proactive force for a 
coordinated, basin-wide vision in the MRB. Understanding why requires considering the political 
context in which the institution is embedded. Federal involvement in water in general declined 
through the 1990s and was eventually replaced with, what critics suggest is, a pro-industry 
perspective less sympathetic to environmental concerns (Clancy 2014). In matters related to 
transboundary waters, the federal government is satisfied to defer to the provinces and territories 
(Saunders 2014) whose interests can vary significantly. The level of government that could adopt 
a broader, basin wide perspective did not possess the political will or capacity to strongly 
advocate such a vision. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two, jurisdictional representatives 
on the Board have historically been more interested in protecting their jurisdiction’s interests than 
considering the basin as a whole. These factors constrained interest in empowering the Board to 
play a proactive role in the basin.  
Interest in the MRBB was renewed again in the late 2000s and early 2010s as the 
government of the Northwest Territories pursued its Water Stewardship Strategy and former 
Government of the Northwest Territories Minister of Environment and Natural Resources 
Michael Miltenberger prioritized developing bilateral water management agreements with 
upstream jurisdictions. While that renewed interest and commitment is positive, it reflects a key 
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vulnerability in the sense that political commitment to transboundary water or the MRBB can 
wax and wane as other political priorities take over. This observation is especially pertinent given 
the newly completed Bilateral Water Management Agreements. Like the Master Agreement and 
the MRBB, they contain many promising principles and commitments to interjurisdictional 
cooperation; they reinforce the principles that underlie the Master Agreement. Many of the 
specifics of each agreement have yet to be detailed by the Bilateral Management Committees 
created by the Agreements. The Bilateral Agreements may provide additional incentive to 
prioritize the Master Agreement and further embed transboundary water governance in the MRB 
as a political priority. However, as other economic issues take precedence commitment to and 
enthusiasm for the Bilateral Agreements could wane as did enthusiasm for the Master Agreement 
and MRBB. Although good institutional design is necessary, it is insufficient: the will and desire 
of governments to effectively implement and empower institutions is required to realize a 
coordinated, adaptive approach to transboundary water governance that contributes to 
sustainability.  
This brings me to an observation about the need to make linkages between the BMCs and 
MRBB explicit. As discussed in Chapter Two, the Bilateral Agreements and Appendices indicate 
no explicit commitment to coordinate among the BMCs and the Board. For practical reasons, 
doing so may be desirable. For instance, what Alberta and British Columbia agree to implement 
on the Peace River could directly affect the Slave River Alberta shares with the Northwest 
Territories. Yet, they will have separate BMCs. Coordinating the BMCs and MRBB may also be 
advisable as a strategy to enable a coordinated, basin wide and adaptive approach to governance 
in the basin. The nested institutions may collectively achieve what the MRBB cannot. Similar 
commitments, governance structures and principles articulated in the respective Bilateral 
Agreements and parallel operating procedures for BMCs may facilitate such an approach. 
Coordination may take place informally. It may also not take place at all. Detailing explicit 
commitments to coordinate could make certain what is currently uncertain. However, as 
discussed above, merely making the intention to coordinate BMCs with one another and the 
Board will likely not be sufficient to actually realizing the coordination that may be necessary for 
a proactive, adaptive approach to governance in the MRB.    
It is necessary to explicitly consider the transboundary implications of jurisdictional-level 
decisions 
It is not always the case that resource management decisions made on water bodies that flow into 
different political jurisdictions should engage interjurisdictional discussions or institutions. Doing 
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so would likely be costly for governments that are constrained for resources. However, it may 
also be equally, or even more costly, to not directly address resource management issues within 
jurisdictions that have transboundary implications. Cases considered in this study offer important 
insights in this regard. Both the Site C Dam and the Framework were decisions made entirely 
within the upstream jurisdictions of British Columbia and Alberta, respectively. Although the 
federal government had some responsibilities, the primary jurisdiction is with the provinces. The 
decisions also regard resource management activities that have raised concerns in downstream 
jurisdictions. 
Although the EA of Site C provided opportunities for downstream governments and 
communities to be involved in the process, they had limited influence in important matters related 
to minimum flows, cumulative effects assessment and the spatial boundaries of the effects 
assessment, which did not include the PAD nor the Slave River and Delta as requested by some 
participants. Failing to consider and include the transboundary interests at stake on the Peace 
River may prolong what has already been a multi-decadal conflict over flow regulation. In fact, 
the government of British Columbia has a pattern of ignoring or not directly engaging with 
interjurisdictional committees concerned with the downstream impacts of flow regulation on the 
Peace River. By failing to adequately consider its operation of the hydroelectric dams as a 
transboundary issue and act as such, the government of British Columbia has prolonged this 
conflict. Unresolved issues related to its cumulative effects and operating procedures for the Site 
C Dam will persist until the government of British Columbia and BC Hydro directly address the 
issue. 
The development of the Framework offers an interesting contrast. The government of the 
NWT and residents of the NWT were not directly involved in the development of the Framework. 
Although there are numerous concerns about the potential impacts of expanding oil sands mining 
on the downstream NWT, water withdrawals from the Athabasca River are relatively small and 
unlikely to directly influence flows in the Slave River, to which the Peace River is the major 
contributor. Transboundary concerns regard the scale and pace of oil sands development and the 
extent and possibility of contamination from oil sands mining. Although the government of the 
NWT was not directly involved in the development of the Framework, the government of Alberta 
did indicate that it considered the NWT’s interests related to water quantity in the development of 
the Framework. The Framework explicitly acknowledges that Alberta must meet transboundary 
commitments with the NWT (Government of Alberta 2015c). Although the Framework could 
easily be considered entirely a jurisdictional issue, the government of Alberta proactively 
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identified the potential transboundary implications of water withdrawals. Again, this is in contrast 
with the government of British Columbia’s actions regarding the Site C Dam, and its newly 
developed Northeast Water Strategy (Government of British Columbia 2015). The Northeast 
Water Strategy contains no recognition of transboundary commitments with or obligations to 
neighbouring NWT or Alberta. This is notable because northeastern British Columbia is where 
the majority of hydraulic fracturing, with its high water demands and potential water 
contamination issues, is taking place in the province. There is room to improve by proactively 
identifying and responding to potential downstream interests. Doing so may resolve potential 
problems before they emerge and become intractable. 
The ways in which potential transboundary issues were dealt with in the Bilateral 
Agreements may offer a productive and proactive model useful for other jurisdictions and in other 
resource management contexts. The model adopted should be considered further for its 
possibilities. In the MRB, governments addressed the issue of when resource management within 
jurisdictions become an interjurisdictional, transboundary problem by identifying water quality, 
quantity and biodiversity thresholds and objectives in Bilateral Water Management Agreements 
(Government of Alberta and Government of the Northwest Territories 2015; Government of 
British Columbia and Government of the Northwest Territories 2015). Thresholds, if triggered, 
require varying degrees of action ranging from jurisdictional to interjurisdictional actions. 
Although specific thresholds and objectives are still to be determined, they may provide a 
productive and proactive way to address potential problems on transboundary waters. However, 
much depends on the actual thresholds as well as the political commitment to implement and 
enforce the agreements. As discussed above, history has shown that the enthusiasm to do so in the 
basin has waxed and waned. This reinforces that good institutional design is necessary, but 
insufficient. 
Consider governance processes at different levels and how they interact 
Considering transboundary systems as multi-level allows for an assessment of where impact and 
influence can be achieved. For those concerned with enabling more sustainable transboundary 
water governance, based on this study’s results, there are many gains to made by working at – 
and potentially more leverage available – at the jurisdictional level. This is reinforced by 
observations from the Framework discussed in Chapter Four. Although ENGOs and Indigenous 
governments did not fully realize their interests, they articulated concerns, perspectives and 
options that might serve to lead to a more sustainable future. For instance, although the 
recommendations ultimately adopted by the government of Alberta were non-consensual, with 
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ENGOs and Indigenous governments dissenting, the Framework does make an important 
incremental step forward by acknowledging that there might be value in adopting an ecosystem-
based flow policy in the Athabasca River and identifying a threshold at which most water 
withdrawals must cease. Similarly, although the government did not adopt an Aboriginal Base 
Flow or Aboriginal Extreme Flow as requested by some Indigenous governments, Aboriginal 
navigation was included as a trigger in the Framework’s monitoring program. There may be 
incremental gains to be made within jurisdictions that a focus on the interjurisdictional level 
would not reveal.  
Considering multi-level dynamics can also reveal constraints on particular processes that 
might not be apparent at one analytical level. For example, although participants in collaboration 
may report positive perceptions about their involvement in collaborative activities, considering 
how collaboration intersects with over governance processes may lead to different assessments 
about their effectiveness. That was particularly important for the cases of collaboration 
considered in this study, because they were designed and developed in response to the pace and 
scale of major resource management decisions. Although they have created some positive 
outcomes, the collaborations have not directly influenced the major resource development 
decisions that created the need for them. Considering how governance processes intersect may 
allow for organizations to prioritize activities in particular processes to realize maximum effect. 
5.4 Study limitations and ideas for future research 
The purpose of this research was to assess factors that constrain and enable sustainable 
transboundary water governance, focusing on the multiple levels at which important 
transboundary water governance processes occur in a federal context. In this section, I reflect on 
limitations of this study and present ideas for future research. 
In the course of identifying and assessing the various multi-level governance processes 
included in this study I made eight field trips throughout the MRB. I balanced coverage and depth 
with the time and resource constraints of completing a doctoral program and traveling in 
Canada’s north. I made efforts to seek out additional interviews with representatives from a 
number of sectors, including government, Indigenous organizations, industry and ENGOs. 
Additional interviews with industry and Indigenous organizations might have been beneficial. 
Capacity constraints, participant fatigue (several of the groups I contacted have been extensively 
involved in other research projects) and ongoing resource management decisions and bilateral 
negotiations limited the extent to which participants were willing to be interviewed. The 
extensive document analysis I undertook revealed many of the perspectives and interests I sought 
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through interviews, but as I learned in the interviewing processes, interviewees provide rich, in-
depth data that adds to and strengthens document analysis. Interviews may have provided 
additional perspectives and nuance I was unable to access. A different study design, such as 
participatory research, or spending more time in each community I visited, may have facilitated 
more interviews.  
Chapters in this dissertation adopted a power analysis perspective based on Lukes’ power 
theory, which views power as domination (Lukes 2005). This perspective was necessary to 
consider the ways in which interests are advantaged through various governance processes in 
more and less obvious ways. A different perspective, which considers the potentially empowering 
role of power dynamics (Raik, et al. 2008), might also offer interesting insights regarding multi-
level transboundary water governance in this context. Although I am certain of the evaluative and 
explanatory value of the power analysis framework I adopted, viewing power as zero-sum meant 
that some of the benefits achieved by less powerful actors were not always captured in the power 
analyses I conducted. It was not always clear that power dynamics resulted in absolute losses or 
gains.  
I also think there are gains to be made by explicitly analyzing and considering the roles that 
non-governmental organizations play in federal transboundary water governance. This is 
something I did partially by considering their roles in collaboration and water use decisions. I 
think an explicit assessment, perhaps based on a framework such as Betsill and Correll’s (2001), 
could provide more insight on the nature of the roles and contributions they provide in 
transboundary contexts that might not be captured adequately in the study design I used. 
Throughout the course of my research, I wondered if non-governmental actors were able to 
articulate concerns not politically possible for government actors. For instance, ENGOs and 
Indigenous governments have frequently critiqued the environmental impacts of oil sands mining 
and the operation of hydroelectric facilities in the MRB. Several government officials from 
different jurisdictions reported that bringing up the economic model of oil sands development or 
the operation of hydroelectric facilities in interjurisdictional discussions is politically unavailable 
to them. I believe that this concern stemmed from a concern that doing so would cause 
negotiation partners to walk away from transboundary discussions. ENGOs and Indigenous 
organizations are not bound by the same constraints. They may be able to bring up interests and 
perspectives unavailable to governments but that could potentially impact transboundary water 
governance processes over the long term. Explicitly considering their roles and contributions 
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could provide greater insight into factors that constrain and enable transboundary water 
governance. 
This dissertation used established principles of governance that contribute to sustainability, 
rather than defining what sustainable transboundary water governance means in the context of the 
MRB, to make assessments. This approach was premised on the assumption that it is possible to 
measure the extent to which governance contributes to sustainability using established criteria, 
and that doing so is an important contribution toward furthering sustainability. The result of this 
approach is that I have not defined what sustainability is in the context of the MRB. I adopted this 
approach for several reasons. First, an important critique of the concept of sustainability is that it 
is static and does not reflect insights from systems ecology indicating that ecological systems are 
dynamic (Benson and Craig 2014). Given the extent of environmental uncertainties in the MRB, 
a stationary definition of sustainability may not be entirely appropriate in this context. However, a 
broad vision of ecosystem integrity and human well-being is a valuable normative goal that I 
believe should be pursued in this context. The criterion adaptiveness included in the principles of 
governance that contributes to sustainability reflects the need to recognize the possibility of social 
and environmental changes. Second, the purpose of this dissertation was to assess governance, 
using social criteria. Measurements of sustainability require biophysical criteria and were outside 
of the scope of this dissertation’s objectives. Finally, if I were to define sustainability in the 
context of the MRB, despite the reservations mentioned above, I believe it would be more 
appropriate to adopt a participatory action research study design. Given the history of colonialism 
in Canada and regional tensions inherent in this large and diverse federation, defining 
sustainability in the MRB requires an inductive, ground-up approach. The definition of 
sustainability in the MRB should be grounded in the desires and interests of people who live 
there, blended with established sustainability assessment criteria that include biophysical criteria.  
Finally, several of the cases I considered in this dissertation are relatively recent. For 
instance, PADEMP was formed in 2008 and the SRDP in 2010. The analysis presented in this 
dissertation is based on a snapshot of the relatively short period of time that they have been 
operating. When more time has passed, a longitudinal study design may provide a more nuanced 
analysis of their roles and contributions to transboundary water governance. This would require 
studying these collaborations over the long-term, which was not possible at the time this research 
was conducted. As discussed in the concluding section of Chapter Three, some of the potential 
benefits these collaborations bring to transboundary water governance, such as models of 
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inclusivity and alternative perspectives on governance in the MRB, may be realized over the 
long-term. 
5.5 Research reflections 
The School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability at the University of Waterloo offers a 
unique intellectual environment which contributed directly to the way in which this study was 
undertaken. First, the School’s emphasis on sustainability as a valuable normative goal that can 
be pursued by assessing policy and governance contributed directly to the study objectives and 
assessments made in each of the empirical chapters. Second, the School’s transdisciplinary 
orientation directly informed the identification of the study problem and the research design, 
frameworks and methods used in the course of this research.  
It is important to acknowledge that there are a variety of perspectives regarding what 
transdisciplinary research requires and entails (Pohl 2010; Wickson, et al. 2006). Several key 
assumptions associated with transdisciplinarity informed this research. The first is that research 
should address socially relevant problems (Hirsch Hadorn, et al. 2006; Pohl 2010). The socially 
relevant problem addressed by this study is factors that constrain and enable governance that 
contributes to sustainability. Given the pace and scale of worldwide water degradation, this is a 
very real problem. The second key characteristic of transdisciplinary research is that it 
emphasizes using the appropriate tools, regardless of disciplinary convention, to address the 
practical problems associated with sustainability (Pohl 2010). This orientation encouraged the use 
of concepts and frameworks from disciplines such as sociology, political science and geography 
in the course of this research. For example, concepts related to institutional design, multi-level 
governance, scale, level and power were particularly helpful to achieve this study’s objectives. 
An intellectual environment that encouraged synthesizing useful concepts and insights from 
diverse disciplines was incredibly helpful throughout the course of this research, and resulted in 
the study I achieved and report in this dissertation. 
One of the other characteristics of transdisciplinary research – the use of participatory 
research approaches that integrates multiple knowledges (Hirsch Hadorn, et al. 2006; Lang, et al. 
2012; Pohl 2010) – did not directly inform this study. Such an approach requires the integration 
of practitioner and lay perspectives throughout research. Importantly, this is not a consistent 
characteristic of transdisciplinary research (Pohl 2010), but it may be an important one that 
differentiates it from other approaches. Research that does integrate practitioner and lay 
perspectives can likely offer insights unavailable in this study; they may also more directly 
address practical problems practitioners encounter in their work. Such an approach is incredibly 
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valuable for that reason. In future efforts, I look forward to incorporating multiple knowledges 
and exploring the possibilities for participatory research to contribute to the long-term project of 




6 Chapter Six 
6.1 Semi-structured interview guide questions 
For participants in the Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB): 
 For how long and in what capacity have you been involved with the MRBB? 
 What is the role and involvement of Aboriginal members on the MRBB?  Do the Aborig-
inal members receive support for travel and other costs associated with their membership 
on the MRBB? 
 How well does the MRBB function in terms of fulfilling its original mandate as specified 
in the 1997 MRBTWMA? Can you provide examples? 
 One of the really unique things about the Mackenzie River Basin Board is that it is to 
consider the concerns and needs of Aboriginal people by providing culturally appropriate 
communication and incorporating traditional knowledge and values. What strategies or 
work has the Board adopted or undertaken to provide culturally appropriate communica-
tion and incorporate traditional knowledge and values? How well has the Board per-
formed these tasks? 
 How effective has the MRBB been at coordinating between the various basin jurisdic-
tions? By coordinating I mean assisting in avoiding contradictory policies and conflicts 
about shared water.  Please provide examples.  
 Is the MRBB sufficiently accountable and transparent (and to whom)? If not, what could 
be done to improve transparency and accountability?  
 Do you think the MRBB is contributing effectively to shared governance of the basin? If 
no, what reforms are needed? If yes, can you elaborate on why you think the MRBB is 
contributing effectively? 
 What key activities or initiatives have you been involved with as a member of the 
MRBB? 
 In your experience, what are the MRBB's main strengths or successes? 
 Are there areas in which you think the MRBB could improve? 
 What are some of the challenges or obstacles the board faces? 
 In your experience, has the MRBB been an effective forum to voice your organization's 
interests?  
 Does every actor who has an interest or stake in what the MRBB does have representa-
tion on the board?  
 In your experience, do all members have equal say in determining the MRBB's activities, 
directions or focus areas? 
 Do factors external to the MRBB impact the work that it does? 
 Is there anything about the MRBB that my questions have not addressed or that you think 
I should be aware of?  
 
For participants in the Slave River and Delta Partnership (SRDP) and/or the Peace-Athabasca 
Delta Ecological Monitoring Program (PADEMP):  
 For how long have you been involved with SRDP/PADEMP? 
 What is your organization’s role in the SRDP/PADEMP? 
 How did your organization become involved in the SRDP/PADEMP?  
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 Are all of the actors who have an interest or a stake in the work of the SRDP/PADEMP 
involved? Is there a group you would like to be involved but is not? 
 In your experience, what are some of the main strengths or successes of the 
SRDP/PADEMP? What are some of the areas in which the SRDP/PADEMP could im-
prove (if any)? What would need to happen to make those improvements? 
 How often does the SRDP/PADEMP meet? 
 How is data/information shared within the group [SRDP/PADEMP]? 
 Does SRDP/PADEMP share information with the Joint Oil Sands Monitoring Group 
(JOSM) or any other external groups or individuals? Is information from JOSM shared 
with PADEMP/SRDP?  
 Are you satisfied with the level of information sharing that currently occurs between the 
different monitoring groups (such as JOSM or other community based monitoring ef-
forts) within the Peace-Athabasca-Slave basin? 
 In your experience have all of the actors involved had equal influence in the activities of 
the SRDP/PADEMP (e.g., determining key monitoring priorities and metrics, having 
their interests heard)?  
 Does the SRDP/PADEMP collectively have the resources required to carry out monitor-
ing and communications? 
 Do you have the resources necessary to fulfill your organization’s role in 
PADEMP/SRDP? If not, what changes are necessary to support your role? 
 How has the SRDP/PADEMP included traditional knowledge? Are you satisfied with the 
way that traditional knowledge has been incorporated in the SRDP/PADEMP’s work? 
 Do factors outside of the process impact the work that the SRDP/PADEMP is able to do? 
 Is there anything about the SRDP/PADEMP that my questions have not addressed or that 
you think I should know? 
 
For participants in the Phase 2 Framework Committee (P2FC)/Surface Water Quantity 
Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca:  
 How and why did you become involved in the Phase 2 Framework Committee (P2FC)?  
 Did you have the support (technical and financial resources, or time) necessary to do the 
work required to engage in the P2FC process? If not, where did you get support? 
 Did you feel that all of the relevant actors were present in the process? If not, which ac-
tors do you think should have been there but were not? 
 Were you able to bring up all of your, or your organization’s interests, regarding the 
management of water withdrawals in the Lower Athabasca in the P2FC process? If not, 
which issues were left out of the discussion? 
 Did all actors involved in the P2FC have equal say in determining the final recommenda-
tions? 
 Did events external to the P2FC impact or influence the work that you were doing as a 
part of that process?  
 [For some industry representatives] Was it difficult for your organization to accept the 
0.2m3/s withdrawal allowance (to prevent freezing at Canadian Natural Horizon) in the 
event that the 87m3/s low flow scenario is reached? 
 What do you consider to be the main success(es) of the P2FC process?  What from the 
P2FC experience would be worthwhile to replicate in other water management contexts?  
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 In retrospect, is there anything that you think could have been improved upon in the 
P2FC process? If you had to do it again, is there anything you would suggest should be 
done differently? 
 How does the P2FC compare to other water governance or environmental governance 
processes you have been or are currently involved in? 
 Is there anything that is top of mind for you regarding the P2FC process that my ques-
tions have not addressed?   
[For some government officials] 
 What is your role in developing the Surface Water Quantity Management Framework for 
the Lower Athabasca River? 
 What additional steps were necessary to develop the Management Framework after the 
Phase 2 Committee released its recommendations? [Wasn’t originally intended to be part 
of the LUF] 
 How did your organization navigate the non-consensus nature of the P2FC recommenda-
tions and the recommendations provided by the ACFN and MCFN in the As Long as the 
Rivers Flow document and any other recommendations you might have received [DFO]? 
 Were alternative water withdrawal rules to what the P2FC recommended considered at 
any time during the development of the Surface Water Quantity Management Frame-
work? 
 The P2FC report documents that scientific and legal uncertainty contributed to areas of 
non-consensus. Has your organization taken any steps to resolve that scientific and legal 
uncertainty that led to the non-consensus recommendations? That is, have there been any 
studies of under what conditions historic Water Resources Act licenses may be cut off or 
revised? Or what a scientifically verified cut off threshold is? Do you envision that work 
taking place? 
 How many stakeholder engagement sessions have you had in support of developing the 
Framework? 
 How many engagement sessions have you had with Aboriginal organizations? 
 Have there been any other forms of engagement in support of developing the framework? 
 Did the feedback you received during the engagement sessions impact the development 
of the framework? If so, how? Can you point to specific examples? 
 How did the participation of industry stakeholders impact the framework? Were there dif-
ferences in perspectives between senior and junior license holders? 
 How did the participation of the ENGOs impact the development of the framework?  
 How many engagement sessions have you had with Aboriginal organizations? 
 How has your engagement with Aboriginal organizations impacted the development of 
the framework? 
 What has been the biggest challenge in developing the framework? 
 Where does finalizing the framework figure into your organization’s current list of priori-
ties? 
 Did emerging transboundary obligations with the NWT impact the development of the 
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1 Death of a Delta: A Brief to 
Governments 
1970 Peace-Athabasca Delta 
Technical Committee 
      
2 Mackenzie River Basin Study 
Report 
1981 Environment Canada       
3 Northern Rivers Basin Study 
Report to the Ministers 
1996 Northern Rivers Basin 
Study Board 
      
4 Canada-Alberta-Northwest 
Territories Response to the 
Northern River Basins Study 
Report to the Ministers 1996 
1997 Government of Canada 
Government of Alberta 
Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
      
5 Peace-Athabasca Delta Technical 
Studies: Final Report 
1996 Peace Athabasca 
Technical Studies 
Committee 
      
6 Peace-Athabasca Delta Technical 
Studies: Recommendations 
1996 Peace Athabasca 
Technical Studies 
Committee 
      
7 Mackenzie River Basin 
Transboundary Waters Master 
Agreement 
1997 Government of Canada 
Government of Alberta 




Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
Government of the 
Yukon 
      
8 News Release: The Mackenzie 
River Basin Transboundary 
Waters Master Agreement 
1997 Government of British 
Columbia 
    
9 MRBB History: History of 
Intergovernmental Cooperation 
2010 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
      
10 Report to the Ministers 2004-
2006 
2006 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
12 Report to the Ministers 2006-
2007 
2007 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
13 Report to Ministers April 1, 
2007-March 31 2012 
2012 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
14 Report to Ministers 2012-2013 2013 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
15 Report to the Ministers 2013-
2014 
2014 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
16 Mackenzie River Basin State of 
the Aquatic Ecosystem Report 
2003 
2003 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
17 Mackenzie River Basin Board’s 2012 Mackenzie River Basin      
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2012 Issues Report Board 
18 Strategic Plan 2006 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
19 Bilateral Water Management 
Agreements Guidance Document 
2009 Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
20 Towards a New Current of 
Thought: Best Practices for 
Gathering and Incorporating 
Traditional Knowledge into 
Environmental Monitoring and 
Assessment 
2012 Mark Stevenson, 
Prepared for the 






      
21 Traditional Knowledge and 
Strengthening Partnerships 
(TK/P) Steering Committee 
Terms of Reference 
No 
Date 
Mackenzie River Basin 
Board 
     
22 Defining a Role for the 
Mackenzie River Basin Board: A 
Review of Key Considerations 
and Options 
2000 Canadian Institute of 
Resources Law, prepared 
for the Mackenzie River 
Basin Board 
     
23 Prior Notification and 
Consultation Requirements in the 
Management of Transboundary 
Water Basins 
2000 Canadian Institute of 
Resources Law, prepared 
for the Mackenzie River 
Basin Board 
     
24 Alberta-Northwest Territories 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Bilateral Water Management 
Agreement Negotiations 
2007 Alberta Environment 
GNWT Environment and 
Natural Resources 
Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada 
      
25 British Columbia-Alberta 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Bilateral Water Management 
Agreement Negotiations 
2005 Alberta Environment 
British Columbia 
Ministry of Water, Land 
and Air Protection 
      
26 Yukon-Northwest Territories 
Transboundary Water 
Management Agreement 
2002 Government of Yukon 
Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
Government of Canada 
     
27 Draft Statement of Options 
regarding the NWT-Alberta 
Bilateral Transboundary Water 
Agreement 
2012 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
     
28 NWT Preliminary Interest 
Statements 
2012 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
     
29 NWT Negotiating Principles for 
the NWT-Alberta Bilateral 
Transboundary Water Agreement 
2012 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
     
30 Transboundary Water 2015 Government of the      
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Management Agreements Update Northwest Territories 
31 FAQ: Intentions Documents for 
Northwest Territories–British 
Columbia and Northwest 
Territories-Alberta Bilateral 
Water Management Agreements  
2014 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
     
32 Summary of Differences in the 
NT-AB BWMA and NT-BC 
BWMAs 
2014 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
     
33 Mackenzie River Basin Bilateral 
Water Management Agreements 
Between the Government of 
Alberta and the Government of 
the Northwest Territories 
2015 Government of Alberta 
Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
      
34 Appendices: Mackenzie River 
Basin Bilateral Water 
Management Agreements 
Between the Government of 
Alberta and the Government of 
the Northwest Territories 
2015 Government of Alberta 
Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
      
35 Mackenzie River Basin Bilateral 
Water Management Agreement 
Between the Government of 
British Columbia and the 
Government of the Northwest 
Territories 
2015 Government of British 
Columbia 
Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
      
36 Appendices: Mackenzie River 
Basin Bilateral Water 
Management Agreement Between 
the Government of British 
Columbia and the Government of 
the Northwest Territories 
2015 Government of British 
Columbia 
Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
      
37 Landmark Transboundary Waters 
Agreement to Monitor 
Downstream Impacts of Tar 
Sands Development 
2014 Natural Resources 
Defence Council 
      
38 BC-Alberta Bilateral Agreement 
and the Site C Dam 
2010 Alberta Environment       
39 Canada’s Great Basin: Presumed 
Abundance and Revealed Neglect 
in the Mackenzie Watershed 
2011 Walter & Duncan 
Gordon Foundation 
      
40 Northern Lifeblood: Empowering 
Northern Leaders to Protect the 
Mackenzie River Basin from Oil 
Sands Risks 
2010 Pembina Institute       
41 Back to the Mack: The fight for 
the northern headwaters of 
Canada’s longest river system 
continues 
2014 The Walrus (Chris 
Wood) 
      
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42 Rosenberg International Forum -  
The Mackenzie River Basin: 
Report of the Rosenberg 
International Forum’s Workshop 
on Transboundary Relations in 
the Mackenzie River Basin 
2013 Rosenberg International 
Forum on Water Policy 
      
43 Resolving Water Use Conflicts: 
Insights from the Prairie 
Experience for the Mackenzie 
River Basin 
2012 C.D. Howe       
44 Managing the Mackenzie: 
Negotiating a Future with the 
Basin in Mind 
2012 Canadian Institute of 
Resources Law 
      
45 Special Edition: Water 
Management in the Northwest 
Territories 
2011 FLOW Monitor       
46 The Real Wealth of the 
Mackenzie Region: Assessing the 
Natural Capital Value of a 
Northern Boreal Ecosystem 
2009 Canadian Boreal 
Initiative 
      
47 Keeping the Peace II: Draft 
Watershed Plan 
2007 Keepers of the Water       
48 Resolution 2007 Keepers of the Water       
49 Elders’ Resolution 2007 Keepers of the Water       
50 Declaration – One Land One 
People 
2012 Keepers of the Water      
51 Water Restrictions on the 
Athabasca River and Impacts to 
First Nation and Metis 
Communities 
2015 Keepers of the Water      
52 To Add Wood Buffalo National 
Park to Endangered World 
Heritage Sites List: Mikisew Cree 
First Nation Petitions UNESCO 
2014 Mikisew Cree First 
Nation 
Canadian Parks and 
Wilderness Society 
      
53 Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage - World 
Heritage Committee, Thirty-ninth 
Session 




      
54 Treaty 8 First Nations File 
Lawsuits to Protect Sacred Lands, 
Stop Site C Dam 
2015 West Coast 
Environmental Law 
     
55 Securing Environmental Flows in 
the Athabasca River 
2011 World Wildlife Fund 
Canada 
    
56 Canada’s Rivers at Risk 2010 World Wildlife Fund 
Canada 
     
57 Press Release: Surface Water 
Quantity Management 
2015 Alberta Wilderness 
Association 
    
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58 Letter, re: Surface Water Quantity 
Management Framework for the 
Athabasca River 
2014 Pembina Institute     
59 Athabasca River a Case Study in 
Oil Sands Development 
2013 Troy Media     
60 Oil and Troubled Waters: 
Reducing the Impact of the Oil 
and Gas Industry on Alberta’s 
Water Resources 
2003 Pembina Institute       
61 Oil Sands Fever: The 
Environmental Implications of 
Canada’s Oil Sands Rush 
2005 Pembina Institute     
62 Troubled Waters, Troubling 
Trends: Technology and Policy 
Options to Reduce Water Use in 
Oil and Oil Sands Development 
in Alberta 
2006 Pembina Institute     
63 Down to the Last Drop: The 
Athabasca River and Oil Sands 
2006 Pembina Institute     
64 Running Out of Steam? Oil Sands 
Development and Water Use in 
the Athabasca-River Watershed 
2007 University of Alberta 
Environmental Research 
and Studies Centre 
    
65 Letter, Phase 2 Framework 
Committee Non-consensus Water 
Management Rules 
Recommendation 
2012 WWF-Canada     
66 Press release: Non Consensus on 
Water Withdrawal 
Recommendations for the Lower 
Athabasca River 
2010 WWF-Canada     
67 Toxic Liability: How Albertans 
Could End Up Paying for Oil 
Sands Reclamation 
2010 Pembina Institute     
68 Forecasting the Impacts of Oil 
Sands Expansion 
2013 Pembina Institute      
69 News Release: AWA Joins Lower 
Athabasca River Withdrawal 
Framework Process 
2008 Alberta Wilderness 
Association 
    
70 News Release: Athabasca River 
At Risk 
2010 Alberta Wilderness 
Association 
    
71 Behind the Oil Curtain- 
Athabasca River Monitoring and 
Tar Sands Development 
2010 Alberta Wilderness 
Association 
     
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72 Environmental Incidents in 
Northeastern Alberta’s Bitumen 
Sands Region 1996-2012 
2013 Treeline Ecological 
Research 
Global Forest Watch 
Canada 
     
73 In the matter of BC Hydro and in 
the matter of the Joint Review 
Panel for Site C Clean Energy 
Project: Written Submission 
2013 Yellowstone to Yukon 
Conservation Initiative 
    
74 Atlas of Land Cover, Industrial 
Land Uses and Industrial-caused 
Land Changes in the Peace 
Region of British Columbia 
2012 Global Forest Watch 
Canada 
    
75 In the matter of BC Hydro and in 
the matter of the Joint Review 
Panel for Site C Clean Energy 
Project: Final Argument 
2014 Yellowstone to Yukon 
Conservation Initiative 
    
76 Final Submission to the Site C 
Joint Review Panel 
2014 Clean Energy 
Association of British 
Columbia 
    
77 Submission of the Environmental 
Law Centre to the Alberta 
Utilities Commission Re: 
Regulatory Process for 
Hydroelectric Power Generation 
Development 
2010 Alberta Environmental 
Law Centre 
      
78 Letter to Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau and Premier Clark re: 
Site C Dam and the Human 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
the Peace Valley 
2015 Amnesty International     
79 This Was Our Valley 1989 Brush Education     
80 Taking the Reins: The Case for 
Slowing Alberta’s Bitumen 
Production 
2013 Parkland Institute       
81 Total Joslyn North Mine 2010 
Project Update Review 
2010 Bothe Consulting     
82 Surface Water Quantity 
Management Framework for the 
Lower Athabasca River 
2014 Aqua Environmental 
Associates 
    
83 Letter to Stacey Smythe, 
Consultation on the Surface 
Water Quantity Management 
Framework 
2014 Mikisew Cree First 
Nation Industry and 
Government Relations 
    
84 Letter to Minister Mel McKnight 
– Summary of Key Issues 




     
85 Request for Review of the Lower 2013 Athabasca Chipewyan     
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Athabasca Regional Plan First Nation 
86 Request for Review of the Lower 
Athabasca Regional Plan 
2013 Chipewyan Prairie Dene 
Industry Relations 
Corporation 
    
87 Request for Review of the Lower 
Athabasca Regional Plan 
2013 Fort McKay First Nation 
& Fort McKay Metis 
Community Association 
    
88 Proposal to Develop Athabasca 
Chipewyan First Nation and 
Mikisew Cree First Nation 
Traditional Land and Resource 
Use Management Plans 
2010 Athabasca Chipewyan 
First Nation 
Mikisew Cree First 
Nation 
    
89 Mikisew Cree First Nation 
Applauds UNESCO decision on 
Wood Buffalo National Park 
2015 Mikisew Cree First 
Nation 
      
90 Government and Industry 
Relations: Spring Newsletter 
2015 Miksiew Cree First 
Nation 
    
91 Update on MCFN Settlement 
Agreement regarding BC Hydro’s 
Site C Project 
2015 Mikisew Cree First 
Nation 
    
92 Review of Hydrologic & 
Geomorphic Downstream 
Impacts of Site C 
2012 Aqua Environmental 
Associates 
    
93 A Changing Way of Life: An 
Assessment of the Impacts of the 
W.A.C. Bennett Dam on the 
People of Fort Chipewyan and the 
Peace-Athabasca Delta 
1996 Stuart Adams & 
Associates 
      
94 Proposed Site C Clean Energy 
Project 
2013 James Freedman Kyle 
Law Corporation 
    
95 Draft EIS Guidelines for BC 
Hydro’s Proposed Site C Dam 
2012  James Freedman Kyle 
Law Corporation 
    
96 Environmental Impact Statement 
Guidelines for the Proposed Site 
C Project 
2012 James Freedman Kyle 
Law Corporation 
    
97 Submission to the BC 
Environmental Assessment Office 
and the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
2012 Deninu Kue First Nation     
98 Site C Project, Review and 
Comments on EIS Guidelines 
2012 Fort Chipewyan Metis 
Local 125 
    
99 Little Red River Comments on 
the draft BC Hydro 
Environmental Impact Statement 
Guidelines 
2012 Little Red River Cree 
First Nation 
    
100 Comments on the Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement 
Guidelines 
2012 Smith’s Landing First 
Nation 
    
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101 Comments on the Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement 
Guidelines 
2012 Treaty 8 Tribal 
Association 
    
102 Comments on Site C – Draft EIS 
Guidelines 
2012 Treaty 8 Tribal 
Association 
    
103 Site C Hydroelectric Project on 
the Peace River 
2012 Assembly of First 
Nations 
    
104 Site C – Submission on Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement 
2012 Deninu Kue First Nation     
105 Site C – Submissions on Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement 
2012 James Freedman Kyle 
Law Corporation 
    
106 Site C Clean Energy Project: 
Environmental Impact Statement 
Comments 
2012 Fort Chipewyan Metis 
Local 
    
107 BC Hydro’s Site C EIS – SLFN 
Comments 
2013 Smith’s Landing First 
Nation 
    
108 BC Hydro’s Site C EIS – 
Comments of the Treaty 8 First 
Nations 
2013 Treaty 8 Tribal 
Association 
    
109 Support for Treaty 8 First 
Nations’ Position Relating to the 
Proposed Site C Dam 
2013 First Nations Summit     
110 Athabasca Chipewyan First 
Nation Report on Peace River 
Knowledge and Use for BC 
Hydro’s Proposed Site C Project 




    
111 Final Submissions of Mikisew 
Cree First Nation and Athabasca 
Chipewyan First Nation to the 
Joint Review Panel – 
Environmental Assessment of the 
Proposed Site C Project 
2014 James Freedman Kyle 
Law Corporation 
      
112 Final Submissions to the Joint 
Review Panel Regarding the 
Environmental Assessment of the 
Proposed Site C Project 
2014 Deninu Kue First Nation       
113 Closing Comments 2014 Smith’s Landing First 
Nation  
      
114 Site C Clean Energy Project Joint 
Review Panel Hearings – 
Summary Report 
2014 Treaty 8 Tribal 
Association 
      
115 News Release: Approval of Site-
C Dam Project a Major Step 
Backwards in Provincial 
Government Relations with BC 
First Nations 
2014 First Nations Summit     
116 Steward Phillip: Trudeau 
Government Must Kill Site C 
Dam Project to Show it Cares 
2015 The Province     
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117 How Low Should We Go? 
Athabasca River Water Use 
2010 Suncor Energy     
118 Oil Sands Water Mining Water 
Management Agreement for the 
2012-2013 Winter Period 
2012 Oil Sands Developers 
Group 
    
119 Oil Sands Water Management 
Agreement for the 2014-2015 
Winter Period 
2014 Canadian Natural 
Resources Limited and 
others 
    
120 Backgrounder 2010 Cumulative 
Environmental 
Management Association 
    
121 BC Hydro Annual Report 2013 BC Hydro     
122 BC Hydro Annual Report  2014 BC Hydro     
123 Integrated Resource Plan: 
Meeting B.C.’s Future Electricity 
Needs 
2013 BC Hydro     
124 Environmental Impact Statement 
Executive Summary 
2013 BC Hydro       
125 Site C Clean Energy Project: 
Business Case Summary 
2014 BC Hydro     
126 Environmental Assessment of the 
Site C Clean Energy Project: 
Closing Submission of BC Hydro 
and Power Authority 
2014 BC Hydro       
127 Technical Memo – Peace-
Athabasca Delta 
2013 BC Hydro       
128 Technical Memo – Spatial 
Boundary Selection 
2013 BC Hydro       
129 Response to Dr. Carver’s Report 
filed by ACFN and MCFN on 
November 25, 2013 
2013 BC Hydro     
130 Response to Working Group and 
Public Comments on the Site C 
Environmental Impact Statement 
2013 BC Hydro     
131 Peace Water Use Plan Committee 
Report: Peace Water Use Plan 
2003 BC Hydro       
132 Athabasca Chipewyan First 
Nation Inquiry: WAC Bennett 
Dam and Damage to Indian 
Reserve 201 
1998 Government of Canada - 
Indian Claims 
Commission 
      
133 Water Act 1999 Government of Alberta       
134 Water for Life 2003 Government of Alberta       
135 Water for Life: A Renewal 2008 Government of Alberta       
136 Water for Life: Action Plan 2009 Government of Alberta       
137 Our Water, Our Future: A 
conversation with Albertans – 
2014 Government of Alberta       
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Summary of Discussions 
138 Our Water, Our Future 2014 Government of Alberta       
139 Alberta Land Stewardship Act 2009 Government of Alberta       
140 Lower Athabasca Regional Plan 
2012-2022 
2012 Government of Alberta       
141 Solving the Performance Puzzle; 
Lower Athabasca Regional Plan 
(LARP) Performance 
Backgrounder 
2012 Government of Alberta     
142 Surface Water Quantity 
Management Framework for the 
Lower Athabasca River 
2015 Government of Alberta     
143 Review of the Potential for 
Expanded Hydroelectric 
Production in Northern Alberta 
2013 Alberta –Standing 
Resource Committee on 
Resource Stewardship 
      
144 Oil Sands Conservation Act 2000 Government of Alberta     
145 Regional Sustainable 
Development Strategy for the 
Athabasca Oil Sands Area 
1999 Government of Alberta     
146 Regional Sustainable 
Development Strategy for the 
Athabasca Oil Sands Area: 
Progress Report 
2001 Government of Alberta     
147 Fort McMurray-Athabasca Oil 
Sands Subregional Integrated 
Resource Plan 
2002 Government of Alberta     
148 Mineable Oil Sands Strategy 2005 Government of Alberta     
149 Investing in our Future: 
Responding to the Rapid Growth 
of Oil Sands Development 
2006 Government of Alberta     
150 Athabasca River Water 
Management Framework: 
Alberta’s Regulatory Backstop to 
Protect the Athabasca River 
N.D. Government of Alberta     
151 Energy Strategy: Launching 
Alberta’s Energy Future 
2008 Government of Alberta     
152 Water Management Framework: 
Instream Flow Needs and Water 
Management System for the 
Lower Athabasca River 
2007 Alberta Environment 
Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans 
    
153 Statement of Concern Rejection 
of Oil Sands Environmental 
Coalition – Briefing Note 
2009 Alberta Environment     
154 Alberta’s Interests: the Site C 
Clean Energy Project 
2011 Government of Alberta       
155 Metis Elders Knowledge 
Gathering Workshop 
2012 Government of Alberta       
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156 Site C Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement Guidelines 
(letter from Robert Harrison to 
CEAA) 
2012 Government of Alberta     
157 Alberta’s Comments to Amended 
EIS Guidelines for Site C Project 
(letter from Robert Harrison to 
CEAA) 
2012 Government of Alberta     
158 Alberta’s Comments to the Site C 
EIS (letter from Robert Harrison 
to CEAA) 
2013 Government of Alberta     
159 Adequacy of the Site C EIS (letter 
from Robert Harrison to CEAA) 
2013 Government of Alberta     
160 Submission of Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of Alberta in 
Relation to B.C. Hydro and 
Power Authority’s Proposed Site 
C Clean Energy Project 
2013 Government of Alberta     
161 Closing Remarks of Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Alberta in 
Relation to B.C. Hydro and 
Power Authority’s Proposed Site 
C Clean Energy Project 
2014 Government of Alberta       
162 Operating Procedures for 
Influencing Freeze-Up and Break 
Up of the Peace River at the 
Town of Peace River, Third 
Edition 
2006 Alberta – British 
Columbia Joint Task 
Force on Peace River Ice 
      
163 Report of the Auditor General of 
Alberta 
2014 Auditor General of 
Alberta 
      
164 Report of the Commissioner of 
the Environment and Sustainable 
Development: Monitoring Water 
Resources 
2010 Auditor General of 
Canada 
      
165 Assessing Cumulative 
Environmental Effects of Oil 
Sands Projects 
2011 Auditor General of 
Canada 
      
166 Report of the Commissioner of 
the Environment and Sustainable 
Resource Development: 
Environmental Monitoring of Oil 
Sands 
2014 Auditor General of 
Canada 
      
167 Quenching the Peace-Athabasca 
Delta 
2005 Environment Canada       
168 Environment Canada Comments 
on the draft Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) 
Guidelines for the Proposed Site 
C Clean Energy Project 
2012 Environment Canada     
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169 Environment Canada Response to 
BC Hydro Responses to 
Government Agency Comments 
2012 Environment Canada     
170 Site C Clean Energy Project Draft 
EIS Guidelines Review Table 
2012 Parks Canada     
171 Site C Draft EIS Guidelines – 
PCA Comments re: BC Hydro 
Responses to Public, Aboriginal 
and Government Agency 
Comments 
2012 Parks Canada     
172 Site C Hydro Environment 
Impact Statement – Technical 
Review 
2013 Environment Canada     
173 Site C Clean Energy Project – 
Environment Canada Written 
Submission 
2013 Environment Canada       
174 Parks Canada Comments on the 
Site C Clean Energy Project 
Environmental Impact Statement 
2013 Parks Canada       
175 Adequacy of Responses to 
Information Requests/Comments 
Submitted by Parks Canada on 
the Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) for the Site C 
Clean Energy Project 
2013 Parks Canada     
176 Parks Canada’s Submission to the 
Joint Review Panel for BC 
Hydro’s Site C Clean Energy 
Project 
2013 Parks Canada       
177 Decision Statement Issued under 
section 54 of the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, 
2012 for the Site C Clean Energy 
Project 
2014 Government of Canada       
178 Minister Leona Aglukkaq, 
Minister of Environment, 
Statement on the Governor in 
Council’s Determination that the 
Environmental Effects of the 
Proposed Site C Project are 
Justified in the Circumstances 
2014 Government of Canada       
179 Federal/provincial Consultation 
and Accommodation Report: Site 
C Clean Energy Project 
2014 Government of Canada      
180 Response to the Environmental 
Assessment Report of the Joint 
Review Panel on the Kearl Oil 
Sands Project – Recommendation 
4 
2008 Government of Canada     
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181 Science Evaluation of Instream 
Flow Needs for the Lower 
Athabasca River 
2010 Government of Canada     
182 Parks Canada Agency Water-
related Role and Activities in the 
NWT and Northern Alberta 
2010 Parks Canada       
183 Wood Buffalo National Park of 
Canada Management Plan 
2010 Parks Canada     
184 Re: Jackpine Mine Expansion 
Project – Review of Adequacy of 
Environmental Assessment 
Information 
2011 Parks Canada      
185 A Foundation for the Future: 
Building an Environmental 
Monitoring System for the Oil 
Sands 
2010 Oil Sands Advisory 
Panel 
      
186 Joint Canada – Alberta 
Implementation Plan for Oil 
Sands Monitoring 
2012 Government of Canada 
Government of Alberta 
      
187 Managing the Cumulative Effects 
of Natural Resource Development 
in B.C. 
2015 BC Auditor General     
188 Environmental Impacts of Shale 
Gas Extraction 
2014 Council of Canadian 
Academies 
      
189 Site C Report & 
Recommendations to the 
Lieutenant Governor-in-Council 
1983 British Columbia 
Utilities Commission 
    
190 Clean Energy Act 2010 Government of British 
Columbia 
    
191 A Water Sustainability Act for 
B.C. – Legislative Proposal 
Overview 
2013 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
192 Water Sustainability Act 2014 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
193 Northeast Water Strategy: 
Ensuring the Responsible Use 
and Management of Northeast 
British Columbia’s Water 
Resources 
2015 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
194 British Columbia’s Natural Gas 
Strategy: Fueling B.C.’s 
Economy for the Next Decade 
and Beyond 
2012 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
195 Press Release: Site to Provide 
More Than 100 Years of 
Affordable, Reliable Clean Power 
2014 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
196 BC Government Questions and 
Answers – Site C FID – Clean 
2014 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
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197 Site C Granted Environmental 
Assessment Approval 
2014 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
198 Environmental Assessment 
Certificate #E14-02 
2014 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
199 EAO Executive Director’s 
Response to the Joint Review 
Panel Report for BC Hydro’s Site 
C Clean Energy Project 
2014 Government of British 
Columbia 
    
200 Press Release: B.C. and the 
Northwest Territories Sign 
Transboundary Water 
Management Agreement 
2015 Government of British 
Columbia 
      
201 25 Year Saskatchewan Water 
Security Plan 
2012 Government of 
Saskatchewan 
      
202 Water for Nature, Water for 
People – Yukon Water Strategy 
and Action Plan 
2014 Government of Yukon       
203 Highlights: Final Recommended 
Peel Watershed Regional Land 
Use Plan 
2011 Peel Watershed Planning 
Commission 
      
204 Yukon Government Response on 
the Recommended Peel 
Watershed Plan 
2012 Government of Yukon       
205 Moving Forward on Land Use 
Planning for the Peel Watershed 
Region 
2013 Government of Yukon       
206 Northern Voices, Northern 
Waters NWT Water Stewardship 
Strategy 
2010 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
      
207 NWT Water Stewardship 
Strategy Implementation Progress 
Report – April 2011- March 2013 
2013 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
    
208 ENR Update: Implementing the 
NWT Water Stewardship 
Strategy 
2011 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
    
209 NWT Water Stewardship 
Strategy Implementation 
Workshop – Summary Report 
2013 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
    
210 NWT-Wide Community Based 
Water Quality Monitoring 
Program 
2014 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
    
211 Enhancing Community-Based 
Aquatic Monitoring: Workshop 
Recommendations 
2011 Cygnus Environmental     
212 Water Strategy Report Card N.D. Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
    
213 Our Water, Our Life: Building 2011 Government of the      
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Partnerships to Assess the Health 
of the Slave River and Slave 
River Delta 
Northwest Territories 
Government of Canada 
214 State of the Knowledge of the 
Slave River and Slave River 
Delta 
2012 Pembina Institute; 
Prepared for the Slave 
River and Delta 
Partnership 
    
215 Personal communications 
regarding Slave River and Delta 
Partnership Funding 
2015 Name withheld to 
preserve anonymity 
    
216 Community-based Monitoring 
Funding Opportunities 
2012 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
    
217 We Care About Our Water  2012 Government of the 
Northwest Territories 
    
218 Report Summary: Slave River 
Water and Suspended Sediment 
Quality in the Transboundary 
Reach of the Slave River, 
Northwest Territories 
2012 Government of Canada       
219 Water and Suspended Sediment 
Quality of the Transboundary 
Reach of the Slave River, 
Northwest Territories 
2012 Government of Canada       
220 Water Science News – Peace-
Athabasca Delta Environmental 
Monitoring Program 
2010 Government of Canada     
221 Peace-Athabasca Delta 
Ecological Monitoring Program 
Update 
2013 One River News     
222 Obed Mountain Mine Process 
Water Release - Update 
2014 Government of Alberta     
223 Muskrat Monitoring in the Peace-
Athabasca Delta 
2015 Parks Canada     
224 Update: BC Hydro’s Proposed 
Site C Hydroelectric Project 
2014 Parks Canada      
225 The Flow: News From the Peace-
Athabasca Delta Ecological 
Monitoring Program – PADEMP 
Newsletter 
2014 Peace-Athabasca Delta 
Ecological Monitoring 
Program 
    
226 Maintaining Connections: 
Learning Through Monitoring in 
the Peace-Athabasca Delta 
2014 Parks Canada     
227 Peace-Athabasca Delta 
Ecological Monitoring Program 
Forum #3 Agenda 
2015 Parks Canada     
228 Personal communications 
regarding PADEMP funding 
2015 Name withheld to 
preserve anonymity 
    
229 Peace-Athabasca Delta 2013 Parks Canada     
 165 






Ecological Monitoring Program 
Backgrounder 
230 State of the Watershed 2015 Mighty Peace Watershed 
Alliance 
     
231 Terms of Reference for the Peace 
and Slave Watershed Integrated 
Watershed Management Plan 
2015 Mighty Peace Watershed 
Alliance 
    
232 Traditional Knowledge Overview 
for the Athabasca River 
Watershed 
2011 Brenda Parlee      
233 Athabasca River Instream Flow 




    
234 Instream Flow Needs Screening 
Study – Delta Region Lower 
Athabasca River Literature 





– Dillon Consulting 
Limited 
    
235 CEMA In-stream Flow Needs 
Determination Workshop – 
Athabasca River 
2005 Watershed System 
Group, Inc. 
    
236 Estimating Effects of Water 
Withdrawals from the Lower 
Athabasca River IFNTTG Final 
Report 
2010 Laughing Water Arts & 
Science, Inc. 
    
237 Lower Athabasca River Phase 2 
Water Management Framework – 
Process Guidelines 
2008 Compass Resource 
Management 
    
238 Surface Oil Sands Water 
Management Summary Report 
2005 Alberta Technology and 
Science, Inc. 
 
    
239 Phase 2 Framework Committee 
Report 




    
240 As Long as the Rivers Flow: 
Athabasca River Use, Knowledge 
and Change 
2010 Firelight Group Research 
Cooperative, with the 
Athabasca Chipewyan 
First Nation 
     
241 Press Release: CEMA’s 
Recommendations for Water 




    
242 Decision 2004-009 2004 Government of Alberta 
Government of Canada 
(Joint Review Panel) 
    
243 EUB Decision 2004-005 2004 Government of Alberta     
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Government of Canada 
(Joint Review Panel) 
244 EUB Decision 2006-126 2006 Government of Alberta 
Government of Canada  
(Joint Review Panel) 
    
245 EUB Decision 2007-013 2007 Government of Alberta  
Government of Canada 
(Joint Review Panel) 
    
246 Report of the Joint Review Panel 
– Shell Canada Energy Jackpine 
Mine Expansion Project 
2013 Government of Alberta 
Government of Canada 
(Joint Review Panel) 
      
247 Report of the Joint Review Panel 
– Site C Clean Energy Project – 
B.C. Hydro and Power Authority 
2014 Government of British 
Columbia 
Government of Canada 
(Joint Review Panel) 
      
248 Participant Funding Program – 
Aboriginal Funding Envelope – 
Funding Review Committee’s 
Report on the Allocation of 
Federal Funds for the 
Environmental Assessment of the 
Site C Clean Energy Project 
2012 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
    
249 Participant Funding Program: 
Regular Funding Envelope – 
Funding Review Committee’s 
Report on the Allocation of 
Federal Funds for the 
Environmental Assessment of the 
Site C Clean Energy Project 
2012 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
    
250 3
rd
 revision (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 1: December 
9, 2013, Fort St. John, British 
Columbia 
2013 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
251 3
rd
 revision (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 2: December 
10 2013, Fort St. John, British 
Columbia 
2013 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
   
252 Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 3: December 
11, 2013, Fort St. John, British 
Columbia 
2013 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
    
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Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
253 Revised Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 4: December 
12, 2013 – General Session, Fort 
St. John, British Columbia 
2013 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
254 Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 6: December 
13, 2013 – General Session – 
Hudson’s Hope, British Columbia 
2013 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
255 Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 8: December 
16, 2013 – West Moberly 
Community Session 
2013 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
256 Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 15: January 9 
2014 – General Hearing Session 
in Dawson Creek, British 
Columbia 
2014 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
257 Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 14: January 8, 
2014: General Public Hearing 
Session in Dawson Creek, British 
Columbia 
2014 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
258 Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 16: January 10 
2014 General Hearing Session in 
Peace River, Alberta 
2014 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
259 Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 17: January 
10, 2014 Day 1 – Topic-Specific 
Session Aquatic and Downstream 
Environment in Peace River, 
2014 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
    
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Alberta Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
260 Final  (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 18: January 
11, 2014 – Day 2 of the Topic-
Specific Session Aquatic and 
Downstream Environment in 
Peace River, Alberta 
2014 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
261 Final (Certified) Hearing 
Transcript Volume 28: January 
23, 2014 Close of Hearing, Fort 
St. John, British Columbia 
2014 Government of Canada – 
Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
Government of British 
Columbia – British 
Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Office 
    
262 The Sixty-Storey Crisis: The 
Story Behind BC Hydro’s Worst 
Nightmare 
1999 B.C. Business Magazine      
263 Alberta Natives Vow to Fight Site 
C 
2005 Vancouver Sun       
264 Help Needed on Fish Health 
Study 
2011 Slave River Journal     
265 River Health Monitoring Plan 
Needs Local Input 
2011 Slave River Journal     
266 Council Compiling Slave/Peace 
Watershed Report 
2013 Northern Journal     
267 Paddle Power 2013 Alaska Highway News     
268 Treaty 8 Opposes Site C Legacy 
Deal 
2013 Alaska Highway News     
269 B.C. Hydro’s Site C Dam Faces 
Fiscal, Regulatory Minefield 
2013 Globe & Mail     
270 Site C to Top Next B.C. 
Government’s Energy Agenda 
2013 The Northern Journal     
271 PRRD Shares Concerns Over Site 
C 
2013 Alaska Highway News     
272 New Study Launched on Slave 
River 
2013 Northern News Services     
273 Anxiety over Site C Running 
Deep in Alberta and NWT 
2013 Globe & Mail       
274 Alberta Aboriginals Oppose B.C. 
Hydro’s Site C Dam Project 
2013 The Canadian Press       
275 B.C. Hydro Underestimating Site 
C Dam’s Impact, Environment 
Canada Says 
2013 Globe & Mail     
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276 Last First Nation Withdraws from 
Joint Oil Sands Monitoring 
Program 
2014 Sweetgrass News      
277 Looking For Answers in the 
Rivers of the Great Slave Basin 
2014 WWF-Canada       
278 First Nation Challenges to 
Hydroelectric Development – A 
Tale of Two Provinces 
2014 Wilmms & Shier 
Environment Aboriginal 
Energy Law 
    
279 Researchers, Public Network at 
Slave River Open House 
2015 The Northern Journal     
280 NWT, Alberta Ink “Unparalleled” 
Water Management Deal 
2015 My Yellowknife Now       
281 Head of Review Panel Repeats 
Call for Delay to B.C. Hydro’s 
Site C 
2015 Globe & Mail     
282 B.C. Government Should Have 
Deferred Site C Dam Decision, 
Says Chair of Joint Review Panel 
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